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ABSTRACT
The objective of this study was to examine 
Remarque's Weltanschauung as expressed through his 
novels.
Remarque sees the world negatively when he 
regards it as a whole. This all-encompassing world, 
the macrocosm, is defined by two basic factors: the
evil side of man's nature, and the existence of death.
The world, as Remarque views it, is not ruled according 
to a divine plan but is a world of man's own making. 
Because man has been unable to keep in check his 
tendencies for committing evil, he has brought about the 
events which characterize the first half of the twentieth 
century: two world wars and their accompanying ramifica­
tions. Remarque delineated these events and pictured 
man's inhumanity to man, unfathomable in extent and depth. 
Whereas there is some ray of hope— however subliminal—  
that man may eventually overcome his inclination for evil, 
the second factor contributing to Remarque's pessimistic 
world view cannot be ameliorated, for death can never be 
conquered. For Remarque, death is an abstraction and it 
is a reality; in both cases it marks the mortality of man 
and the end of the self in its present form. Knowledge
v
of death colors the world of man with a sense of 
transitoriness and futility, and forces him to question 
the meaning and purpose of life.
In contrast, when Remarque regards the world in 
its detail and component parts, he views it positively.
It is here, in man's private world, in the microcosm, 
where primitive impulses are satisfied, where a degree 
of genuine humanity exists, and where real love adds a 
new dimension to life. His heroes create their own 
"Insel des Glucks" from which they derive a sense of 
personal triumph over the chaotic world in which they 
must live. In spite of all they must witness and 
personally suffer and endure, they are imbued with an 
immense desire to live. Life itself is sweet despite 
its brevity and vicissitudes.
Remarque's heroes are members of the "lost genera­
tion." They are unable, even unwilling, to forget the 
events of the past which have inflicted such horrific 
damage to their world, and ultimately they put their 
life in the service of fighting against the evil they 
have witnessed. If there is hope for mankind, it can 
only come from the individual, for only the individual 
displays a sense of responsibility for his actions and 
gives evidence of a social conscience, qualities which 
are in danger of dissipating when he is absorbed by the
vi
amorphous mass, as happens in times of war.
The background of this study examines sociolog­
ical approaches to literature since all Remarque's novels 
are social novels depicting society and societal relation­
ships, and it analyzes the historical and philosophical 
considerations which have contributed to the particular 
formation of Remarque's world view.
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INTRODUCTION
It is the purpose of this dissertation to examine 
Remarque's Weltanschauung as it is expressed through his 
novels. More specifically, I will examine how Remarque 
regards and evaluates the world, what— if any— meaning 
he derives from it and how he views man's position in 
the world. It is my contention that Remarque does not 
consciously put forth a cosmology but that a comprehensive 
conception of the world becomes apparent when analyzing 
his work.
Remarque's novels are social novels. An examina­
tion of social and sociological approaches to literature 
will make clear the artistic purposes and goals which 
such novels presume. Social literature directs its 
attention to man's social world. It depicts society and 
societal relationships, raises questions about man's 
contemporary situation and interprets what it observes.
It identifies the values and anxieties of man and relates 
them to the historical climate from which they derive.
Remarque's concern rests with mid-twentieth century 
man. His heroes have witnessed two world wars, a world­
wide economic crisis and Hitler's efficient murder machine. 
To fully understand the emotional trauma which characterizes
viii
his heroes and to understand the precarious situation 
in which they find themselves, I will examine those 
occurrences and factors which are responsible for them. 
To that end, I will delineate the historical events of 
that time and trace the philosophical currents which 
have shaped its mood. Man is a historical creature; 
whatever he proves to be is determined to a large degree 
by* the particular events and the culture of his time.
The literary and philosophical movement of existential­
ism which grew out of the catastrophes of the twentieth 
century presents a view of human existence and reflects 
man's threatened state; it operates in contemporary 
society under the pressures of contemporary events and 
moods.
Having established a frame of reference for 
Remarque's novels and for his evolving world-view, I 
shall determine those factors which cause Remarque to 
perceive the world in largely negative terms. These 
factors lie in the macrocosm. Two basic causes are 
recognizable to which all others may be correlated: 
man's evil nature and the recognition of death. As 
becomes apparent through Remarque's heroes, man has 
not yet been able to overcome his tendency to commit 
evil and continues to bring upon himself calamities such 
as he witnessed in this century. Since the evidence 
bears out that the quality of evil is an inherent part
ix
of man's nature, the possibility for its eradication 
is subliminal at best. In the case of death, the 
outlook is even more grim. Since death can never be 
overcome, and since man must live with the recognition 
that death ends his existence unequivocally, he is 
imbued with a sense of transitoriness and futility 
that tinctures his actions, his behavior and his 
relationships.
However, Remarque is not a total pessimist. 
Positive qualities in man's private world, in the 
microcosm, counteract the negative forces of the outer 
world to some degree. Nature, epicurean delights, 
friendship, love, the fact of simply being alive are 
the positive factors which invest his heroes with an 
appreciation for life. A sense of social responsibility 
takes them beyond the state of mere bons vivants.
Once the macrocosm and the microcosm have been 
defined and the elements analyzed which identify and 
characterize them, I shall then examine to what extent 
and with what degree of success the heroes adjust to 
their environment and to the difficulties confronting 
them. How do they reconcile themselves with an insen­
sitive cosmos, or do they even attempt to? How do 
they come to terms with their fate, or do they at all? 
Why do they not resort to suicide, since this is an
option open to them at all times but of which they 
make no use? By what code do they live that allows 
them to endure all they must endure? These are questions, 
which, when and if answered, will add a new dimension to 
Remarque's work.
xi
CHAPTER I
A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO LITERATURE
"Literature is synonymous with ’great’ books." 
"Literature refers to everything in print." "Literature 
refers to writings having excellence of form, writings 
having universal or permanent interest, or writings 
exhibiting great emotional effect." "Literature makes 
reference to a world of fiction and of the imagination."^
Such general formulations are not, of course, the 
only possible means of defining what literature is or what 
it perhaps may be, but the statements are symptomatic of 
the difficulty inherent in attempting to provide a satis­
factory description of the nature of literature, what it 
is, what it does, or what it is supposed to do— if anything.
No single definition will suffice, for a literary
work is, as Wellek said, a "highly complex organization of
a stratified character with multiple meanings and relation- 
2
ships" that does not lend itself to singular classification 
or narrow categorization. Literature's manner of verbal 
usage determines that complexity; in contrast to the clear
^These formulations are taken from Rene Wellek and 
Austin Warren, Theory of Literature (New York: Harcourt, 
1957), pp. 20-28.
2Ibid., p. 22.
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and universally understandable signs and symbols of the
language of science, literature employs a language which,
according to Wellek, "will appear in some ways deficient.
It abounds in ambiguities; it is . . . full of homonyms,
arbitrary or irrational categories . . . ; it is permeated
with historical accidents, memories, and associations. In
a word, it is highly 'connotative'. . . .  It has its
expressive side; it conveys the tone and attitude of the
. . . writer. And it does not merely state and express
what it says; it also wants to influence the attitude of
3
the reader, persuade him, and ultimately change him."
To determine those principles by which a writer 
might be guided when in the process of writing, we turn to 
literary criticism which has taken up the challenge of 
finding a frame of reference whereby these principles—  
perhaps only subconsciously active in the mind of the writer 
— may be elucidated. It recognizes four major points of 
reference: (1) the literary product itself, (2) the 
creator of that product, (3) the subject matter or content, 
and (4) the reader. According to Abrams, they are elements 
in "almost all theories which aim to be comprehensive."^
3Ibid., p. 23.
4
M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the L a m p : Romantic 
Theory and the Critical Tradition (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), p. 6.
3For purposes of interpretation, analysis, and appraisal, 
the critic may focus on any one or a combination of these 
factors.
Given these potential bases for interpretation, a 
literary work can, first of all, be regarded from the point 
of view of "what it is," as a door is first of all a 
door. When its primary function has lapsed, it may acquire 
a secondary use, which, in the case of the door, may be a 
tabletop. Initially, however, every object can stand on 
its own; in principle, it can be regarded as an autonomous 
whole, a self-sufficient entity existing in isolation from 
all external points of reference and being judged solely 
by its parts in their internal relations. Secondly, 
literary works can be explained in relation to the 
particular creative powers of their author, as owing their 
existence to "the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings," 
as Wordsworth has stated. According to this theory, the 
writer’s thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and desires give 
rise to impulses which in turn seek expression. The third 
major orientation expounds the idea that art is essentially 
an imitation of life, an imitation not of essences but of 
the world of appearances. This concept remained prominent 
through the eighteenth century and was expressed succinctly 
by Lessing, who said: " ’Nachahmung’ is still for the poet
the attribute which constitutes the essence of his art.""* 
The fourth and last perspective puts primary emphasis on 
the audience. Its specific purpose is to achieve a certain 
effect, a requisite response, in the reader. Based on this 
theory, a literary work is chiefly a means to an end, and 
its value depends on how successfully its goal of getting 
something done is being realized.
Literary works bring these four elements into* close 
relationship but with various degrees of emphasis and, 
as Abrams observes, with "a discernible orientation
g
toward one only." Since writers do not deliberately and 
consistently adhere to critically defined categories, much 
depends on the w r i t e r ’s own perception of the role of the 
artist and on his sense of responsibility or indifference 
to the needs or expectations vis-S-vis his audience.
The task lies with the reader and the critic to extract 
from particular works that which the writer— more or less 
consciously— expressed in them. And just as the writer had 
available to him a number of options from which to evolve 
his personal approach to writing— be it, as we have seen,
^Gotthold E. Lessing, Laokoon, ed. W. G. Howard, 
pp. 99-102, cited by M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the L a m p : 
Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), p. 13.
^Abrams, ££. c i t ., p. 6.
l ’art pour l'art, the mimetic, the didactic, or the
expressive orientation— so the reader and critic likewise
may choose one of several approaches, keeping in mind,
however, that any extrinsic study must be augmented by an
intrinsic one: verification in all cases must come from
the works themselves. Among the available options, the
reader or critic may, for example, employ a biographical
approach whereby a literary work is explained in terms of
the personality and life of the writer; or he may pursue a
psychological direction developing either a psychological
study of the writer, of the creative process, or of the
psychological effects upon the reader. An extrinsic study
might also be conceived of philosophically, treating the
literary work froin a specifically economic or political
point of view, or from a metaphysical or theoretical,
aesthetic perspective. Finally, a work of literature
might be shown to manifest a sociological approach
examining society, social institutions and social relation- 
7
ships. To a large extent, the particular method of 
analysis to be selected depends on the interest of the 
reader or critic, but to a certain degree also on the work 
as such. Not every work lends itself with equal advantage
7
These are the extrinsic approaches to the study of 
literature as cited by Wellek and Warren, o p . c it., 
pp. 73-135.
to every kind of study: a poem which is seemingly
created to exist as an independent aesthetic object may 
provide little additional insight if analyzed from a 
sociological point of view, while, similarly, a work with 
strong sociological or political implications might yield 
better results if analyzed with the aid of other than 
aesthetic considerations. A logical, persuasive connection 
must be made between a literary work and the method of 
investigation.
For our purposes, the bulk of the discussion must 
necessarily come from the sociological direction since all 
the works to be considered in this treatise are governed by 
ideological factors emanating from society and societal 
relationships. This analysis gives particular emphasis 
to those aspects which relate to man and his various settings. 
Literature does not operate in a vacuum; it occurs in a 
precise social context and as part of the culture; its 
creations are a social act as well as a social product; they 
are rooted in and grow out of the parent social body. 
Indubitably, the influences which bring them into existence 
are there, but they are difficult to identify for we are not 
dealing, as in the sciences, with isolated physical phenomena 
which can be fitted precisely within some cause-and-effect 
pattern; in literature this relationship is much more 
subtle. If the critic succeeds, however, in determining the 
influences upon a given work and in recognizing the
relationship between that work and the world in which it 
is rooted, then a picture of social reality and a social 
document of the time can be abstracted from it.
When used as a social document, literature can be
0
made to yield the outlines of social history. Throughout 
history, writers have taken their cue from the times in 
which they lived: in Meier Helmbrecht we are presented
with an account of the threatened feudal order reflecting 
a shift in society; Grimmelshausen, in Simplizissimus, 
depicts the chaos of the Thirty-Year War; Lessing, in his 
Minna von Barnhelm, reflects the ethical and political 
climate of the age of Frederick the Great and the Seven- 
Year War, while in Emilia Galotti he presents the moral 
corruption of the princely representatives of absolutism. 
The tragic plight of the middle class and its desperate 
struggle against aristocratic oppression are vividly 
portrayed in Schiller's Kabale und Liebe, while Theodor 
Fontane describes the social transformations which were 
taking place in his Prussian homeland in the late 
nineteenth century. A similar series of social pictures 
could be assembled from the literatures of other countries, 
for each one has its social history and its literary 
documents. Examples could be multiplied indefinitely. One
8Ibid., p. 103
could assemble and posit the 
Importance each gives to 
to war, to soldiers, 
delineation of clergymen, 
Important and true about 
Since the time of Plato, 
been regarded as the mirror 
reflection of nature holding up 
mirrour of manners and of life, 
and vital part of man's culture,
8
of each writer, the 
marriage, to business, 
to illness, or to the 
something both 
surroundings. 
that is, art, has 
a looking glass, a 
the reader a "faithful 
Literature is an extant 
an apparatus for viewing 
One of its great values 
the expressive symbols 
things about that culture 
According to Wilson, "litera­
ls enmeshed in the 
underlies the stability 
once a product of human 
It is a primary
the
1979),
the world and man's place in it. 
lies in the fact that a reading of 
of a culture can reveal important 
and its social environment, 
ture Clike most facets of culture! 
curiously circular pattern that 
of social arrangements. It is at 
beings and an influence upon them." 
source of knowledge about man and society and has most 
faithfully delineated humanity's central concerns since
9Ibid., p. 32.
"^Robert N. Wilson, The Writer as Social Seer 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
p. 9.
"world" 
love and 
to refugees,
and discover 
one's social 
literature, 
of life, 
to
beginning of time. It communicates images, sensations 
or ideas from man to other men; it is the essence of human 
intercourse. Again and again man turns to it as a source 
of information and in a quest to discover how other men 
live or have lived.
Although the relationship between literature and 
society has a long history, the deliberate treatment of 
that connection dates only back to the nineteenth century. 
Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893) is generally regarded as the 
founder of the sociology of literature. Taine's theories 
are firmly connected with the positivistic philosophy of 
Auguste Comte who postulated that all knowledge is 
confined to that which can be observed, and that sociology, 
the last of the sciences to be developed, must and can 
adhere to the same principles as do the physical and 
natural sciences. Taine applied this theory to literature. 
He wanted to submit literary works to the same research 
methods as were employed by the other sciences. He 
believed that literature and art, like science, neither 
comdemn nor pardon, but merely state and explain facts. He 
was convinced that a literature based on the positivistie 
approach could become a valid source of information and 
documentation, a necessary product of human activity, no 
less important and meaningful than any other human activity. 
He saw its great value in the fact that it could be used to 
reconstruct and understand present and past ages, for, as
10
Allen explains Taine's theory, literature was "like 
fossils imprinted by a once-living organism in sand 
before it had hardened into s t o n e . " ^  In positivism, 
the standard of excellence is based on the fidelity 
with which the writer adheres to observable facts.
Great artists are those who are dispassionate observers, 
recording without the admission of any subjective 
sentiment.
Taine was, however, not the first person to 
recognize the value of a sociological approach to literary 
analysis. Early attempts at a sort of proto-sociological 
interpretation of literature are evident in the writings 
of J. G. Herder and Madame de Stael, among others. Herder 
had argued that "each work of literature was rooted in a 
certain social and geographical environment where it per­
formed specific functions and that there was no need for
..12
any judgement of value: everything is as it had to be.
Madame de Stael took a further step in this direction by 
acknowledging the importance of such elements as climate, 
geography and national spirit, and by recognizing the 
important influence of religion, customs, and law upon
■^Gay W. Allen and Harry H. Clark, Literary 
Criticism: Pope to Croce (Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, 1962), p. 479.
12
Diana T. Laurenson and Alan Swingewood, The 
Sociology of Literature (New York: Schocken Books,
1972), p. 26.
11
literature. But Herder and Madame de Stael developed 
no systematic theories incorporating their views; in 
fact, they did not go much beyond the vague generalities 
of even earlier writers who had espoused— if somewhat 
haphazardly— a correlation between literature and social 
structure. The first systematic development of a social 
interpretation of literature was left to Taine. Through 
his efforts, the field of literary analysis was signifi­
cantly expanded to deal with the social aspects of life 
and man in a coherant fashion. Its major limitation at 
that point was that it restricted its investigation to 
externals.
But this limitation has been overcome. Just as 
literature is, or can be, more than a social document, 
so literary criticism is, or can be, more than an inter­
pretation based strictly on external factors. If all 
that could have been expected from literature were a 
documentary report, both sociology and history, whose 
prerogative is also the study of man and his surroundings, 
would better be able to document man's situation— present 
and past— by pursuing an even more scientific and 
systematic approach: sociology would provide us with a
scientific, objective study of man in society, while 
history would give us the record of the actions of mankind. 
And although these three fields of investigation deal in
12
much Che same economic, social, and political textures, 
literature proceeds to capture— or at least attempts to 
capture— the essence of man and life once the externals 
of social documentation and social history have been laid 
bare. Ultimately, literary analysis does the same: it
penetrates the surfaces of social life and puts its stress
on internals as much as on externals.
13Among the social theorists today, it is, in 
particular, Alan Swingewood who argues for a revival of 
a social analysis of literature--somewhat along the line 
expressed by Taine's thought, but ultimately stepping 
beyond the limitations imposed by his theory. Swingewood 
contends that just as there is a sociology of religion, or 
a sociology of education, or of politics, or social change, 
so there is a need for a sociology of literature. As the 
term sociology of literature itself indicates, we are 
dealing here with a combination of two separate— and what 
many critics consider to be incongruous--fields of investi­
gation. Swingewood maintains, however, that sociology and 
literature are not two wholly distinct disciplines, but 
that, at their most basic level, they share a similar
We could also identify them as literary social 
analysts or sociologists of literature. For our purposes, 
the terms may be used interchangeably.
13
perspective: both are pre-eminently concerned with man's
social world and with his adaptation to it, and they com-
14
plement each other in their attempt to understand society. 
Swingewood's point is well taken. All too frequently, we 
have fostered narrowness of vision whereas we should have 
directed our efforts toward widening our scope and incor­
porating the knowledge of other domains— of at least those 
which are similarly oriented--into our investigations.
Swingewood is in agreement with those theorists who 
contend that literature should be subject to the same kinds 
of inquiry as are the traditional social sciences, and that 
the depiction of a particular historical setting or back­
ground not only is a desirable and interesting by-product 
in a literary work, but is, in fact, a crucial ingredient. 
These propositions do not, of course, constitute a departure 
from past efforts to explain man and his position. The 
newness of his proposal and that of other similarly-minded 
theorists lies in the attempt to overcome the external 
limitations of the past.
Today's social theorists believe that when the 
actions of man are described against a particular historical 
background, man can then be portrayed in depth. They do not 
restrict thenrse'lves to a description or explanation of man's
14Ibid., p. 13.
14
surroundings, his actions and behavior. Although these 
factors are essential elements in their effort to arrive 
at a "total" interpretation and analysis of a literary 
work, they do not confine themselves to them, but, in 
addition, enter the inner world of man. They identify 
the values, the aspirations, anxieties, and hopes of man, 
and relate them to the historical climate from which they 
derive. Their main purpose is to discover the "core of 
meaning" in literary works and to reveal the central 
problem with which man has been concerned at various times. 
To that end, externals are to be delineated and explicated 
because it is the externals which are ultimately responsible 
for shaping m a n ’s inner life; they are the fertile ground 
on which the sentiments and attitudes which man exhibits—  
and the writer expresses— develop. On the basis of the 
writer's observations., his work may become, in the words 
of Swingewood, "one of the most effective sociological 
barometers of the human response to social f o r c e s , " ^  but 
it is on the level of values, as Swingewood contends, 
that literature reinforces and illuminates purely socio­
logical material.
The appeal and applicability of the sociological
15Ibid., p. 17.
15
approach to the present study on Remarque derives from 
the focus of that approach. Social literature not only 
asks the question "what happened," but also "what was 
the effect of it happening." Lowenthal, one of the 
distinguished writers in the field of social inter­
pretation of literature, maintains that it is in the area 
of attitude and feeling that social literature excels.
He states that "man is born, strives, loves, suffers, and 
dies in any society, but it is the portrayal of how he 
reacts to these common human experiences that matters.
. . Nothing can show better than literature the
ways in which men and women subjectively experience 
society. And since the feeling which man has about his 
society is a sound indicator of what that society is, 
no one concerned with human society can afford to ignore 
the literary consciousness and the "literary witness," 
as Richard Hoggart phrased it. Hoggart points out that 
"without the full literary witness . . . the student of 
society will be blind to the fullness of s o c i e t y . " ^
16
Leo Lowenthal, Literature and the Image of M a n : 
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1900 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), ill.
^ L a u r e n s o n  and Swingewood, ££. c i t ., p. 13.
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The social critic concerns himself with the w riter’s
vision of man within the universe. Seldom is m a n ’s
relationship to society, the interplay of man with his
fellow man and of man with his environment simple and
secure. M a n ’s private situation is ambivalent, to say
the least. And although it is a cliche to say that "man
is a social animal," this axiom clarifies and identifies
man's position instantaneously and lucidly. Man is, in
fact, both individual and social in nature. He is an
individual through and through: he is born alone; he
lives and decides alone; he dies alone, and much of his
"labor is spent in a never completely successful effort
18to close down the gap" of his separation. Each person
must find his own means of reconciling his separation with
his social instincts. Generally, society aids him in this
effort and provides him with the opportunities to satisfy
his need for social interaction, for social organization
and community of thought. For man is also social
through and through: "the conception that gives Chim3
existence, and the childbirth that brings ChimD into the 
19world" are social acts; the food that becomes his 
18
Alex Preminger (ed.), Princeton Encyclopedia of 
Poetry and Poetics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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19Ibid., p. 776.
physical substance, the language with which he thinks, 
decides, and perhaps rebels are given to him by his society 
No man can wholly reject his society; he may accept it 
genuinely and unequivocally, or he may lament and criticize 
but in every case, he is affected by it. Literature 
depicts this dichotomy of man's being and man's effort to 
reconcile his diverging tendencies. It raises questions, 
attempts answers; it contemplates man's fate and life in 
its totality; it interprets what it observes; it envisages 
the situation of man and of the writer separately and in 
solidarity.
Literature has dealt with the theme of human
experience in the past— in fact, that is its private
domain—  but it lacked in urgency, or as Robert Lovett
says in his essay Literature and Animal Faith, literature
was "usually of minor forms and subsidiary to so-called
20higher interests." Today it is eminently needed to
fill a void. Because theology and science, in which man
has put his faith in the past, have failed to sustain
man "in his sense of unique significance in the scheme 
21
of things," human experience is invested with a new and 
20
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University of Michigan Press, 1957), p. 10.
21Ibid., p. 10.
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compelling Importance. Man Is thrown back on his own 
experience and on his own resources from which to 
elicit values of living. Literature can aid him in 
this effort. To come to terms with this situation, 
and to find a value system that ensures survival and a 
degree of contentment in an age of crisis and catas­
trophe is an intimation of what literature can be.
True, it may be deficient in relaying ultimate truths, 
as philosophy can do; it may be deficient in relaying 
historical accuracy, as history can do; it may lack a 
systematic study for individual or collective behavior 
which sociology has; but it more than compensates for 
these deficiencies. Literature has its own reason for 
being. And in those areas which are its prerogative, 
it excels.
We have seen that writers may differ in their 
orientation. Depending on their individual view of the 
artist and his craft, they may also differ in their 
commitment to their art. Those writers with whom we are 
primarily concerned— those who exhibit a strong social 
inclination— are committed to truth and humanity; they 
bear the full burden of social responsibility, taking 
sides, as Sartre urged, "against all injustices wherever
19
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they may come from," launching their own crusade in 
behalf of exploited mankind. And, significantly, they 
work within their particular historical occurrences.
The situation of the writer today is as precarious 
as is that of man. His position at an earlier time 
when he took his seat on M t . Olympus, so to speak, from 
where he could oversee the whole and control his figures 
like marionettes, has been relinquished. The modern writer 
no longer enjoys such a secure vantage point. As is 
man about whom he writes, the modern writer feels equally 
alienated and equally cut off from his religious, meta­
physical, and transcendental roots; he is equally aware of 
the all-pervasive sense of uncertainty evident on all 
levels. The political events of the twentieth century have 
beset him with doubts as to the physical survival of his 
world, while psychoanalytical findings have shown him that 
man is not a totally rational being but is swayed and 
motivated by forces of which he is not aware and which he 
cannot control. The writer is particularly vulnerable to 
the cumulative loss of confidence and increased sense of 
frustration evident today, for his attunement and sen­
sitivity to his environment and to the mood and atmosphere 
of his time cause him to perceive them more acutely and
22
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intently. A writer is not a recluse residing alone in an 
aesthetic dwelling or ivory tower; on the contrary, he is 
part of the age in which he lives— more or less integrated 
within his society— but totally embedded in it. With the 
aid of his creative powers, he formulates his personal 
values in an effort to master a hostile environment and 
endure in a capricious social universe; he must, first of 
all, satisfy private demands and create what is of urgent 
importance to him; he must find an alternate lifestyle in 
a world devoid of meaning. He must grapple with the ever- 
changing problems of his personal adaptation to society.
He has become increasingly preoccupied with his own 
integrity, and increasingly aware of the forces which 
threaten it. The writer is, above all else, a questioner; 
he wants to find out how man should live and how he can 
live, what he owes to others, and what he owes to himself.
He does not take for granted a fixed model or a traditional 
set of values in a society that is characterized by flux 
and fluidity, but recognizes that it is up to the 
individual to determine his value system and procure his 
sense of identity. Wilson expresses these sentiments quite 
clearly when he states that "with the passing of traditional 
static societies . . . the individual has been thrown much 
more nearly on his own to make or define himself and is much 
less able to rely on the definitions earlier attached to a
2 3
fixed community position." In today’s society, shot 
through as it is with "confused values, rapid change, 
restlessness, and the rootlessness entailed by the loss 
of community,1,24 the individual must forge for himself 
a way of coping. He must construct a self. Constantly 
he is alerted to his "frightening freedom to choose" 
how to conduct himself. The possibilities of self- 
realization exist, but they carry with it the burden of 
responsibility. It is his existential dilemma.
23
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The situation of mankind in the twentieth century 
has been growing ever more urgent. Metaphysical 
certainties have been lost, and all that exists has 
become relative and doubtful. Technology, which man 
regarded initially as his ticket to utopia, may prove to 
be his nemesis instead. As the threat of nuclear war 
looms dangerously on the horizon, and as the events of 
the twentieth century continue to erode his faith in a 
rational world, man, who at one time felt himself to be 
the master of nature, has increasingly sensed his servility. 
He has become enslaved by the machine age; as a member of 
mass society he has been reduced to an object, a thing to 
be manipulated. He stands at the zenith of his techno­
logical successes and industrial achievements, looking 
down into an abyss, not sure if there is any hope for his 
survival.
In the medieval period, man had felt secure. It 
was a time of peaceful cooperation among all classes, an 
age of organic growth of culture, a harmonious society.
It was the Age of Faith. Final truths had already been 
written. Man was ruled by religion; he was like a child, 
playing under the watchful eyes of a benevolent God. A
22
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traveler on this earth, he used the present life to prepare 
for the next. He was guided by a Divine Will which 
directed his destiny according to a cosmic purpose. The 
world was fixed. Each person had his proper place, aim, 
and function within the established hierarchy. Knowledge 
was finite. Man was free to discover and create, as long 
as what he discovered and created conformed to the Holy 
Writ. Reason stood in the shadow of religion.
With the advent of the Enlightenment came the 
decline of the Age of Faith. A new awareness of the 
human potential for knowing emerged, and as man became 
conscious of an existence outside of the framework of 
religion, he increasingly disregarded medieval philo­
sophical postulates. Rationalism and humanitarianism 
became the characteristics of the age. Convinced that 
there was no higher authority than his own ability to 
understand, man put his faith in reason and in his own 
rationality. He believed that reason, based on scientific 
laws and discoveries could solve all human problems; he 
was convinced of the perfectability of human nature, and 
thought that perfection could be realized through universal 
application of reason; he was sure that no problem was 
beyond solution and no goal beyond his reach. He believed 
that the universe could function independently and lawfully 
according to purely physical causes and that man could know
24
the world without the help of God. Knowledge was 
infinite, and man recognized that the extent of his 
achievements was limited only by his own vision. Once 
he had the vision, he progressively mastered the 
exigencies of his life. He, in fact, had become his own 
master, and master of the world— or so he thought.
The immediate roots of twentieth century man lay 
deep in the nineteenth century, a most complex and 
diverse era. This was Europe’s golden age, but it was a 
time of ambivalent accomplishments. Francis Bacon's 
(1561-1626) slogan "Knowledge is Power " provided the 
cue for the unprecedented and unparalleled development of 
industry, technology, and science which characterizes 
the civilization of the "machine age." That era succeeded 
in fulfilling man's expectations to create more favorable 
living conditions for all and in placing within the reach 
of everyone a multitude of material goods and hitherto 
unheard-of satisfactions: an improved transportation and
communication system, the reduction of illiteracy, 
eradication of disease, and the extraordinary rise in the 
standard of living. The auspicious rise of science and 
technology shaped man's fundamental attitude of life during 
this time. The benefits to be derived from scientific and 
technological knowledge were believed to be limitless, and 
the spectacular successes achieved by such men of science
25
as Alexander von Humboldt, Heinrich Hertz, and Robert Koch, 
and of Max Planck, Paul Ehrlich, and Albert Einstein 
somewhat later elevated science to a cult. Many men and 
women became skeptical and uneasy about whatever could 
not be proved in the laboratory.
But the scientific and technological achievements 
did not yield the nirvana man had hoped for. Science, 
being amoral, has the dubious distinction of effecting 
both that which is good and that which is evil, that which 
is desirable and that which is undesirable equally. It 
was primarily by virtue of one extraordinary discovery in 
science in the second half of the nineteenth century that 
man was forced to revert to a more modest conception of 
his stature within the universe. As the result of the 
discoveries made by Charles Darwin (1809-1882), man had 
to abandon his self-propelled ascent toward unlimited 
heights and acknowledge his real position among all living 
things— a position less than sublime. In his first major 
work, The Origin of Species, Darwin put forth the thesis-- 
arrived at by means of the scientific method so character­
istic of the age— that all organic life was engaged in a 
struggle for existence and that survival of any species 
depended on its adaptability. Nature is not the benevolent 
and wise guide, but is instead a blind force leading to a 
struggle between life and death, between the survival and
26
extinction of each and every species. Darwin's theory of 
evolution destroyed the very sense of self-confidence and 
self-assurance which man had developed so laboriously, and 
successfully, over the past 300 years. How was he to 
cope with the realization that he was not the epitome of 
living organisms, and not the ultimate creation in the 
universe, but that he was merely one stage in the over­
all evolutionary process of life? With one dramatic blow, 
he was reduced to a position of equality among all living 
things, where the only criterion for his continued 
existence was "survival of the fittest." His ego was 
shattered.
Additional factors play a major role in defining the 
mood of the nineteenth century. Notwithstanding the 
remarkable innovations in industry and science in which 
that century abounded, some critical— even prophetic-- 
voices were heard which dampened the spirit of that age-- 
even imbuing it with a sense of doom. Not even all the 
positive achievements could hide the fact that vast and 
perhaps insurmountable difficulties remained.
There are active within man innumerable factors to 
cloud his sense of reasoning, to cause emotional distur­
bances, and to raise havoc in his soul. Because man is torn 
by passions and primitive instincts on one hand, and a 
desire to adhere to his rational faculties on the other, he
finds himself in a state of perplexity emanating from 
the incongruity of basically incompatible forces. By 
attempting to remain true to the rational element within 
him, he suppresses the irrational aspect of his being—  
creating stress and tension. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) 
analyzed such disorders clinically and established that 
neurosis is, in fact, the "rejection by the conscious 
mind of factors which persist as dynamic repressions in 
the unconscious mind."^ These repressions cause conflict. 
By employing psychoanalysis as a new form of therapy for 
treating various emotional disturbances, Freud threw new 
light upon some of the most important problems of human 
personality and behaviour. But more importantly, his 
work left no doubt as to the existence of an irrational 
side to man's nature. Whereas man was compelled to 
realize as a result of Darwin's discoveries that he 
was not the ultimate goal in the process of creation, 
Freud's discoveries disconcerted him even further because 
they forced upon him the recognition that he is not the 
totally rational animal Aristotle perceived him to be.
Man has no choice but to live with this dual affliction.
^T. W. Wallbank, A. M. Taylor, and N. M. Bailkey, 
Civilization Past and Present (Chicago: Scott, Foresman 
and Company, 1962), p. 579.
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Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) is one of the two
nineteenth century philosophers whose theories are felt
strongly in the twentieth. His views are frequently
self-contradictory and dissonant, but he was able to
analyze his age and give to his contemporaries an
indication of things to come. Though some may still
regard him as a systematic philosopher, his primary
achievement lies in his ability to give a perceptive
analysis of the culture of his age. He was among the
first to unmask what Robert M. Hutchins has called the
2
"twin myths of progress and utility." Nietzsche can 
be viewed as a "cultural critic of outstanding vision, 
integrity, and ruthlessness," and he may be said "to 
have foreseen with accuracy many of the developments of 
the twentieth century." He recognized the emptiness of 
man's achievements, and lamented the "unspeakable im-
4
poverishment and exhaustion of our existence" in the 
midst of a delusive prosperity and exuberant nationalism. 
He believed that the humanistic culture had failed to live
2
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up to its promises and that Christianity, democracy, and 
socialism all shared in this failure by protecting the 
weak and hindering the strong. He regarded it as the 
tragedy of modern civilization that the scientific age 
which had been heralded with promises of peace, security, 
and liberation from all illusion and superstition was 
producing growing instability instead. Nietzsche 
believed that the civilization of his time had lost its 
vitality. He recognized the undercurrents of the des­
tructive forces at work in the Germany of his day, 
remarking: "We are living in an atomic age, an atomistic
chaos. Today everything is determined by the coarsest 
and most evil forces, by the egotism of an acquisitive 
society and by military potentates."^ He was aware of 
the cultural crisis which manifested itself by a lack of 
confidence in established cultural values and standards. 
Since— as Nietzsche declared--God was dead, man was 
drifting through an infinite void without bearing or 
anchor. Nietzsche indicted the moral and spiritual bank­
ruptcy of the time and raised an isolated voice of 
gl-oom about the future. The preface of his principal 
work Per Wille zur Macht contains the following prophetic 
passage:
Was ich erzahle , 1st die Geschichte der nachsten
zwei Jahrhunderte. Ich beschreibe, was kommt, was
5Ibid.
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nicht mehr anders kommen kann: die Heraufkunft des
Nihilismus. Diese Geschichte kann jetzt schon 
erzahlt werden: denn die Notwendigkeit selbst ist
hier am Werke. Diese Zukunft redet schon in hundert 
Zeichen, dieses Schicksal kiindigt iiberall sich 
an. . . . Unsre CsicJ ganze europaische Kultur
bewegt sich seit langem schon mit einer Tortur der 
Spannung, die von Jahrzehnt zu Jahrzehnt wachst, wie 
auf eine Katastrophe los: unruhig, gewaltsam,
iiberstiirzt: einem Strom &hnlich,gder ans Ende will,
der sich nicht mehr besinnt . . .
But despite such pessimistic predictions, Nietzsche saw
some hope for man: by means of vitalization of unused
recuperative resources, through "Umwertung aller Werte,"
man could advance to a new level of being. The cultural
crisis which he witnessed and of which he was part was
merely a stage of transition to that higher level.
The second strong influence to come out of the 
nineteenth century and seriously affect the twentieth was 
that of the pessimistic philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer 
(1788-1860). Schopenhauer, a misanthropist like Nietzsche, 
did not put much faith in man's intellect. He regarded 
the world as evil, and happiness as an illusion. He 
derided the optimism of Leibnitz and his tenet that this 
was "the best of all possible worlds." Weighing the 
actual amount of good and evil in the world against each 
other, he arrived at the conclusion that life was "a
Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Wille zur Macht: 
Versuch einer Umwertung aller Werte (Leipzig: Alfred 
Kr6*ner Verlag, 1930), p. 1.
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business whose profits do not nearly cover its expenses"^ 
and that, therefore, this world was "the worst of all 
possible worlds." But unlike Buddhism, which takes 
evil for granted, Schopenhauer was not satisfied with 
the recognition of its existence, but consciously sought 
an explanation. He found it in life Itself. He arrived 
at this conclusion based on the hypothesis that man is 
ruled by his will and that this will is irrational: it 
makes man a "slave to his nature, his emotions, and
g
sexual drives"; it makes the intellect subservient to
the subconscious mind; it makes will the master, and the
intellect the servant.
Yet the will"is not the only causative factor
for evil.- Life is also evil because life is war. In
the words of Schopenhauer, " . . .  sehen wir in der Natur
iiberall Streit, Kampf und Wechsel des Sieges. . . . Jede
Stufe der Objektivation des Willens macht der anderen
g
die Materie, den Raum, die Zeit streitig. . . . ," 
making the total picture of life almost too painful to 
contemplate. More than one hundred years ago, Schopenhauer 
put into words that which could have come from the pen of
^Reinhardt, p. 505, quoting Schopenhauer.
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a writer of the present age. He wrote:
Wenn man nun jedem die entsetzlichen Schmerzen und 
Qualen, denen sein Leben bestandig offensteht, vor 
die Augen bringen wollte, so wiirde ihn Grausen 
ergreifen: Und wenn man den verstocktesten Optimisten
durch die Krankenhospitaler, Lazarette und chirur- 
gische Marterkammern, durch die Gefangnisse, Folter- 
kammern und SklavenstSlle, iiber Schlachtfelder und 
Gerichtsstatten fiihren, dann alle die finsteren 
Behausungen des Elends . . . ihm Sffnen und zum
SchlufS ihn in den Hungerturm des Ugolino blicken 
lassen wollte, so wiirde sicherlich auch er zuletzt 
einsehen, welcherart dieser meilleur des mondes 
possibles 1st. Woher denn anders hat Dante den Stoff 
zu seiner Holle genommen als aus dieser unserer 
wirklichen Welt? Und doch ist es eine recht ordent- 
liche Holle geworden.^-0
The world is against man. And as if his immersion into a
cruel environment were still not enough to plunge him into
despair, he is also his own worst enemy.
Schopenhauer’s tenet "man is a wolf to man" is a
third element in explaining evil. It cogently expresses
his conviction that man is cruel to his own species, an
idea on which he elaborated thusly:
Durch die gesamte Natur laSt sich dieser Streit 
verfolgen. . . . Ist doch dieser Streit selbst nur die
Offenbarung der dem Willen wesentlichen Entzweiung mit 
sich selbst. Die deutlichste Sichtbarkeit erreicht 
dieser allgemeine Kampf in der Tierwelt, welche die 
Pflanzenwelt zu ihrer Nahrung hat, und in welcher 
selbst wieder jedes Tier die Beute und Nahrung 
eines andern wird, das heiSt die Materie . . . jedes 
Tier Ckann3 sein Dasein nur durch die bestandige 
Aufhebung eines fremden erhalten . . . , so daB der 
Wille zum Leben durchgangig an sich selber zehrt und 
in verschledenen Gestalten seine elgene Nahrung ist, 
bis zuletzt das Menschengeschlecht, well es alle
10Ibid., p. 363.
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anderen iiberwaltigt, die Natur fur ein Fabrikat zu 
seinetn Gebrauch ansieht, dasselbe Geschlecht jedoch 
auch . . .  in sich selbst jenen Kampf, jene Selbstent- 
feweiung des Willens zur furchtbarsten^Jeutlichkeit 
offenbart und homo homini lupus wird.
Man stands alone in an inhospitable and hostile universe
and must rely on his own resources. As Durant explained:
"What one human being can be to another is not a very
12
great deal; in the end everyone stands alone." For 
Schopenhauer, life is a struggle, and man, because of his 
intellect-limited though it may be--is aware of the 
struggle and of his own suffering. Life depends on his 
not knowing it too well.
To understand the situation of man at a specific 
point in time, one must understand the historical 
occurrences operative at that time. And since we are 
primarily concerned with man's situation and outlook in 
the first half of this century, those events must be con­
sidered which set the mood and shaped his views. For man 
does not live in a vacuum. He is a historical creature 
and partakes in the vast historical process of the world. 
He is embedded in a particular culture, which, in turn, is 
part of the totality of civilization. Having entered into
11Ibid., p. 178.
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this totality, man is affected by the events of the age 
and they, in turn, are reflected in his spirit.
As Germany entered the twentieth century, things 
looked serene on the surface. She retained her formidable 
appearance to outsiders and to most Germans; she extended 
her empire geographically, and her economic and industrial 
progress continued on a grand scale. But under this 
veneer of success, the forces of destruction were already 
at work. It was not only Germany which was ultimately 
responsible for the events leading to World War I. Other 
nations— France, Great Britain, Russia, Italy, Austria- 
Hungary--were equally guilty of embarking on a course of 
action characterized, as Dill notes, by "militarism,
13commercial rivalry, imperialism, national chauvinism."
It was the spirit of the time. The elements for war 
were present. All that was needed was one spark to ignite 
the smoldering embers seething under the surface. The 
spark came with the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, 
heir to the Austrian-Hungarian throne, by a Serbian 
nationalist. That murder launched Germany, and eventually 
the world, on one of the most catastrophic periods in the 
history of mankind. On August 3, 1914 the world was at 
war. It was the day when, in Sir Edward Grey's famous
13 Marshall Dill, Jr., Germany: A Modern History 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970), p. 217
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phrase, "the lights had gone out all over Europe."^-4
Thus the forward march of western civilization 
which had shown such promise was halted. For the next 
four years, science, industry, wealth, and power were 
put into the services of destruction. It was the first 
war of truly global proportions; twenty-seven powers 
became involved, fighting on land, and at sea, and, for 
the first time, fighting in the air and below the water.
The Great War was a total war; it was fought not only on 
battlefronts but also on homefronts far from the scene of 
military conflict. During the first two years, optimism 
remained high in Germany that the country would emerge 
victorious. But as the war dragged on, as supplies and 
equipment were exhausted, as the number of civilian and 
military casualties increased, as food became scarce, and 
as the likelihood of victory became ever more dim, Germany 
was ready to end the conflict. In the autumn of 1918, the 
armistice was signed.
For all its horror and tragedy, World War I generated 
ambitious ideals for a better world. During a brief period 
following "the war to end all wars," hopes were raised that 
out of the chaos a new world might emerge— a better world, 
a world of lasting peace. In the arts this vision was 
reflected in the Expressionists' promulgation of "der
14Ibid. , p. 216.
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neue Mensch," one who would encompass such Ideals as 
"humanozentrischeCsj BewuStsein; Brudergef iihl; Gemein- 
schaftsldee; . . . Erdballgesinnung. Attempts were
made to fulfill an honest longing to build a better 
world. A new era of International cooperation began 
under the auspices of the League of Nations. In Germany 
monarchial rule was displaced by the democratic Weimar 
Republic, whose task it became to restore a defeated 
Germany. Some progress was achieved. The new constitu­
tion revived the spirit of the people and implanted a 
sense of optimism toward the future; a degree of political 
stability was restored, and prosperity was once again 
attained.
However, it soon became apparent that the Republic 
did not stand on solid foundations. The injustices of 
Versailles— built around the concept that Germany was 
responsible for the war— festered deep wounds while 
political inexperience and heavy economic burdens 
assessed to Germany as war reparation combined to discredit 
the new government among many dispirited and humiliated 
Germans. From the very beginning democracy experienced 
strong opposition from the Left and from the Right, and 
the government expended most of its effort in defending 
itself against these enemies who were united only in their
■^Otto Mann and Wolfgang Rothe (eds.), Deutsche 
Literatur im 2(). Jahrhundert: Strukturen und Gestalten 
(Bern: Francke, 1967), I, p. 558.
denial of democratic values.
In retrospect the frenzied and agitated decadence
of the twenties looks like a danse macabre, as Dill
describes it. Literature and the arts reflect the
ambivalence, the diversity and conflict, and the sense
of despondency which were evident at the political and
social level. Some creative minds of the period, "with
16
the sixth sense of the artist," saw where Germany was 
heading, but the great mass saw only a time of prosperity 
and gaiety.
Yet progress and success were merely a facade. As 
had been the case at the turn of the century, Germany 
appeared strong and powerful. And again, as had been the 
case prior to the first World War, Germany seethed with 
unrest under this veneer of prosperity. Again it would 
take an International catastrophe to lay bare the inner 
decay.
This time the international incident that precipi­
tated a string of .irreversible events leading to the 
ultimate catastrophe came in the form of a world depressio 
Spreading from the United States, the depression flung 
Germany into a state approaching civil war and eventually 
brought about the total collapse of the Weimar Republic—  
assisted to a large extent by the exploits of the rapidly 
growing and intensifying nationalist movement which
16Ibid., p. 326.
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fervently, and successfully, fanned the flames of dis­
content. When the Weimar Republic came to an end, it was 
by dint of a blow from the Right. The ideological legacy 
of World War I, expressed as "making the world safe for 
democracy*" was about to be challenged, and nowhere was 
it challenged more than in Germany, where, under the 
messianic leadership of Adolf Hitler, one of the most 
antidemocratic reactions in all of history began.
Hitler's program was one of national regeneration, 
German revival and expansion, coupled with virulent anti­
semitism. Upon establishing himself firmly as party 
leader, Hitler set in motion the myth of the "Fiihrer" 
and assumed as Dill phrases it, a sort of magico- 
religious p o s i t i o n . H i t l e r  made the Nazi Party his 
instrument of rule, wielding an ever tightening grip on 
individuals and institutions. Political, economic, and 
social organizations were nationalized, business became 
the servant of the state, and all opposition was ruth­
lessly eliminated. Dill, in delineating Hitler's 
increasingly despotic and merciless reign, relates the 
fate of Jews, Communists, Social Democrats, and other 
undesirables who under Hitler, had to endure "an existence
17Ibid., p. 352.
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of sadistic ferocity such as the world has rarely 
18witnessed." The brown terror of arrests, beatings,
imprisonment, and shootings was on full rampage. Every
class of society, labor, civil servants, teachers,
students, farmers, or doctors was watched and guided at
every step of the way. Germany's youth, "the reservoir
of the future party," was indoctrinated. Education had
to serve the State; according to Dill, it had to be
technically competent, nationalistically German, and
ideologically Nazi. That learning was muzzled in Nazi
Germany was evident from the infamous book burning
ceremony at the University of Berlin in 1933; here
"students danced around the pyre waving swastika flags
and singing Nazi songs, CwhileU hundreds of banned
books from the university library were consumed by 
19flames." It was a public display of censorship, and a 
step back into the medieval past.
But more was still to come, as Dill explains: to
totally ensure "public enlightenment" of Nazi ideology, 
strict censorship was Instituted and the printing of 
material not completely in accord with Nazi doctrines 
was forbidden; to listen to broadcasts from foreign
1 ft
Ibid., p. 346. 
19Ibid., p. 363.
countries became a serious and punishable offense;
newspapers, radio, and motion pictures gave the public
only what was officially prescribed; "to read one news-
20paper was to read them all." The Nazis were thorough 
and efficient in pursuit of their aims. They left 
nothing to chance and to random development. As a 
result, states Dill, "Germans lived in a sealed cocoon to 
the extent that a powerful government was able to 
enforce its w i l l . " ^
The Germans had deluded themselves into believing 
that Hitler was the saviour they had been waiting for.
They had staked all their hopes on him, but by the time 
they realized that they had been deceived and recognized 
the extent of their deception, it was too late to do any­
thing about it. True, Hitler changed the national 
psychology from one of despair to one of confidence in 
his Third Reich; and true, he changed a situation of 
extremely high unemployment to one approaching full 
employment; he created the "Arbeitsdienst," providing such 
work as reclamation of land, prevention of erosion; and' 
he gave a new impetus to rearmament, road building, and 
public works. But the price for economic security was 
extremely high: freedom was lost, for Germany had
20
Ibid., p. 372.
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become a police state.
World War II began with Hitler's march into
Poland. There was nothing of the enthusiasm, the
bands and parades that accompanied the German armies
marching off during World War I. Too many people were
still alive who remembered all the horrors and privations
twenty years before. Far more than World War I, World
War II represented a global conflict. It was enormous
in scope; all the major powers of the world had joined
in the war, and all of the lesser states had enlisted
with them on one side or the other, or, if they remained
neutral, had felt the war's violent impact. The entire
globe became a battlefield. World War II was again a
total war in the sense that the civilian population had
become deeply involved as targets of air raids, rockets,
and, finally, the atom bomb. World War II was a new kind
of war. Developments in technology had made possible
"mass bombing raids, air-borne invasions, amphibious
assaults, operations from carrier-based planes, and mass
22murders in Nazi concentration camps.
The war lasted.six years. When it was over, the 
world lay prostrate. The damage it had done was too 
enormous to comprehend; the mere statistics were unfathom-
4
able: 15 million military deaths, and 30 million
22
Wallbank, 0£. cit., p. 711.
civilian deaths; 100 million military personnel had
been mobilized; economic and financial costs totaled
$1.6 billion. "In total deaths and in economic and
financial costs World War II was about five times as
2 3expensive as World War I." Yet this presentation of 
data, though it alone staggers the imagination, is only 
one, however awesome, facet in the total horrorpicture.
World War II was a return to barbarism but using 
twentieth century technology. Eleven million innocent 
victims— six million of them Jews— were exterminated.
The word genocide had to be created to be able to describe 
the deliberate and systematic destruction of whole 
racial, political, and cultural groups. Hitler could 
have been proud of his efficient murder machine.
This then is the historical background against 
which mid-twentieth century man must be viewed. The 
first half of the twentieth century was certainly one 
of the most tumultuous periods in all of history. In 
less than half a century, two world wars and a world­
wide financial crisis racked mankind, and during this time 
humanity experienced the most poignant suffering. Small 
wonder that the spiritual and psychic nature of twentieth- 
century man, specifically of mid-twentieth century man,
23
Trevor N. Dupuy, The Military History of World 
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should be one Inclined toward pessimism.
Prewar and postwar Germany are a study In contrast.
At the turn of the century and just prior to "the war to
end all wars," the overall mood was one of utmost
exuberance and boisterous optimism, brought about by the
spectacular advances in science and technology. As we
saw earlier, man put his faith and his trust in them and
expected that the technological progress of mankind would
be accompanied by an equally rapid and unqualified moral
ascent. Stefan Zweig (1882-1942) relates the Zeitgeist
of this period in his autobiography, Die Welt von Gestern,
describing the era as "das goldene Zeitalter der Sicher- 
..24
heit. Zweig maintains that in those days man lived his
life in uniformity: a life from beginning to end, seemingly
without disturbance or danger, a life of, perhaps, slight
anxieties but of hardly any noticeable transitions, a
life lived "in gleichen Rhythmen, gemachlich und still . . .
25von der Wiege bis zum.Grabe . . . "  It was a life 
seemingly based on permanency where everything had its 
norm and everything stood firmly and immovable in its 
appointed place. It was an age in which man believed in
Stefan Zweig, Die Welt von Gestern? Erinnerungen 
eines Europaers (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1976), p. 14.
25Ibid., p. 10.
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the binding power of tolerance and conciliation: "Cer
meinteD, die Grenzen von Divergenzen zwischen den
Nationen und Konfessionen wiirden allmahlich zerflieden
ins gemeinsane Humane und damit Friede und Sicherheit,
diese hochsten Giiter, der ganzen Menschheit zugeteilt 
2 6sein." According to Zweig, no one thought of wars,
of revolution, or revolts; all that was radical, all
violence seemed impossible; the world was headed on a
straight and unfailing path toward being the best of all
possible worlds; it would be merely a matter of decades
until the last vestige of evil and violence would finally
be conquered.
In Zweig's words, it was this unswerving belief
in progress which so eloquently characterizes that age:
. . . dieser Glaube an den ununterbrochenen, unaufhalt-
samen 1 Fortschritt 1 hatte fur jenes Zeitalter wahr- 
haftig die Kraft einer Religion; man glaubte an diesen 
'Fortschritt' schon mehr als an die Bibel, und sein 
Evangelium schien unumstb'Blich bewiesen durch die ^  
taglich neuen Wunder der Wissenschaft und Technik.
As time went on, progress became ever more marked, more
rapid, and more varied. Jubilation knew no bounds at
the ever more wondrous inventions and events: the first
telephone, the first "Kodak," the first radio, the first
flight of the Zeppelin. Alvin Toffler was to explain the
accelerative thrust of technological progress a generation
2^Ibid. , p . 16.
27Ibid., p. 15.
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later suggesting that technology feeds on Itself, that
28
technology makes more technology possible. At the 
turn of the century, the limits burst, propelling the 
feelings of optimism and faith In the future to ever 
greater height. Everyone seemed to gain strength from 
the upswing of the times.
But as man was to discover all too soon, his 
optimism and exuberance were short-lived. With one 
swoop, the catastrophe that was World War I hurled him 
back a thousand years, destroying his world of security 
and shattering his hopes and dreams for a better and 
more humane future, instilling in him a sense of impotence 
as to the ways of the world— a feeling compounded and 
intensified a thousand-fold by the events of World War II.
In retrospect, man's optimism during the pre-World 
War I era seems banal. But hindsight is always notoriously 
superior to contemporary judgment. Looking backward, one 
can readily perceive the nemesis lurking at that time. 
Apprehension and caution were expressed even then by 
those— primarily intellectuals— who sensed the super­
ficiality of that optimism running rampant among the 
general population, and who recognized that forces were 
already at work to undermine that— apparent— world of 
security.
28
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Among those observers and analysts of the time who
expressed opposition to the all-pervasive optimism, the
historian-philosopher Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) gives
a particularly pessimistic assessment of that age and of
the future of the Western world in general, even
prophesying its decline. Spengler had "affinity to the
29
attitudes associated with fin de siecle,11 the feeling
of melancholy, of Weltschmerz, the awareness of
decadent man, society and civilization. He regarded
technology as one of the prime forces in the destruction
of culture. Chiefly known for his work Der Untergang des
Abendlandes in which he "sings the swan song of Western
civilization and preaches a funeral oration over its
30
allegedly decomposing corpse," as Reinhardt notes,
Spengler adopted the principle of cyclical progression 
to Western civilization, concluding that Western civil­
ization was in the winter cycle of its development, and 
that its end and death were, therefore, predictable and 
inevitable; for, according to Spengler, all cultures follow 
the laws of evolution, that is, they pass through the 
successive stages, or "seasons," of spring, summer, autumn, 
and winter; in other words, through stages of "Kindheit . . .
29 Garland, oj>. c it. , p. 811.
30
Reinhardt, o£. c i t ., p. 679.
31Jugend . . . Mannlichkeit . . . Greisentum."
Every age conceives its own world view relative
to its heritage, its encounters with observable facts
and events, its perception of reality, and its present
state of knowledge. Man does not exist in a void. He
carries within him the sum total of all previous events,
32
attitudes, processes, and trends. Whatever he proves 
to be will be conditioned largely by his history and 
culture. The situation of man in the twentieth century 
is one characterized by ambivalence. We have seen man 
at his worst, and we have seen him at his best; we are 
aware of his potential for committing evil and committing 
good; we have been repelled by his irrational behaviour 
and been astounded by his intellectual accomplishments.
We have seen man's phenomenal progress in the fields of 
science and technology in the nineteenth century; but 
what he has achieved in the twentieth century is nothing 
short of miraculous.
At present, man's technology is moving ahead at
31 Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes; 
Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte (Munich;.
C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1921), I, p. 154.
32A concept akin to the "collective unconscious" 
on which the artist draws when in the process of creating 
a view propagated by Carl Jung.
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supersonic speed, and each day sees it further acceler­
ated. Meanwhile, however, there has been no correspond­
ing increase in man's own mental capacity. He probably 
has no more native intelligence than his Stone Age 
ancestors. Even the usually optimistic Goethe was 
alarmed at man's inability to change for the better, and 
visualized a mankind which would become more shrewd and 
more intelligent, but hardly better or happier. All 
man's technological and scientific know-how could not 
save him from the trauma of the twentieth century.
Again we turn to Stefan Zweig to give us the sense of 
life of his generation, this time as a witness to the 
political-historical events of the first half of the 
century. It is a world of man's own making, a world 
which, in Hamlet's phrase, seems "out of joint":
Alle die fahlen Rosse der Apokalypse sind durch 
mein Leben gestiirmt, Revolution und Hungersnot, 
Geldentwertung und Terror, Epidemien und 
Emigration; ich habe die groSen Massenideologien 
unter meinen Augen wachsen und sich ausbreiten 
sehen, den Faschismus In Italien, den Nationalso- 
zialismus in Deutschland, den Bolschewismus in 
Ruflland und vor allem jene Erzpest, den National- 
ismus, der die Bliite unserer europaischen Kultur 
vergiftet hat. Ich muBte wehrloser, machtloser 
Zeuge sein des unvorstellbaren Ruckfalls der 
Menschheit in lMngst vergessen gemeinte Barbarei 
mit ihrem bewufiten und programmatischen Dogma der 
Antihumanitat. Uns war es vorbehalten, wieder seit 
Jahrhunderten Kriege ohne KriegserklSrungen, 
Konzentrationslager, Folterungen, Massenberaubungen 
und Bombenangriffe auf wehrlose Stadte zu sehen,
B e s t i a l i t a t e n  a l l  d i e s ,  w e l c h e  d i e  l e t z t e n
fiinfzig Generatlonen nicht mehr gekannt haben ^3
und kiinftige hoffentlich nlcht mehr erdulden werden.
The twentieth century Is an age of acute crisis 
for man. It Is the crisis of the Individual who no 
longer has a frame of reference and who finds himself 
adrift In the secular world he has created. In a world 
where the urban population doubles every eleven years, 
as Toffler says, man finds himself alone; in a world 
where, according to Toffler, the total output of goods 
doubles every fifteen years, he is homeless; and in the 
midst of a gigantic social apparatus that fulfills his 
material wants, he finds himself alienated; he is an 
outsider even within his own human society. He is 
fragmented, because his world lacks cohesion; he is 
lost, because he senses neither purpose nor unity nor 
harmony in his universe; he finds himself in a state of 
impermanence, a state of transcience, that penetrates and 
tinctures his consciousness; he is alienated, rootless, 
and estranged from God, nature, and his fellow man; he 
is the "homo faber" of our mechanized and technological 
age. He lives in the Age of Relativity. The certainties 
of the past have been lost, and everything has become 
relative and therefore doubtful. His spirit yearns for
50
an answer that will allay the turmoil of doubt and
uncertainty. But the world denies him an answer.
Modern man knows the world better than did his forebears
through knowledge derived from the scientific process.
And he knows himself better and knows of the devil
within him; he knows that the menace lurks from within.
He knows that science and technology may have given
him the knowledge to master his physical environment,
but that he has not, as yet, learned to master himself.
Twentieth century man is learning to live by the
new rules. As Wheelis writes, man must accept the fact
that he "does not now— and will not ever— live by the
3 ^bread of scientific method alone," and must make
conjectures about things like "life and death, love and
35cruelty and despair" which do not lend themselves to 
experimentation. Wheelis believes that modern man has 
already come to the realization that he, as an individual, 
has only limited powers of intervention, that the actual 
results of his activity depend largely on general 
environmental conditions rather than upon the aims he is 
trying to fulfill. He has come to recognize the small
34
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extent of his sphere of Influence as compared with the 
vast possibilities of which he is abstractly aware. He 
senses his powerlessness to change the course of the 
world and sees himself as being dragged along in the 
wake of events which he, at one time, had hoped to guide.
We come to a fundamental question. How is modern 
man to cope with the ever widening disparity between 
what he has and what he i_s? How can he accommodate 
himself to this sense of powerlessness, frustration, and 
impotence, and rise above it? Definitive answers to 
these questions are not forthcoming, for there are none.
Each person must find his own way of resolving the conflict. 
That is his responsibility and his challenge. It is the 
dilemma of modern man. Cognizant of the fact that there 
is no indoctrination with moral regulations, he must 
meet the challenge and search for new ways to anchor 
himself. He must rely on his own resources, shape his 
own destiny, and construct his own morality. However, he 
must also accept responsibility for that which he has 
created.
The predicament of modern man is reflected in the 
literary and philosophical movement of existentialism.
It epitomizes the mood of our time, but it is as old as 
human self-concern. Philosophically it was first proclaimed 
when Socrates embraced the Delphic oracle "Know thyself" 
as man's foremost duty.
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Existentialism is chiefly a twentieth century
European phenomenon that arose in the wake of the
3 6European collapse. It centers upon an analysis of the 
individual human being in the present age, and bases 
its investigation on man as a being-within-the-world, 
rather than an object isolated from the external world 
or as abstraction itself. Martin Heidegger, Karl 
Jaspers, and Jean-Paul Sartre are the main exponents of 
existential philosophy, greatly indebted to Soeren 
Kierkegaard whose rediscovery after World War I provided 
momentum to the existential movement. Though they do 
not espouse a common philosophy or set of principles 
(in fact, they differ greatly in their assessment of man's 
plight), they share a common starting-point: that man is a
responding being and is expressive of his age.
Existentialism is not easily definable, for there 
is no single entity or essence to which the word corresponds. 
It does not concern itself with abstractions, symbols, 
the transcendental realm, search for eternal truths, 
aesthetics, or epistemology--the traditional strains of 
philosophy, and does not pursue a delineated method of
3 6F. H. Heinemann, Existentialism and the Modern 
Predicament (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 
p. 3.
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investigation. Rather, existentialism points to a certain 
state of mind, a specific approach or attitude; it has to 
do with man as he exists in his lifetime. Existentialism 
attempts to give an expression of the whole man, not 
merely of his intellect. It express the Zeitgeist.
It is not a matter of chance that this philosophy arose 
at the time it did--as a response to national catas­
trophes. As Heinemann explains, existentialism expresses 
human problems which
arise immediately from our human condition and 
concern us directly as persons. We are not looking 
out for problems. The problems choose us. We have 
to express them. We have to meet their challenge.
. . . Because the very existence of man on this earth
is menaced, because the annihilation of man, his 
dehumanization and the destruction of his humanity 
and of all moral values is in real danger, therefore 
the meaning of human existence becomes our problem.
We have to reinterpret man, his position in the 37
Universe, his relation to his fellow-men and to God.
Kierkegaard is considered to be the founding 
father of existentialism. He espoused several concepts 
which were to become primary characteristics of existential­
ism. Indubitably, his most important contribution is his 
virtual declaration of war on traditional philosophy. 
Kierkegaard believed that the purpose of philosophy was 
not to engage in speculative thought, in abstractions
37Ibid., p. 178.
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and transcendental phenomena, but that philosophy 
should be put in the service of man. Kierkegaard 
postulated that man is a real person, a concrete human 
personality, existing in this world, and that his 
existence is not open to speculation, but is, in fact, 
a reality.
Kierkegaard is also credited with formulating 
the concept of the individual within mass society. As 
early as 1846, in his essay The Present A g e , Kierkegaard 
protested against the ascendancy of the mass, and he 
warned against the precariousness of the position of the 
individual within such a society. His sympathies 
clearly rested with the individual whose existence was 
threatened by the encroachment of mass society.
"Angst," despair, dread— these are key terms in 
existentialism, and Kierkegaard originated their use in 
relation to the situation of man of his time. However, 
application as to its usage has shifted from a strictly 
Christian emphasis during the time of Kierkegaard to a 
more secular one. Kierkegaard suggests that man's 
estrangement from his own being, evident even at that 
time, was the result of man's loss and negation of God, 
leaving a void that eventually would be filled with 
despair. What Kierkegaard tried to accomplish was to 
save man from this gathering religious lethargy; for,
55
in the words of Heinemann, without God, man has no Self,
38and whoever has no Self is in despair.
Heidegger's interpretation of "Angst" and anxiety 
added a new dimension to existentialism. True to the 
concept of this philosophical movement, Heidegger further 
explored man's existence within this, our real world, and 
determined that man's fears are not attributable to any­
thing specific and definite, but are the result of a 
general feeling of "dread" permeating everything, some­
thing that cannot be pinpointed. It is a mood or an 
attitude, arising out of the fateful recognition that 
man's existence is temporal, that he is finite, that 
death is absolute yet unpredictable, and that everyone 
must endure it alone. Everything that makes up human 
existence must be understood in light of man's tempo­
rality .
Jaspers' notion of despair is derived from yet 
another source. Although Jaspers was a staunch champion 
of science, and acknowledged the technological achievements 
of the age, he also recognized that man was threatened by 
it, most clearly so because of the advent of mass society 
with its inherent tendency to obliterate the individual 
by absorbing him into its own amorphous mass, a mass
•J Q
Ibid., p. 37.
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which is, as Barrett notes, "unconscious of itself,
uniform and quantitative, devoid of specific character
39
and cultural heritage, without foundation and empty." 
Mass-man, dominated by external forces, by society, the 
state, impulses, natural desires, has lost his in­
dividuality— his authenticity. To escape the danger of 
becoming a mere cog within the enormous machine, he 
must create his own authentic existence, for only by 
accepting the challenge of self-destiny and increased 
self-consciousness, can he prevent his total absorption, 
perhaps even obliteration, by the mass. Such situations 
arise when man has no roots and when he is made dis­
pensable and exchangeable by such conditions as are 
generated by the technological age. A feeling of despair 
accompanies man's attempt to make himself authentic, to 
create himself, for in the process of achieving authen­
ticity, he must make choices--receiving, however, no 
external guidance or support. He must choose according 
to his own conscience; if his conscience is in error, 
then so is the decision or choice based upon it, prompting 
feelings of anxiety. Modern man is free. But he is also
39
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burdened with the responsibility for choosing, and for
having to live with his choice. In his essay The
European Spirit, Jaspers postulates what is the desired
goal of existentialism and of existential man. He wrote:
The philosophically serious European is faced . 
to-day with the choice between opposed philosophical 
possibilities. Will he enter the limited field of 
fixed truth which in the end has only to be obeyed; 
or will he go into the limitless open truth? That 
is, will he submit to a dogmatic form of total know­
ledge; or will he hold in balance, as the means of 
his existence, all possibilities of thinking and 
knowing? Will he solidify his independence till it 
petrifies . . .  or will he win this inner inde­
pendence in perilous openness, as in existential 
philosophy, the philosophy of communication, in 
which the individual becomes himself on condition 
that others become themselves. . ... We trust our 
direction when we hold to three claims: (1) Limit­
less communication between man and man . . . (2) To 
become master of our thoughts . . . (3) To acknow­
ledge love as the final guide. . . .  If it should 
be said the existential philosophy is a dream and 
mere fanaticism, then I dare to reply that if it 
is a dream it is perhaps one of the dreams out of 
which what is human has always b e e n ^ o r n ,  and the 
reason for life being worth living.
Sartre continued the line of reasoning introduced 
by Jaspers as it relates to man and his responsibility to 
transform himself into a whole and new human being.
Unlike Jaspers, though, who regarded mass society and 
the technological age as the source for man's demise, 
Sartre saw it in the Universe itself. From his atheistic
Karl Jaspers, The European Spirit, trans. 
Ronald G. Smith (London: Stanhope, 1948), pp. 63-64;
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vantage point, Sartre regarded man's position in the
Universe as alien, unjustified and unjustifiable, even
absurd, and lacking sufficient reason to explain why
either he or the Universe existed. Sartre's point of
contention was not so much to prove that there is no
God, but that man needs to discover himself even in the
absence of God. According to Sartre, man is nothing in
the beginning; he simply exists; and only if, and when,
he makes something of himself, is he something. As
Sartre said: "man is nothing else but what he purposes,
he exists only in so far as he realizes himself, he is
therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions,
41
nothing else but what his life is." Man makes his own 
essence. He alone is responsible for what he is.
Existentialism is a view of human existence. It 
has its being and operation in current society, and operates 
under the pressure of contemporary events and moods. It 
has as its thesis the existing individual who strives for 
identity and meaning solely in and through his own terms.
Be it through Kierkegaard's "Grenzsituationen," in which 
the "eternal mystery of being" is ultimately made clear in
41
Morton White (ed.), The Age of Analysis t Twentieth 
Century Philosophers (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955), 
p. 134, quoting Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and 
Humanism, trans. Philip Mairet (London: Methuen and Company, 
Ltd., n.d), pp. 25-42.
59
face of existent nothingness, or be it in Jaspers’ 
concept of self-authentication, or be it Sartre’s 
ambitious goal of self-creation, they all share a desire 
for self-recognition, self-realization, and self- 
consciousness in view of a mute, indifferent world, of 
a life permeated by a sense of agony, despair, alienation, 
and isolation.
Existentialism does not have ethics. The principles
of conduct, of moral principles and values must be
determined by the individual. Modern man lives at a time
when the moral law has lost its Divine sanction and
when, as Heinemann states, "the individual, unable to fall
back on any accepted standard of values, has to make his
42
own solitary decision." Living in a world where there 
is no God, he cannot take recourse in religion and 
cannot make excuses for his failures by appealing to 
external forces. He alone decides his being, and nothing, 
and no one can show him what to do. Only he can make 
himself significant and particular by choosing himself 
in particular ways.
^Heinemann, o_£. c i t . , p. 177.
CHAPTER III 
THE MACROCOSM AS NEGATIVE EXPERIENCE
Erich Maria Remarque is a man of the modern age.
His lifetime spanned a period of seventy-two years. He 
witnessed all the political, social and economic up­
heavals which the twentieth century unleashed upon the 
world. Two world wars, inflation, depression, totalitar­
ianism, genocide and emigration are the hallmarks of this 
century, and within this framework man must now live. His 
traditional values, his heritage of a classical-romantic 
idealism, and his former sense of security, however 
tenuous it may have been, are now lost, and man has been 
thrust into a world characterized by alienation, dis­
illusionment, relativity, and nihilism.
Remarque's novels are rooted in the history of the 
time. They are an emotional and intellectual response to 
those phenomena which have shaped our age: they show
man as a victim of gigantic impersonal forces; they show 
how the individual struggles to survive and how he 
struggles to preserve his sense of self in a world that 
wages global warfare, exploits human beings on a mass 
scale, uses power politics as an instrument of domination 
and systematically kills off millions in death factories.
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Remarque exposed these shocking evils and pictured their 
grim realities. He was an acute observer of contemporary 
political and sociological events; he captured the mood 
of the time and eloquently expressed its Zeitgeist. He 
tried to heighten man's sense of responsibility to the 
cataclysmic violence of war and to the barbarism of the 
age. He gave us a commentary on this, our twentieth 
century, and became its chronicler par excellence. As 
the poet Conrad Aiken put it , the artist is the only true 
contemporary.
In the following treatise, Remarque's philosophy 
of life, his conception of the Universe and of life will 
be examined and discussed, based upon his novels, with 
particular emphasis given to six: Im Westen nichts Neues,
Der Funke L eben, Zeit zu leben und Zeit zu sterben, Der 
schwarze Obelisk, Die Nacht von Lissabon, and Schatten im 
Paradies. These works may be viewed as fictional embodi­
ments of Remarque's basic themes: that man is doomed to
suffer catastrophe because of the world in which he lives 
and is unable to escape such disasters of "civilization" 
as war, inflation, intolerance, fanaticism; that "life is 
a relentless, irreversible process which inevitably 
culminates in the oblivion of death, that each individual
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is essentially alone and that nothing endures";*- and 
that, despite personal knowledge and experience of these 
factors, he has the courage and desire to survive, draw­
ing upon inexhaustible resources of the spirit, pre­
serving his composure during crises, displaying stoical 
bearing in the face of grave danger. In selecting these 
novels, consideration was also given to the chronology 
of historical events which they depict, and his first 
and his last novels were included for the purpose of 
comparing Remarque’s adherence to or departure from 
major themes during his writing career.
Im Westen nichts Neues (1929), Remarque's first
novel, describes the horrifying experiences of death and
destruction of World War I as related by Baumer. The
novel is an indictment of war in general. It introduces
the theme of the "lost generation" telling the story of
those who escaped the war in the flesh but not in the
spirit; as Remarque said in a prefatory statement:
"Dieses Buch . . . soil . . . den Versuch machen, iiber eine
Generation zu berichten, die vom Kriege zerstfirt wurde—
2
auch wenn sie seinen Granaten entkam."
^Christine R. Barker and Rex W. Last, Erich Maria 
Remarque (London: Oswald Wolff, 1979), p. 152.
2
Erich Maria Remarque, Im Westen nichts Neues 
(Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1976), p. 5. (Future quotations from 
Im Westen nichts Neues will be taken from this edition, and 
the novel will hereafter be referenced as IWnN.)
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Per schwarze Obelisk (1957) treats the inflation- 
ridden Weimar period, observing the struggle of ordinary 
people, such as Bodmer, during the period between the 
two world wars. The novel contains philosophical dis­
cussions on religion, love, death and on the meaning of life.
Zeit zu leben und Zeit zu sterben (1954) is a 
World War II novel and portrays the impact of war on men 
and women on the homefront. The story encompasses the 
perversion of war and raises questions of personal guilt 
and corruption. It describes Graeber's relationship with 
Elisabeth which is based on a true sense of abiding human 
satisfactions and values.
Per Funke Leben (1952) has as its setting one of 
the most infamous structures of the modern age: the
concentration camp. The novel depicts with terrible 
intensity human anguish and unimaginable suffering. It 
is a saga of life triumphant, a tribute to the human 
spirit as exemplified by 509. It is a protest against 
inhumanity, and any type of doctrinary tyranny.
In Pie Nacht von Lissabon (1964), Remarque treats 
the plight of the emigrant, a theme closely associated 
with the Germany of World War II— internment, escape, 
flight, the individual as faceless statistic. The 
novel relates Schwarz’ moving story of personal courage 
and of love.
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Schatten im Paradies (1972), Remarque's last novel 
and published posthumously, is concerned with the ex­
periences of World War II refugees in the United States. 
Guilt, despair, failure to establish a real relationship, 
inability to forget the past, criticism of the Teutonic 
personality and soul— these are some of the themes of the 
work as manifested in Ross. The novel reiterates virtually 
all of Remarque's concerns, and because they are now 
described retrospectively, based upon a lifetime of 
observation and experience, the work is invested with 
great importance--although, admittedly, aesthetic con­
siderations alone do not warrant preoccupation with the 
novel.
To a great extent, Remarque's work is rooted in 
personal experience. Remarque had been part of the 
tumultuous events of the time and was permanently scarred 
by them. First-hand knowledge of the war, personal 
experience with Nazi tactics— harassment, forced emigration, 
book burnings, the murder of his sister "im Namen des 
Volkes"— combined with what he observed and intuited, 
and heightened his sensibility for the situation of man. 
Remarque depicts that segment of society which is— like him—  
spiritually wounded, and the misfortunes of his individual 
characters become representative of the misery and 
suffering endured by thousands of others. Surrounded by
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danger, tyranny and fanaticism and by an indefinable and 
amorphous fear, they find themselves at the edge of 
society and at the edge of existence. Remarque does not 
give us a positive hero to be emulated, and there is in 
his novels no intimation of a progressive society con­
fidently facing the future. Instead, we find that his 
hero has become the unheroic hero, detaching himself 
from society, a society that is mad with the rage to kill 
and destroy. Marcel Reich-Ranicki describes Remarque's 
heroes in this way:
Seine Helden sind sehr menschliche Menschen, sehr 
mannliche Manner, sehr frauenhafte Frauen. Sie 
haben viele Schwachen, aber gerade diese Schwachen 
machen sie so liebenswert. Sie haben allerlei 
Tugenden, die sich indes in ertraglichen Grenzen 
halten. Bisweilen miissen sie rauh und hart sein, 
aber sie werden nie vulgar, und sie bleiben immer 
zartlich. Sie neigen zur Schwermut, mitunter zur 
Resignation--und sind doch ganze Kerle.
Sie fiirchten den Tod und lieben das Leben und 
mochten es— trotz allem— noch einmal genieSen.
Sie reden viel iiber das, was ist und nicht sein 
sollte, iiber Gott und die Menschen, iiber die Welt 
und die Ungerechtigkeit.^
In his writings, Remarque does not lose himself 
in idealistic dreams or phantasmal pursuits, nor does 
he provide easy solutions to the perplexity of man's 
situation— or any solution, for that matter. He presents 
the questioning self as it encounters the external world
3
Marcel Reich-Ranicki, "Sein Geschmack war der 
von Millionen. Zum Tod Erich Maria Remarques," Die Zeit, 
October 2, 1970.
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in situational dilemmas. He wrote as he had to, listening 
to his intuition and to his sense of life, as Richard Katz 
explains:
Im Heere der Sehriftsteller gibt es Einzelganger, 
die nicht nach rechts noch links blicken, sondern 
nur der Wahrheit ins Auge sehen. Ihr Los ist hart.
Sie stoQen mit anderen zusammen, sie stolpern iiber 
Steine, die auf dem Wege liegen oder ihnen vor die 
Fii3e geschoben werden. Es ist das Los Zolas und 
Tolstois, Victor Hugos und Gerhart Hauptmanns. Es 
ist das Los derer, die keine Kompromisse schlieflen.
Es wurde auch das Los Remarques.
And in the process of recording what he saw, Remarque made
a statement that contributed significantly to the present
human condition.
Remarque regards the macrocosm with pessimism. 
Ultimately, his pessimism derives from two basic causes 
to which all others are correlated: first, that man—
although possessing both the seed for good and for evil-- 
has a strong inclination toward evil. His emotional and 
mental faculties have not evolved at the same rate as has 
his intellect— resulting in a great disparity between 
rational know-how and irrational application and behavior. 
Secondly, that death is the only absolute value for man—  
coloring all his actions and achievements and enveloping 
them with a cloak of impermanence.
4
Richard Katz, "Ein Soldat der Wahrheit. Zum 60. 
Geburtstag Erich Maria Remarques am 22. Juni 1958," 
F orum: Osterreichische Monatsblatter fiir kulturelle 
Freiheit, V, 54 (June, 1958), pp. 226-227.
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Modern man lives in a world out of which grows 
hope, for the first time in history, of a society where 
there will be freedom from want. For the most part--and 
due to m a n ’s rational faculty— he has been able to 
eradicate the immediate concerns of man in past ages: 
hunger, cold, and disease--the direct threats to his 
survival. But despite all his vaunted progress and his 
great wealth, and despite all that he has achieved in 
the fields of science and technology, the panacea he 
expected would be its natural consequence has not 
materialized: Submission to his irrational powers and
the ensuing intensification of man's inhumanity to man 
have— so far— prevented its occurrence. Man's Faustian 
nature— to which Remarque makes frequent reference—  
is his adversary and his own worst enemy. When Faust 
is appraised on the basis of his personal and individual 
nature (in contrast to Faust as a representative of human 
endeavor and activity where his nature is characterized 
by his "striving"), he exhibits this same division and 
the same internal conflict between good and evil. He is 
torn by two opposing forces: the dictates of his irrational
nature and the demands of reason. All too often, his 
irrational side exerts the greater force resulting in the 
exposure of such negative human qualities as egotism,
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ruthlessness, and scrupulousness. In Drel Kameraden 
Remarque writes: "Einer gtfnnt dem anderen nischt. . . .
Daran liegt's aber seit ein paar tausend Jahren."^
Even the Remarque hero himself, who most generally dis­
plays the good qualities of man, is not immune to actions 
such as he normally condemns. As Schwarz explains, "Man 
war gezwungen zu liigen und zu betrvigen, um sich zu ver- 
teidigen und am Leben zu bleiben." Ross recognizes that 
he cannot extricate himself from the human race, but is 
an integral part of it— though he may wish it to be 
otherwise:
Ich gehore zu ihnen, dachte ich, ich gehore zu dieser 
Horde von MSrdern . . . es war ttfricht, wenn ich mir 
vormachen wollte, daft ein treues, ehrliches, un- 
wissendes Volk durch Legionen vom Mars (iberfallen 
und hypnotisiert worden sei. . . .es war der alte, von 
Oberlehrern angebetete furor teutonicus gewesen, der 
zwischen Gehorsamsknechten, Uniformvergotzern und 
viehischem Atavismus aufgebluht war; 
mit der einzigen EinschrSnkung freilich, dag das 
Vieh niemals so viehisch war. Es war keine Einzeler- 
scheinung!7
Erich Maria Remarque, Drei Kameraden (Frankfurt: 
Ullstein, 1977), p. 289. (Future quotations from Drei 
Kameraden will be taken from this edition, and the novel 
will hereafter be referenced as DK.)
^Erich Maria Remarque, Die Nacht von Lissabon 
(Munich: Knaur Taschenbuch, 1977), p. 160. (Future quota­
tions from Die Nacht von Lissabon will be taken from this 
edition, and the novel will hereafter be referenced as D N v L .)
^Erich Maria Remarque, Schatten im Paradies (Munich: 
Knaur Taschenbuch, 1977), p. 227. (Future quotations from 
Schatten im Paradies will be taken from this edition, and 
the novel will hereafter be referenced as SiP.)
Thus man is still threatened in his fight for 
survival after all. However, the immediate danger lies 
no longer in a primitive and unsophisticated physical 
environment, but rather it emanates from man's unevolved 
mental state. And even if in some distant future man 
should succeed and conquer his dichotomous condition, 
he has one further obstacle— insurmountable— that will 
prevent him from ever achieving that perfect state: for
no matter how well he may build his world— banish even 
his negative nature— he cannot banish death itself; he 
must live with the knowledge that he must die and that, 
therefore, nothing is permanent.
It should not surprise us that a questing writer 
like Remarque should exhibit a basically pessimistic 
outlook. His exquisite and sensitive a.ttunement to the 
times, to the titanic and sinister forces at work during 
our century left no uncertainty as to the propensity of 
man's inhumanity to man. The overwhelming impulse of 
human beings to dominate one another, the systematized 
mass murder and mass slavery on a scale never known befor 
and the horror we have come to call the Holocaust tax our 
belief and make us wonder if they really happened. But 
even more onerous than the nightmare itself, and more 
onerous than the actual outbursts of monumental violence- 
massacres that have all too frequently punctuated human
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history--is the cognition of the new potentialities in 
the human ability to dominate, enslave, and exterminate 
with the aid of ever new and ever improved technological 
innovations.
The wars themselves, with their inherent capacity 
to annihilate everything in their path, are a major 
contributing factor in the evolution of an overall sense 
of an essentially evil reality. When the "great" war, 
the "war to end all wars," proved to be a delusion, when 
destruction, death, economic privation, loneliness and 
fear, the intrinsic accomplices of war, were increased 
multitudinously with the Second World War, the accompanying 
sense of impending doom likewise was increased drastically. 
As soldiers lay dying by the millions on the battle­
fields and as the civilian population experienced a similar 
fate on the homefront, the insidious side of man's nature 
was being exposed; for war is the ultimate embodiment of 
man's inhumanity to man: it is a testimony to the cruelty
which one man is capable of inflicting upon another. War 
lays bare the whole gamut of human perniciousness and gives 
evidence of the wickedness of man's character. As Baumer 
said, "der Mensch ist an und fur sich zunachst einmal ein 
Biest, und dann erst ist vielleicht noch, wie bei einer 
Schmalzstulle, etwas Anstandigkeit draufgeschmiert."
(IWnN, p. 36) Most of the time, however, the beast in him
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commands the dominant status; it is the beast’s evil 
nature, his individual and overriding self-interest 
which becomes the actual motive for all conscious 
action, including war. War brings out the worst in man, 
while, conversely, war is caused by what is worst in 
man. In his book, The Cunning of History, Richard 
Rubenstein declares that the ineradicable dark side 
of human personality is an intrinsic part of m a n ’s make­
up. Rubenstein states that the world of the death 
camps and the society which causes it to exist reveals 
the progressively intensifying nightside of Judeo- 
Christian civilization. According to his analysis, what 
we have seen of man in the twentieth century is nothing 
less than a reaffirmation, on a more drastic scale, of 
the dark side of man's nature. As Rubenstein says in an 
important passage:
Civilization means slavery, wars, exploitation, and 
death camps. It also means medical hygiene, elevated 
religious ideals, beautiful art, and exquisite music. 
It is an error to imagine that civilization and 
savage cruelty are antitheses. On the contrary, 
in every organic process, the antitheses always 
reflect a unified totality, and civilization is an 
organic process. Mankind never emerged out of 
savagery into civilization. Mankind moved from one 
type of civilization involving its distinctive modes 
of both sanctity and inhumanity to another. In our 
times the cruelties, like most other aspects of our 
world, have become far more effectively administered 
than ever before. They have not and they will not 
cease to exist. Both creation and destruction are
g
inseparable aspects of what we call civilization.
The affinity to Remarque is evident: negative
and positive elements are part of man's nature, closely 
intertwined. Whether we agree with Rubenstein and see 
them not as antithetical elements but as two aspects of 
the totality of man's constitution, or whether we see 
them as two diametrically opposed elements vying for 
supremacy is, in our case, just a matter of emphasis.
As is evident from Remarque's novels, Remarque believes 
that the good and evil of the Faustian nature are indeed 
inherent in human nature but are not active in equal 
proportion in all men and at all times. Different times 
differing personalities, and different environmental 
factors play an important part in the ascendancy of the 
one element over the other; but eradication of man's 
evil nature, or better, its reduction to a subliminal 
state is at least possible— if perhaps unlikely. In our 
century, however, evil forces have held the upper hand.
All of Remarque's heroes— all are male— are in 
one form or another, directly or indirectly, affected 
by the experiences of war and its manifold ramifications 
But whereas the war experiences of the hero of the World
g
Richard L. Rubenstein, The Cunning of History: 
The Holocaust and the American Future (New York: Harper 
Colophon Books, 197 5), p. 92.
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War I novels are limited strictly to those connected 
with front-line duty or a front-line hospital stay, the 
range of war-experiences of the hero of the World War II 
novels is vastly expanded to include all those related 
areas which have become characteristic of that period: 
war on the homefront, emigration, concentration camp, 
torture. No matter where or at what stage of the 
conflict , or at what intermediate stage between con­
flicts the heroes find themselves, they are sure to be 
confronted with many of those aspects that characterize 
their time, for the effects of war are far-reaching and 
long-lasting, and the consequences inescapable.
To a Remarque hero, war means air raids, and 
sirens and bunkers; it means, as Graeber experienced, 
coming home on furlough to find that your home has 
been destroyed during a bombing raid, not knowing 
whether your parents are still alive, and if they are, 
where. War means, as Baumer was to realize, watching 
your classmates and your comrades die, one by one, while 
carrying out assigned duties to kill; it means watching 
your friend, nineteen years old, lying on his bed with an 
amputated leg, telling him that he is lucky, he could 
have lost both legs or his right arm, knowing all the 
while that your friend will not survive and that you 
cannot help him; you want to lead the whole world by 
his bedside to let the whole world see that your friend,
crying because his young life is leaving him, does not
want to die. War means becoming aware of the full
range of possible injury to life as Baumer was to find
out when he was wounded and sent to the military hospital:
In Stockwerk tiefer liegen Bauch- und Riickenmark- 
schiisse, Kopfschusse und beiderseitig Amputierte.
Rechts im Fliigel Kieferschiisse, Gaskranke, Nasen-, 
Ohren- und Halsschusse. Links im Fliigel Blinde und 
Lugenschiisse, Beckenschiisse, Gelenkschiisse, Nieren- 
schiisse, Hodenschiisse, Magenschiisse. Man sieht 
hier erst, wo ein Mensch iiberall getroffen werden 
kann. (IWnN, p. 183)
War means becoming a witness to the horror and
pain of life, and to the enormity and intensity of
human suffering:
Und dabei ist dies nur ein einziges Lazarett, 
nur eine einzige Station— es gibt Hunderttausende 
in Deutschland, Hunderttausende in Frankreich, 
Hunderttausende in RuBland. Wie sinnlos ist 
alles, was je geschrieben, getan, gedacht wurde, 
wenn so etwas moglich ist! Es muB alles gelogen 
und belanglos sein, wenn die Kultur von Jahr- 
tausenden nicht einmal verhindern konnte, dafl 
diese Strome von Blut vergossen wurden, daB diese 
Kerker der Qualen zu Hunderttausenden existieren.
Erst das Lazarett zeigt, was Krieg ist. (IWnN, p. 184)
And war means becoming an emigrant; it means 
persecution, a life lived in secrecy and under assumed 
names, negation of one's humanity; it means being home­
less, being shuffled from country to country like cattle—  
"das Freiwild aller":
CEin MenschU muBte verbluten im Gestriipp der ver- 
weigerten Ein- und Ausreisevisen, der unerreich- 
baren Arbeits- und Aufenthaltsbewilligungen, der 
Internierungslager, der Biirokratie, der
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Einsamkeit, der Fremde und der entsetzlichen all- 
gemeinen Gleichgiiltigkeit gegen das Schicksal 
des Einzelnen, die stets die Folge von Krieg,
Angst und Not ist. Der Mensch war urn diese Zeit 
nichts mehr. (D N v L , p. 5)
And ultimately war means having to confront man's
cruel nature directly. It means beatings and hangings,
medical experimentations and burnings, and tortures
totally unimaginable to the mind. Josef Schwarz has the
dubious distinction of having known different methods of
torture, different reasons for meting them out, and
differing degrees of intensity when put into execution.
The Nazis may have encouraged conformity in most areas,
but they coveted originality where torture was concerned
according to the motto: the worse, the better. Schwarz
distinguishes between two types of Nazis: between
Lachler and his own Nazi brother-in-law, Georg, both of
whom have given Schwarz samples of their "work" previously:
Er CGeorgD setzte sich breltbeinig auf einen Schemel 
vor mich— das Symbol der absoluten Macht, das wir 
glaubten im neunzehnten Jahrhundert langst uberwunden 
zu haben und das trotzdem zum Wahrzeichen des 
zwanzigsten geworden ist— vielleicht gerade deshalb.
Ich sah an diesem Tage zwei Manifestationen des 
Bosen--der Lachler und Georg, den absolut Bb’sen und 
den brutal BSsen. Von beiden war der Lachler der 
schlimmere, wenn man noch Unterschiede machen will—  
er qualte aus Lust, der andere, urn seinen Willen 
durchzusetzen. (D N v L , p. 180)
The power that has been given to them has corrupted them.
War corrupts. It needs no justification for the misuse of
power; on the contrary, war affords protection and abjures
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responsibility for actions committed for the "cause."
And just as war corrupts, so power corrupts; during war, 
power is in the wrong hands— too much power altogether 
in anyone's hands.
Much of the load for the execution of war-related
atrocities of World War II is borne by Lachler, Georg,
and their counterparts, by the so-called "normal" people,
9
the average man. To call them normal and average may at 
first glance strike us as perhaps totally inappropriate 
and may stretch our imagination to the utmost, while, 
in fact, it epitomizes Remarque's view of man. The 
difference between a Lachler and a Georg and a typical 
Remarque hero is that the hero holds the evil that is in 
him, as it is in all men, at abeyance, whereas in Lachler 
and Georg it has come to the surface. It is not the place 
here to delve into the many and interesting variations of 
man which play a role in Remarque's novels, except to say 
that the degree of evil man may manifest varies from type 
to type, and from person to person. Generally speaking, 
however, Lachler and Georg represent the incarnation of 
evil. Their over-zealous sense of duty, of order, of
9
He may also be referred to as "Zweckmensch"
(Der Weg zuriick, p. 120) and incorporates positive and 
negative qualities. In civilian life he is the "Klein- 
burger" unconcerned with the nature of life or the world, 
the "Gehorsamsknecht," "UniformvergStzer," a cog in the
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obedience coupled with a sense of new-found power, their 
lack of a questioning attitude as to what is good and 
evil, and right and wrong allow them to commit crimes and 
barbaric deeds which few would commit outside the frame­
work of war. But since war knows no moral responsibility 
and since the burden of guilt for committing evil is not 
heavy in times of war, war becomes open season on man. 
Lachler and Georg are representatives of that particular 
type of man who reverts back to the beastly side of his 
being--most generally hidden under a veneer of respect­
ability— when the restraints of convention and societal 
retribution are lifted. Lachler and Georg, and modified 
variations of them, are what constitute the mass of society: 
people who carry out orders, any orders, willingly and well. 
Ross describes this type of man:
Das wirkliche Grauen— der Kleinburger, pflicht- 
bewuBt und schlau und mit gutem Gewissen bei der 
blutigen Arbeit, nicht anders als beim Holzsagen 
oder beim Fabrizieren von Kinderspielzeug-, das 
konnte ich ihm nicht begreiflich machen. . . .
Er wollte mir nicht glauben, dafl dies ganz normale
machine with no moral will and with no sense of personal 
responsibility for evil committed in times of war. To a 
large extent, Graeber displayed some of these traits before 
he discovered a moral will within himself. Ethics lose 
their remoteness for him when he realizes, by observing 
the actions and attitudes of Binding and other like- 
minded "good" Nazi soldiers, that to be passive about 
evil means becoming part of evil itself. The "Zweck- 
mensch" has not come to that recognition.
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Leute waren, die eifrig Juden tdteten, so wie sie 
auch als Buchhalter eifrig gewesen waren; die, 
wenn das einmal alles vorbei ware, wieder Kranken- 
pfleger, Gastwirte und Ministerialbeamte werden 
wurden, ohne eine Spur von Reue oder das BewuBt- 
sein von Unrecht, und daft sie sich auch da wieder 
bemiihen wurden, gute Krankenpfleger und Gastwirte 
zu sein, so, als ware das andere vorher nie dage- 
wesen und vollig iiberdeckt worden von den Zauber- 
worten Pflicht und Befehl. Es waren die ersten 
Automaten eines automatischen Zeltalters. . . .
Hier mordete man ohne Schuld, ohne schlechtes 
Gewissen, ohne Verantwortlichkeit, und die MSrder 
waren brave Staatsbiirger, sie bekamen Extraschnaps, 
Extrawiirste und Extra-Verdienstkreuze, nicht well 
sie MSrder waren, sondern weil sie einen etwas 
anstrengenderen Beruf hatten als einfache 
Soldaten. (SiP, p. 274)
Again and again, Remarque reiterates that the seed
for evil is there and that certain circumstances or events
draw it to the fore. Wartime does so most effectively.
In the case of the normal and average man, the "braver
Zweckmensch," it is the uniform and what it symbolizes
that brings out what is most evil in him. Yielding power
where there was none before and abnegating personal
responsibility by providing an apparent veil of security,
the uniform becomes his excuse for committing evil. And
paradoxically, the less his sphere of influence was in
civilian life, the more he exerts his power once he has it.
In an exchange between Kat and Baumer, the cruel behavior
of the tyrant HimmelstoG, a former mailman, is explained
in these words:
Das macht die Uniform. . . . Sieh mal, wenn du einen 
Hund zum Kartoffelfressen abrichtest und du legst
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ihm dann nachher ein Stuck Fleisch hin, so wird 
er trotzdem danach schnappen, veil das in seiner 
Natur liegt. Und wenn du einem Menschen ein 
Stiickchen Macht gibst, dann geht es ihm ebenso; 
er schnappt danach. . . . Und es steigt ihm urn so
mehr zu Kopf, je weniger er als Zivilist zu 
sagen hatte. (IWnN, p. 37)
Take the uniform away, and the sense of protection and
forcefulness evaporates, an experience that Neubauer,
commander of Mellern concentration camp, had when he
exchanged his uniform for a civilian suit: "Sonderbar,
wie die Entschlossenheit sich aus einem Gesicht verlor,
wenn die Uniform fehlte? Man wurde wabblig, weich.
Fiihlte sich auch so."^® With the external support thus
gone, Neubauer would have to rely on his own resources—
small wonder that he should be leery.
To have seen to what depth of evil man may sink, 
or conversely to what height of evil he may rise and has 
risen in our century, and to have become cognizant of the 
fact that the life and welfare of a person count for 
absolutely nothing in our time is only part of the problem 
confronting the Remarque hero. He must also live with 
the knowledge that the events that took place in Germany, 
World War I and World War II, and the exploitative and 
inhumane acts perpetrated by the Nazis prior and during 
World War II are not isolated phenomena in the annals of
Erich Maria Remarque, Der Funke Leben, (Frankfurt: 
Ullstein, 1976), p. 228. (Future quotations from D e r Funke 
Leben will be taken from this edition, and the novel will 
hereafter be referenced as DFL.)
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history, nor are the actions restricted to a particular 
nationality; rather, they are symptomatic of a more 
universal condition and are an indication of how deeply 
the germs of destruction lie within man.
The extent of man's inhumanity can be viewed from 
a horizontal as well as from a vertical dimension. Seen 
horizontally, we can state that what Remarque's heroes 
witness in the course of their lifetime— keeping in mind 
that Remarque provides us in his novels with a quite 
accurate account of our age— may find its expression in 
other countries,' among other peoples, and at another 
time as well, and it may do so for the very reason that 
the root cause lies not so much in the mentality of a 
particular group of people, but is to be found in the 
very nature of man in general. Schwarz, for example, tells 
Helen about his difficult life as an emigrant in France 
although, to be sure, it was significantly less traumatic 
than his life under the Nazis. Schwarz states, drawing 
upon personal experience, that "Macht ist Macht, und ein 
Polizist ist ein Polizist in jedem Lande der Welt,"
(D NvL, p. 116) while 509--in a discussion with Werner, an 
avowed communist— argues that a totalitarian system is as 
bad in one country as it would be in another because the 
characteristics that identify such a system are bad. He
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contends that the methods employed In order to achieve 
desired goals— killing, internment, torture, subordina­
tion of the individual to the state— are inherent in that 
system no matter where it surfaces.
Baumer, who has just been forced to kill a French­
man in the course of self-preservation and who has had 
to watch his enemy's losing battle with death, expounds 
on the universality of another aspect of human encounter—  
that of universal human suffering and similarity of fate:
Jetzt sehe ich erst, daft du ein Mensch bist wie ich. 
Ich habe gedacht an deine Handgranaten, an dein 
Bajonett und deine Waffen;— jetzt sehe ich deine 
Frau und dein Gesicht und das Gemeinsame. Vergib 
mir, Kamerad! Wir sehen es immer zu spSt. Warum 
sagt man uns nicht immer wieder, daft ihr ebenso arme 
Hunde seid wie wir, daft eure Mutter sich ebenso 
angstigen wie unsere und da3 wir die gleiche Furcht 
vor dem Tode haben und das gleiche Sterben und den 
gleichen Schmerz. (IWnN, p. 158)
The evidence thus bears out Remarque's recognition 
of the universality of the human condition. His emphasis 
is not restricted to an examination of the fate of "der 
Deutsche unter den schwersten Belastungen," "der Deutsche, 
der litt,"— even though that is a major theme— but he 
goes beyond such narrow confines to.embrace the whole 
situation of man and to incorporate "die geknechtete 
Kreatur," "die Menschen dieses Jahrhunderts, die Fragen
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der H u m a n i t a t " ^  in his work. Remarque's sympathies 
rest with that particular type of man— anywhere— who 
finds himself at the mercy of others and who is emotionally 
crippled by the drama to which he must bear witness.
To say that Remarque's work has a vertical dimen­
sion regarding the nature of man (and it does) is to say 
also that he has a sense of historical awareness.
Schopenhauer's basic precept, "eadem, sed aliter"— the
12
more things change, the more they are the same — can aptly 
be applied to Remarque. Remarque recognizes the linkage 
from the past to the present and into the future of man's 
inhumanity. He sees it as part of a continuum that has 
been engrafted for centuries onto the very body of 
western civilization. That we have to admit to our 
inability to rise above the evil forces that are within 
us, that we allow them again and again to gain mastery 
over us, and that we have not been able, in the course 
of several thousand years, to significantly alter our 
destiny does not speak well for us.
^ I r e n e  Wegner, "Die Problematik der 'verlorenen 
Generation' und ihre epische Gestaltung im Romanwerk 
Erich Maria Remarques" (Dissertation, Jena, 1965) p. 238.
12
Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy; The 
Lives and Opinions of the Greater Philosophers (New 
York: Pocket Books, 1976), p. 321.
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Remarque's hero is extremely conscious of the
perpetual recurrence of all that we associate with what
is negative in man. Through personal experience he has
become aware that the evil observable in man may be more
than a superficial and temporary state. Evidence from
the past proves it to him. Everything repeats itself:
Bodmer, in his personal study of history, has learned
that the world of today is not much better off than it
was during much earlier periods, contrary to what
Vicar Bodendiek implies:
Man hat uns in der Schule und im Religionsunterricht 
immer von den dunklen, primitiven, grausamen vor- 
christlichen Zeiten erzahlt. Ich lese das nach 
und finde, daB wir nicht viel besser sind--abge- 
sehen von den Erfolgen in Technik und Wissenschaft.
Die aber benutzen wir auch zum gr 6*IB ten Teil nur, 
urn mehr Menschen tb'ten zu k S n n e n . ^
As Remarque notes, if it were not for the technological
and scientific advances, mankind could not report much
progress since even pre-Christian times, and those
successes we have attained, we employ, for the most part,
in the pursuit of committing more evil. Remarque reminds
us of the eras of Attila and Genghis Khan whose barbarism
we have surpassed in our century. He reminds us of the
Thirty-Year war with its horrendous loss of life and
13 Erich Maria Remarque, Der schwarze Obelisk 
(Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1976), p. 155. (Future quotations 
from Der schwarze Obelisk will be taken from this edition, 
and the novel will hereafter be referenced as D s O .)
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destruction of property, of the Crusades, the Inquisition
and the witch hunts, and he tells us about the dichoto-
mous eighteenth century with its minuet, its grace, its
rococo atmosphere— and its guillotine. Ravic explains:
Alles war dutzendmal dagewesen. Die Liigen, die 
Treubriiche, die Morde, die BarholomMusnachte, die 
Korruption durch den Willen zur Macht, die unab- 
lassige Kette der Kriege— die Geschichte der 
Menschheit war mit Blut und TrMnen geschrieben. . . .
Die Demagogen, die Betriiger, die Vater- und Freundes- 
mtfrder, die nachttrunkenen Egoisten, die fanatischen 
Propheten, die Liebe mit dem Schwerte predigten; es 
war immer dasselbe . . . es hatte kein Ende.l^
But as if what the Remarque hero knows of the 
events of the present age and what he has ascertained 
about the past were not sufficient cause to plunge him 
deeply into despair, he must still consider the last 
element in order to complete the circle: the future.
All indications are that he can expect more of the same.
Be it intuition, a study in probability, prediction, or 
simply lack of faith in man's ability to change, the fact 
remains that another of Schopenhauer's tenets, "man is a 
wolf to man," will most likely prove to be true in the 
future as well. Indicative of the suspiciousness and 
apprehension with which the Remarque hero regards the
14
Erich Maria Remarque, Arc de Triomphe (Munich: 
Goldmann, n. d.), p. 225. (Future quotations from Arc 
de Triomphe will be taken from this edition, and the 
novel will hereafter be referenced as A d T .)
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future, Graeber, in full knowledge of the events of the 
immediate past, cannot fathom any improvement. He is 
less than elated at the prospect of putting a child into 
the world as Elisabeth suggests: "Ein Kind! Es wiirde
fur einen neuen Krieg geradeso zurechtkommen wie wir fiir 
d i e s e n . " ^  Selma, Neubauer’s wife, echoes Graeber's 
gloomy prediction. She recognizes that all those who 
are directly or indirectly responsible for the fate of the 
inmates at the concentration camp and for the causes that 
brought them there initially, even she, will suffer a 
like fate; the wheel of fortune will be turned— she 
senses the imminence of that occurrence— and all those 
who have been subjugated will rise in order to even the 
score. Selma tells Neubauer: "Uns kann passieren, was
anderen passiert ist, als ihr an die Macht kamt . . . 
genauso werden sie euch erwischen." (D F L , p..191) Yet 
there is not so much a hint of revenge in her statement 
as there is an acknowledgement of the way of the world.
A painting of the Spanish Inquisitor elucidates this point 
further. Ross, standing before the painting, is over­
whelmed by the vividness and intensity it suddenly seems 
to display; it is as if the painting were coming alive
^ E r i c h  Maria Remarque, Zeit zu leben und Zeit zu 
sterben (Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, n.d.), p. 313. 
(Future quotations from Zeit zu leben und Zeit zu sterben 
will be taken from this edition, and the novel will here­
after be referenced as Z z 1.)
to communicate what it has seen and learned in the 
centuries since its creation: that the sinisterness,
the bloodshed, the cruelty, the dehumanization which 
it represents were not dead. "Es war nicht tot. Es 
wiirde nie sterben. Die Folter war ewig. Die Angst blieb 
Niemand war gerettet." (SiP, p. 121) The future looks 
dim. The Germans can perhaps be defeated, but never the 
Nazis, said GrSfenheim. The future is "Kain und Abel, 
immer wieder!" (D s O , p. 141) It is George Orwell's 
characterization of our time and his vision of our future 
a boot stamping into a human face.
Thus the situation of man has not changed drama­
tically since the beginning of time. Almost every age 
has its nightmares. What differentiates our age from 
previous ones is not that such nightmares could and did 
occur in our time, but that the sheer scale of these 
chaotic conditions, unfathomable at one time, staggers 
the imagination. We thought that absolute power and 
barbarism were things of the past,that they died out 
with the dark ages, yet they became the landmark of our 
century. The true child of the twentieth century is the 
little boy whom Helen and Schwarz take with them to 
Portugal to save him from Nazi persecution and extermi­
nation. He was three years old when his grandfather was 
beaten to death, he was seven when his father was hanged,
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and he was nine years old when his mother was gassed.
Remarque writes:
Ein Weltfrevel war veriibt worden und fast gegliickt; 
die Gebote der Menschlichkeit waren umgestofien und 
fast zertrampelt worden; das Gesetz des Lebens war 
bespuckt, zerpeitscht und zerschossen worden; Raub 
war legal, Mord verdienstvoll, Terror Gesetz ge- 
worden. (D F L , p. 102)
What does it say about the world of the Remarque
hero, and what does it say about man when we have to admit
that we could not prevent these monstrous and horrendous
events from happening? And what does it say about man's
limitations, and what about the strength of the forces of
evil to know that we still cannot prevent their repetition?
Quite eloquently and succinctly, Remarque airs these
sentiments in the following paragraph written as an
introduction to Der schwarze Obelisk:
Die Welt liegt wieder im fahlen Licht der Apokalypse, 
der Geruch des Blutes und der Staub der letzten Zer- 
stbrung sind noch nicht verflogen, und schon arbeiten 
Laboratorien und Fabriken aufs neue mit Hochdruck 
daran, den Frieden zu erhalten durch die Erfindung 
von Waffen, mit denen man den ganzen Erdball sprengen 
kann.— Den Frieden der Welt! Nie ist mehr dariiber 
geredet und nie weniger dafiir getan worden als in 
unserer Zeit; nie hat es mehr falsche Propheten 
gegeben, nie mehr Liigen, nie mehr Tod, nie mehr 
Zerstorung und nie mehr Tranen als in unserm Jahr- 
hundert, dem zwanzigsten, dem des Fortschritts, der 
Technik, der Zivilisation, der Massenkultur und des 
Massenmordens. (D s O , p. 5)
In Remarque's novels the cataclysmic events of the 
world of his hero reverberate extensively and exhaustively. 
Through Remarque's eyes we have become witness to them and
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to man's abominations, and through his eyes and alongside 
his hero we shall learn of the accompanying emotional 
and spiritual trauma. Every part of his being is permeated 
with firsthand knowledge of man's inhumanity to man, with 
the feeling of lack of security and stability in the present, 
and with a sense of uncertainty about the future. The 
Remarque hero is not left unscathed. He cannot divorce 
himself from what he has seen and from what he knows but 
must live with full knowledge thereof. In a world 
populated by "braven Zweckmenschen und Schiebern, in a 
world filled with violence and cruelty, a world in which 
man's life counts for nothing, he cannot function 
"normally." He has no choice but to create an alternate 
lifestyle; he constructs a life for himself as best he 
can under given circumstances and lives it at the periphery 
of society.
Basically the Remarque hero is representative of the 
"lost generation," a characterization offered by Gertrude 
Stein and repeated by a number of writers following World 
War I to describe that segment of the postwar generation 
which was unable to rid itself of the images and memories 
of war, return to its earlier "carefree" existence, and
^ E r i c h  Maria Remarque, Per Weg zuriick (Frankfurt: 
Ullstein, 1975), p. 120. (Future quotations from Per 
Weg zuriick will be taken from this edition, and the 
novel will hereafter be referenced as P W z .)
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become Integrated, once again, in the maelstrom of 
society. Baumer, 509, Graeber, Bodmer, Schwarz, and 
Ross are all representative of the maladjusted, the 
spiritually, mentally and emotionally wounded generation 
which was brought face to face with the nightmares of the 
twentieth century. And although only Baumer and Bodmer 
count as true representatives of the "lost generation" in 
the strict interpretation of the term (being victims of 
World War I) the symptoms they evince are not unique but 
are equally evident in a particular group of individuals 
after World War II. Similar times bring about similar 
themes. We can identify them all as members of the "lost 
generation." All Remarque heroes are thus part o,f the 
"lost generation," for all suffer equally from the 
symptoms understood under that rubric.
The young generation which saw military action during 
World War I— BSumer and Bodmer are Remarque's representa­
tives— was not yet out of school when the war began. Its 
members were torn from a relatively stable environment and 
cast into direct and continual confrontations with death 
where instruments of destruction became their daily com­
panions, where they learned to identify the sounds of 
imminent danger and differentiate between the sounds of 
explosions, rockets, tanks, machine gun fire, mortar
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fire, shell fire and hand grenades. They lived by the
motto: kill or get killed. BMumer expresses clearly
the destruction, the pain and the absurdity of what he
witnessed at the age of twenty:
Ich bin jung, ich bin zwanzig Jahre alt; aber ich 
kenne vom Leben nichts anderes als die Verzweiflung, 
den Tod, die Angst und die Verkettung sinnlosester 
Oberflachlichkeit mit einem Abgrund des Leidens.
Ich sehe, dad Volker gegeneinandergetrieben werden 
und sich schweigend, unwissend, toricht, gehorsam, 
unschuldig tb'ten. Ich sehe, dag die kliigsten 
Gehirne der Welt Waffen und Worte erfinden, um das 
alles noch raffinierter und langerdauernd zu 
machen. Und mit mir sehen das alle Menschen meines 
Alters hier und druben, in der ganzen Welt, mit mir 
erlebt das meine Generation. (IWnN, p. 184)
The"lost generation" is unable to bridge the gap between
war and peacetime. What knowledge its members had acquired 
in the trenches was utterly useless in civilian life, 
while the reverse was also true: that knowledge attained
in school became utterly useless at the front. BMumer 
notes the incongruity between past and present: "Zwischen
heute und damals liegt eine Kluft . . . Ich finde mich 
nicht mehr zurecht, es ist eine fremde Welt." (IWnN, p. 121) 
When the war is over, when he and others of his generation 
return home, they are as emotionally unprepared for peace­
time living as they had been for wartime duty, and they 
reenter civilian life as they had entered war: with no
firm emotional foundation in either.
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Again BMumer speaks for the "lost generation" 
when he presents his personal reaction to the horrible 
routine of death and human suffering during war, 
explaining their psychological effect on his state of 
m ind:
Wir sind verbrannt von Tatsachen . . . Wir sind 
nicht mehr unbekiimmert— wir sind furchterlich 
gleichgiiltig. Wir sind verlassen wie Kinder und 
erfahren wie alte Leute, wir sind roh und traurig 
und oberflMchlich— ich glaube, wir sind verloren.
(IWnN, p. 91)
The members of the "lost generation" of World War I 
feel they have been misused, exploited, entrapped to 
fight for what turn out to be the self-serving interests 
of others: "Okkupationsplane einer habgierigen
Industrie . . . Ruhmsucht . . . Machtwillen . . .
verlogene Romantik . . . Dummheit . . . GeschMftsgier."
(DWz, p. 121) Their sense of indifference is strictly 
a protecting device to save them from even greater 
emotional harm than what they already suffer in view of 
their experiences.
509, Graeber, Schwarz and Ross are the Remarque 
heroes who witnessed the full horror of Naziism and the 
horrible destruction during World War II, becoming thereby 
representatives of the "lost generation" of a later period. 
Graeber, on leave in his hometown from active duty at the 
front, happens to come upon his old school building. He 
reminisces about his school days not so long ago ,
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realizing— as did Baumer— that what was taught here has
no relationship to the life he was forced to lead as a
soldier and is frequently even contradictory to the
actualities of real life:
Graeber fiihlte nichts als Leere. Alles, was er nach 
der Schulzeit an Erfahrung gesammelt hatte, war 
gegen das gewesen, was er hier gelernt hatte. Nichts 
war beblieben. Es war ein Bankrott. (Zzl, p. 137)
Such examples could be multiplied indefinitely. Every
Remarque hero has his own story to tell, the emigrant no
less than the soldier or the inmate of a concentration
camp. Peculiar to them all is the intense awareness
of human cruelty, sensitivity to human suffering,
recognition that there is not much they can do to alter
that state, inability to readjust to peace time conditions
and the all-pervasive sense of estrangement and alienation
from life and man. These elements are easily and readily
attributable to the events of the time and they are what
identify the hero as part of the typical "lost generation."
One might be tempted to argue that such cate­
gorization does not differentiate the Remarque hero from 
the average man since no one is, or was, left untouched 
by the destructive powers of war. However, this is not 
the case. As was shown earlier, there is a large number 
of people, average men, good citizens, who feel no 
compunction in abnegating either personal or collective
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responsibility toward the events of the time and who are 
immune to a recollection of these events. This type is 
not endangered. For him nothing changed. War was merely 
an interlude, an interruption in the course of his life, 
an opportunity perhaps to gain a measure of recognition 
and authority, if only for a moment.
The Remarque hero, in contrast, suffers as a 
result of his experiences and the shadows of these experi­
ences remain with him. "Die Reise mit schwerem Gepack" 
becomes a motif in the novels and is a reminder of his 
inability to shake off the memories of the past. Although 
the idealism of youth dissipated when the realities of 
life set in, he does not deceive himself by thinking 
that it makes any difference what he says, thinks, or 
does, but recognizes that he has no impact on the course 
of events. Baumer says: "Wir sind keine Jugend mehr.
Wir wollen die Welt nicht mehr stiirmen. Wir sind 
Fliichtende. . . . Die erste Granate, die einschlug, traf 
in unser Herz. Wir sind abgeschlossen vom Tatigen, vom 
Streben, vom Fortschritt." (I WnN, p. 67) It is the 
recognition of such realities which sever the Remarque 
hero from the mainstream of life.
His background, however, had marked him as "normal." 
In his early life he embraced the values, aspirations and
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attitudes of the social middle class. This changed when, 
as a result of the war, he realized that these values, 
aspirations and attitudes had been instrumental, had 
aided and advanced the course of action which led to the 
catastrophic events of the time. The hero is tempted to 
ask what would have been the course of history had "der 
Mensch mit den Handen an den HosennShten," (D s O , p. 141) 
who exemplifies bourgeois mentality and whose major flaw 
is a disinclination to think, not existed in such numbers? 
On the other hand, the hero asks himself if this type of 
person is not advantaged because he can disassociate him­
self from the past and can return to his former life 
after his war-time duty has ended?
The Remarque hero displays an ambivalent attitude 
toward this average man and toward the bourgeoisie of 
which he is a member. He alternates between contempt and 
envy for the values they embody. He rejects their 
philistinism, their bourgeois concern for respectability, 
the tedious sameness of their life, the banality of their 
thoughts and actions centering around materialistic and 
egoistical interests, the ease with which they relinquish 
their individuality and personality to averageness and 
mediocrity. But he is envious of the facility and natural­
ness with which they accept their lot, envious of their 
serenity, their apparent sense of security, their clearly
defined patterns of existence. He longs for their
conventional life where there is some semblance of
regularity and surety, and longs for their simple pleasures
a wife, a garden, grilling steaks, taking a stroll,
evenings of leisure, small things that remind him of the
old times, times of peace, of dreams, of innocent youth,
of the times before the twentieth century embarked on its
path of destruction. Host of all he is envious of their
ability to turn their back on the chaos in which they
live and of their ability to accept life as it is without
asking what lies beyond. Bodmer, after another serious
discussion with Isabelle about the nature of life, about
fears and forces of persecution and about "Nothingness,"
allows his thoughts to drift, for a brief moment, in the
direction of that other way of ldfe:
Ein einfaches Leben, ohne Probleme, mit einem braven 
Beruf, einer braven Frau, braven Kindern, einem 
braven Abdienen der Existenz und einem braven Tod—  
alles als selbstverstandlich hingenommen, Tag, Feier- 
abend und Nacht, ohne Frage, was dahinter sei. Eine 
scharfe Sehnsucht danach packt mich einen Augenblick 
und etwas wie Neid. (D s O , p. 227)
Already Baumer was aware of this dichotomy and was 
concurrently attracted and repelled by the obvious display 
of indifference on the part of the "normal" population 
toward the horrors of war— which may, in fact, be nothing 
more than their personal method of coping with the 
realities at hand. Baumer said:
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Wenn ich sie so sehe, in ihren Zimmern, in ihren 
Biiros, in ihren Berufen, dann zieht das mich un- 
widerstehlich an, ich mb'chte auch darin sein und den 
Krieg vergessen; aber es st&’ftt mich auch gleich 
wieder ab, es ist so eng. Wie kann das ein Leben 
ausfiillen, man sollte es zerschlagen, wie kann 
das alles so sein, wShrend drauBen jetzt die 
Splitter iiber die Trichter sausen und die Leucht- 
kugeln hochgehen, die Verwundeten auf Zeltbahnen 
zuriickgeschleif t werden und die Kameraden sich in 
die Graben drucken!--Es sind andere Menschen hier, 
Menschen, die ich nicht richtig begreife, die ich 
beneide und verachte. (IWnN, p. 122)
Ross, the hero of Remarque's last novel, still exhibits
this same sense of ambivalence for the general population,
describing its members as
getrieben von einfachen Emotionen, von verniinftigem 
Ungliick und der Fassungslosigkeit dariiber, daB das 
Gluck kein Zustand war, sondern eine Welle im Wasser—  
bei keinem aber lauerte im Schatten eine orestische 
Verpflichtung zur Rache, eine finstere Unschuld, eine 
Verstrickung in Schuld und ein Pack von Erynnien, die 
die Erinnerung bewachten. Wie gliicklich und beneidens 
wert sie waren mit ihren Erfolgen, ihrem miiden Zynis- 
mus, ihren Bonmots und ihren harmlosen Unglucken, von 
denen ein Verlust in Geld oder Liebe schon das Limit 
war. Sie saBen alle vor mir wie Ziervogel eines ande- 
ren Jahrhunderts und zwitscherten. Wie g e m  wSre ich 
einer von ihnen gewesen, hStte vergessen und mit ihnen 
gezwitschert. (S i P , p. 125)
The whole mental make-up of the Remarque hero is such that
it becomes well-nigh impossible for him to step out of
himself in order to liberate himself from the thoughts,
memories and fears which restrain him. He never becomes
an integrated part of the general population but always
remains on the fringes of society. As Bernhard wrote in
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his analysis of Remarque’s post-World War II novels:
Die Hauptgestalten in seinen Romanen schlieBen 
nicht ihren Frieden mit der biirgerlichen Gesell- 
schaft, akzeptieren die sozialen und moralischen 
Praktiken der Bourgeoisie nicht. Sie sind Non- 
konformisten. '
He cannot help but be what he is: a branded individual.
That is his affliction, and that is what makes him a 
member of the "lost generation." Unlike a "braver 
Zweckmensch," he cannot accept his lot unquestioningly 
but must probe into the realms of the "Why" and "Where­
fore." He must carry the memory of the events of his 
time and consider their causes in order that, by under­
standing them, he may do his part to prevent a recurrence 
of human suffering such as he witnessed. He must accept 
responsibility for the events of his time simply because 
he Is a member, and thereby unwitting contributor, to the 
furor teutonicus which inflicted such horrific damage.
Our age has been described as the Age of Anxiety. 
But whereas the fears of man during war have loci— fear of 
being wounded, fear of death, of torture, of hanging, fear 
of bombings, fear of imprisonment— anxiety does not. 
Anxiety is not so much fear of a personal, immediate,
^ H a n s - J o a c h i m  Bernhard, "Erich Maria Remarques 
Romane nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg," Arbeiten fiir 
deutsche Philologie, VII (1973), p. 37.
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active sense of impending disaster, of personal terror 
directed against the self as it is the vague feeling that 
the future is unmanageable. Anxiety harbors a sense of 
unease that something unspecified and indeterminable may 
happen. It is suggestive of the state of "Geworfensein," 
a term coined by Karl Jaspers, to describe man's modern 
condition: being flung helplessly into a largely hostile
w o r l d .
Remarque's heroes have many names for their state 
of "Geworfensein" and for the kind of indefinable fear 
which permeates their being and is diffused throughout 
their consciousness. Whether they call it "Schwermut des 
Lebens," "Weltschmerz," "anonyme Angst," "das Namenlose," 
"das dunkle Gef iihl," "das Unsichtbare," "das groQe 
Dunkel," "die Angst der Ohnmacht," "das anonyme Dasein," 
"die unpersonliche Furcht," these terms all refer to an 
abstract fear which cannot be pinpointed but whose roots 
are solidly anchored in the two world wars. It is an all- 
encompassing apprehension, a conglomeration of various 
fears and is expressive of what happened, what is 
happening and what may happen.
Without exception, the Remarque hero gives evidence 
of that fear and its multifarious components. Baumer, for 
example, senses the acute emotional distress of war
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suffered by soldiers everywhere, observing, "den Schmerz
der Kreatur, die furchtbare Schwermut des Lebens und
die Erbarmungslosigkeit der Menschen." (IWnN, p. 138)
Graeber alludes to the injustice, to the lies and
deception of war, to the killing which is more nearly
like murder, to the senselessness of dying: "Es war
das Dunkle gewesen, das er im Feld so oft gespiirt hatte,
die jahe, pressende Verzweiflung." (Zzl, p. 158)
And to Graeber we can attribute the fear of the
lurid and sinister aspects of life at the front which
are now spreading and smothering hitherto uninfested
areas. In modern times of war, no place was safe anymore:
Das Ungreifbare, Gespenstische war wieder da, das 
schon so lange herumschlich, das nie ganz zu fassen 
war, das auswich und wiederkam und einen anstarrte 
und hundert undeutliche Gesichter hatte und keines.
Er blickte auf die Schienen. Sie fuhrten in die 
Heimat, in das Feste, Warme, Wartende, in den 
Frieden, das einzige, was noch geblieben war. Und 
nun schien das von drauSen mitgeschlichen zu sein, 
es atmete unheimlich neben ihm und war nicht zu 
verscheuchen. (Z z l , p. 63)
And it is Graeber who offers a superb delineation
of a great many aspects which combine to create the
"black fear" of the times:
Er spiirte die Angst wieder, stickiger, schwerer und 
klebriger als vorher. Er kannte viele Angste, 
scharfe und dunkle, atemlose und lahmende, und auch 
die letzte, groBe, die der Kreatur vor dem Tode—  
aber dieses war eine andere, es war eine kriechende, 
wiirgende Angst, unbestlmmt und drohend, eine Angst, 
die zu beschmutzen schien, schleimig und zersetzend 
die nicht zu fassen war, und der man sich nicht
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stellen konnte, eine Angst der Ohnmacht und des 
zerfressenden Zweifels, es war die korrumplerende 
Angst um den andern, um die schuldlose Geisel, den 
rechtlos Verfolgten, die Angst vor der Willkiir, 
der Macht und der automatischen Unmenschllchkelt—  
es war die schwarze Angst der Zelt. (Z z l , p. 215)
The fear of the emigrant Is voiced by Schwarz, 
who knows first-hand "die Angst vor der anonymen Angst, 
die irgendwo drauBen durch die StraBen schleicht, an die 
ich nicht denken und von der ich nicht reden will,"
(D N v L , p. 56) the fear of capture, of imprisonment, 
of concentration camps, of possible torture by fanatical 
or vainglorious Nazis and of possible death.
Finally, a fear is depicted which notes man's 
loss of direction, his difficulty in focusing, and his 
sense of being defenselessly cast into a hostile environ­
ment from which it will be insuperably difficult to exit 
(a theme quite reminiscent of contemporary writings 
outside of the framework of war):
Die Front grollte. Alles war plotzlich sehr fremd, 
und alle Verbindungen schienen gelost zu sein.
Graeber kannte das Gefiihl; er hatte es oft gehabt, 
wenn er nachts aufgewacht war und nicht gewuBt hatte, 
wo er sich befand. Es war so, als ware man aus der 
Welt herausgefalien und schwebte v&'llig einsam in 
der Dunkelheit. Es dauerte nie lange. Man fand 
immer bald zuriick; aber jedesmal blieb ein leises, 
sonderbares Gefiihl, einmal nicht mehr zuriickzu- 
finden. . . . man schrumpfte . . . ein, als w£re 
man winzig wie ein Kind, ausgesetzt in einer rie- 
sigen Steppe, aus der jeder Weg hinaus hundertmal 
zu weit war. (Zzl, p. 336)
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The foregoing evidence allows us Chen Co draw up 
a composiCe picCure of ChaC parCicular, all-embracing 
CwenCieCh cencury fear which could only come abouC aC 
a Cime "wo ein Mensch weniger isC als eine Ameise 
unCer dem Stiefel," (D N v L . p. 127) a fear which, for Che 
Remarque hero, incorporates "VerlusC," "Leere," "Willkiir 
des Menschen," "zwecklosen Tod," "Schmerz der KreaCur," 
"Leben ohne Sicherheic," "UnmenschlichkeiC," "und eine 
leere Zukunfc."
UndoubCedly, the best and most comprehensive and 
penetrating summary -description of the world of the 
Remarque hero as he experiences it, is to be obtained by 
directing the attention to Isabelle, the "crazy one,"
"the mental patient," suffering from a "psychotic 
disorder characterized by loss of contact with the 
environment." Isabelle: "Schizophren," "Seher und
Heilige," or "vom Teufel Besessene." Bodmer does not 
believe that she is ill, for she has too much insight 
into the phenomena of our world. Or, as Bodmer implies, 
is that the reason for her illness?
One of the underlying motifs in Isabelle's story 
is the division of her personality. Her "illness" 
brings about the continual interplay between reality and 
unreality making it difficult to distinguish between who 
is sane and who is insane. Isabelle observes and recog­
nizes the dangers to and of our world, yet becomes herself
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a victim. She lives In a "dreamworld" which at closer 
scrutiny becomes our reality, that is, our nightmare.
She speaks most nearly for the "lost generation" although 
outside of the context of war.
Isabelle knows about people. She deduces from 
their behavior that they do not admit to their real 
nature but hide and even negate it. She points to their 
hypocritical side and to one of the ironies of life (a 
theme of notable importance in Remarque's work) observing 
that it is the "good" people who do most of the damage 
since they can work under cover of their "goodness" 
whereas a "bad" person poses less danger since everyone 
is beware of him:
«»
Es sind unzahlige. Sie sagen, sie waren gut. Aber 
sie richten viel Bb'ses an. Wer-einfach bose 1st, 
kann wenlg tun. Man sieht es und nimmt sich vor 
ihm in acht. Aber die Guten— was die alles tun!
Ach, sie sind blutig! (D s O , p. 231)
This observation comes from the confused mind of a mental
patient? Small wonder that Bodmer does not question the
rightness or relevance of Isabelle's comments.
Isabelle also knows about the fear, thoroughly 
diffused throughout the world, forever present. Even if 
there were nothing specific to fear, the fear would 
remain and become fear of the future. It has become a 
permanent structure in the life of the hero.
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And Isabelle knows about the forces of persecution.
They are closing in on her, constricting her, ready to
smother her. She feels the vampire bats hovering about
her, waiting for blood. She hears the "voices" pursuing
her like furies, growing ever more stronger and intense
until they hold her in their grip, and once they have
mastery over her, consign her to a life of slow and
methodical torture— by sawing:
Das Sagen. Sie konnten doch schneiden, das ginge 
schneller. Aber dieses stumpfe, langsame Sagen!
Alles wachst immer schon wieder zusammen, wenn sie 
so langsam sind! Dann fangen sie wieder von vorn 
an, und so hort es nie auf. Sie sagen durch das 
Fleisch, und das Fleisch wachst dahinter zusammen, 
und es hb‘rt nie auf. (D s O , p. 251)
Isabelle incorporates in her being "die Frage
nach dem Warum, CdenU Schrei, die Angst und das Ver-
stummen." (D s O , p. 41) She was sent to the mental
hospital because she could not function "normally":
she "misinterpreted" actualities; she made "insinuations"
about the less than ideal individual and his tactics of
oppression; she "hallucinated" about fears that transform
life into nightmares; and she "imagined" the threats to
her life. Bodmer senses the agony that rages within her:
Ich spiire wieder, in welcher Einsamkeit sie lebt . . . 
allein mit ihren Gesichten, bedroht von ihnen und 
ihnen hingegeben, ohne Dach, unter das sie fliichten 
konnte, ohne Entspannung und ohne Ablenkung, aus- 
gesetzt alien Winden des Herzens, ohne Hilfe von 
irgend jemand. (DsO, p. 160)
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He recognizes that Isabelle Is more sane than all the 
so-called sane people who are able to shrug off the 
undesirable elements of their environment— at the cost 
of their individuality, whereas Isabelle sees and admits 
to the inadequacies and flaws of her world, suffering as 
a result of them.
Interestingly, or rather, ironically, when Isabelle 
is "cured" and released from the mental hospital, she 
becomes again a "Zweckmensch," going to church regularly 
and fulfilling the expectations imposed by her family 
and by her society.
The twentieth century world of the Remarque hero 
is, as we have seen, one of utter turmoil. Compared to 
the present, all previous ages seem paradisiacal. 
Nostalgically, he recalls the times of his youth before 
the wars when life was still pleasant and secure, or 
seemingly so, and in retrospect: "Friiher hatte man vieles--
Sicherheit, Hintergrund, Glauben, Ziele—  alles freund- 
liche Gelander, an denen man sich halten konnte." (A d T , 
p. 295) That stable framework is now gone. Day by day, 
the Remarque hero must live with the knowledge and awareness 
of man's past actions while the fear of future conflicts, 
of conflicts of even greater magnitude, greater horror, 
and greater terror is suspended above him. Knowing what 
he knows about man, he is justified in his fear.
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To have been a witness to man's inhumanity Is a 
heavy burden, to be sure; but It Is not man's sole 
burden. He must, In addition, carry the heaviest load 
of all: the knowledge of death and of the finitude of
man. All through the ages, man has contemplated his 
particular situation in relation to the Universe, attempt­
ing to understand death, attempting to extract meaning 
for his existence. But there is no definitive answer to 
these questions, nor can there ever be. Due to man's 
limited capacity for knowledge, many of the questions he 
has asked, must remain unanswered. Nevertheless, the 
Remarque hero probes into that mysterious realm and 
contemplates his own individual death. Much of what can 
be ascertained about Remarque's idea of death is derived 
from Bodmer's quest for answers. Bodmer rejects the 
postulate of the church to accept its explanations, 
based on faith, to believe that God has an overall plan 
in mind in which everything that happens does so for a 
reason. However, Bodmer has seen too much suffering, 
too much cruelty, and too much dying in his time, too 
many things happening to the wrong people, to accept 
naive explanations of heaven and hell, of justice, of 
reward for the good and punishment for the bad. He 
believes that man has been given his power of reasoning, 
his critical faculty and his yearning for proof in order
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that he shall use them. And Bodmer does. He employs 
his rational faculties in the attempt to elucidate his 
particular situation in his particular time and to 
endeavor to understand the nature of death— ultimately 
without success.
For the Remarque hero, death is something to be 
avoided at all cost. In no case is there ever any 
intimation that it should be regarded as a means of 
liberation, a means to free him from servitude to the 
petty cares of his daily life or to free him from the 
horrors of existence. Death is a two-pronged phenomenon: 
it is a reality, and it is an abstraction. It is a fact 
that men die. This happens every day in the world. But 
as long as death remains a fact outside ourselves, we 
have not yet passed from the proposition "men die" to 
the proposition"I am to die." Death is a reality when 
we are directly faced with it; it is an abstraction when 
imminent danger does not exist although we are conscious 
of its eventual occurrence. In either case, however, 
death is final and signifies the end of life and the end 
of man. Bodmer explains the difference thusly: " . . .
der Tod, der einen nicht erreicht hat, ist das geworden, 
was er fast immer im Leben ist: etwas Abstraktes, aber
nicht mehr Wirklichkeit. Wirklichkeit ist er nur, wenn 
er nahe einschlagt oder nach einem greift." (D s O , p. 103)
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Real death is the natural ally of war. Its statis­
tical probability is high. It is the soldier's every­
day companion and is the most elemental yet most resolute 
threat to his existence. It is a physical death only 
and has no metaphysical implication. It is a fact of 
life that strikes the old and the strong with equal force 
as the young and the weak and is equally traumatic for 
all. Death during war is "eine verniinftige Angst," as 
Isabelle said, and survival is strictly a matter of luck. 
Again and again, Remarque's hero finds himself in precarious 
situations from which he may or may not exit victoriously. 
When he does evade death, temporarily, he reflects 
realistically and unemotionally about his good fortune: 
"Kinder, Kinder! . . . Das hatte schiefgehen kb'nnen
. . . Leicht hatte es sein konnen, daQ wir heute nicht
auf unsern Kasten saBen, es war verdammt nahe daran."
(IWnN, p. 18) "Heute du, morgen ich." (IWnN, p. 160) 
"Ebenso zufallig, wie ich getroffen werde, bleibe ich am 
Leben . . . Jeder Soldat bleibt nur durch tausend Zufalle
am Leben." (IWnN. p. 76) Chance is like nature: some­
times for man, sometimes against him, but always in­
different to his personal plight.
Fear of death is the paramount reason for a 
Remarque character to fight so vehemently against dying.
Even with the full knowledge that death would deliver 
him from his hell on earth, he rejects it as a solution. 
With the full knowledge that death is final, he is 
horrorstricken when faced with its reality as is evident 
in the Frenchman, trapped behind enemy lines, aware that 
his hour of doom has come, consigned to a slow and 
painful death at the hands of Baumer; and as is evident 
in the inmates of Mellern concentration camp who are 
forced to run round and round the roll-call ground as 
part of a vicious power play by their Nazi squad leader, 
and who know that they are running not only to satisfy 
their leader's ravenous desire for a show of power, but 
that, above all, they are running for their life since 
those unable to run will almost certainly be killed. In 
both cases, the realization that death is at hand evinces 
a silent outcry of elemental horror and reveals man's 
desperate fear of death: "Cdie Angst war d a 3 : die Angst
der Angste, die groBe Angst vor dem Tode." (D F L , p. 126)
" . . . die Augen schreien, briillen, in ihnen ist alles
Leben versammelt zu einer unfaBbaren Anstrengung, zu ent- 
fliehen, zu einem schrecklichen Grauen vor dem Tode."
(IWnN, p. 155) The Remarque hero will endure more than 
seems humanly possible that one human being can endure if 
it means prolonging life and thwarting death.
Since death is synonymous with end of life, the
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Remarque hero must evade it for as long as possible.
Ultimate avoidance is, of course, not possible, and all 
one can hope for is an extension of the inevitable.
"Jeder kommt dran. . . . Jeder . . . selbst wenn er einmal
entwischt. Er kommt eben das nSchstemal dran." (D N v L , 
p. 96) It is the memento mori motif of the Baroque period, 
one of three themes characteristic of both the seventeenth 
and twentieth Century and germane in their applicability 
to Remarque (vanitas and carpe diem being the other two).
But until that final day of death arrives, a day over which 
he has absolutely no control, he wages his own war of 
resistance. And only when the threat to life is immediate 
and direct, can he do anything at all, however insignificant 
and however limited its impact, to try to save himself, that 
is, to postpone his extinction.
And this seems to be the very crux of the rejection 
of death: extinction. Specifically, extinction of the
self in its present form. Whether there is anything 
beyond death, the hero cannot be sure. If there is, it 
would most likely be another self, "ein neues Ich," (D s O , 
p. 58) but one that would have no awareness, no relation 
and no connection to the present self. All that he really 
knows, or can know, is that he, as a human being, as a 
self, and as an entity onto himself, will end with death. 
That alone is reason enough for him to defer as long as
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possible what Is ultimately his fate. In a discussion 
with Isabelle, Bodmer gives an explanation of what might 
be expected after death: "Was Tod 1st, weifl nlemand,
Isabelle. Man kann Ihn deshalb mit nichts vergleichen.
Aber wir wiirden uns slcher nicht mehr als Selbst fiihlen.
Wir wiirden nur wieder ein anderes einsames Ich werden."
(D s O , p. 158) And Fresenburg explains it in these words: 
"Ein Stuck Leben kann manchmal verdammt kurz sein, was?
Und dann kommt ein anderes, von dem man absolut nichts 
kennt." (Zzl, p. 335) The most comprehensive analysis 
comes from Graeber. Catching his reflection in the mirror, 
he envisions himself as he disintegrates and dissolves 
into Nothingness: "Zuriickgezogen aus dem Begrenzten und
der zufalligen Form, die fur kurze Zeit Ernst Graeber 
hieB, zuriick in das Grenzenlose, das nicht nur Tod war, 
sondern entsetzlich viel mehr, Auslb'schung, Aufl6‘sung,
Ende des Ichs, Wirbel sinnloser Atome, Nichts." (Z zl, p. 
197) And so it is fear of the unknown as much as it is 
nullification of his being that makes him crave the present 
and maintain his present status. For no matter how much 
misery, suffering and unhappiness is levelled against 
him, if death means total obliteration of his self, then 
he will cling to the life he now has. For that is all that 
he will have.
In essence, real death and abstract death are two
aspects of the same phenomenon: obliteration of the self.
What differentiates them, basically, is that real death, 
the immediate and direct threat to life, arouses man's 
intense and powerful survival instinct, a physical 
response, negating any mental activity as part of its 
survival program, whereas abstract death, affording no 
immediate threat to life, makes mental activity its main 
point of interest; by that is meant that recognition of 
abstract death effects an emotional and intellectual 
response rather than a physical one. Knowledge of ultimate 
death colors man's consciousness and charges it with a 
sense of despondency. To know about death is one of the 
"advantages" we have over other living organisms: "Erst
seit wir wissen, dali wir sterben miissen, und weil wir es 
wissen, wurde Idyll zu Drama, Kreis zu Lanze, Werden zu 
Vergehen, und Schrei zu Furcht und Flucht zu Urteil."
(DsO, p. 252) In the end, however, the fine distinction 
between real death and abstract death is of no substantial 
consequence. Abstract death becomes real sooner or later 
and brings about the end of a particular being with equal 
force. Every kind of death is thus an enemy of man.
The emotional and intellectual response of a 
Remarque hero to the realization that death is absolute 
and that it signifies his personal extinction is expressed 
by the attitude that nothing is permanent and, conversely,
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that everything is transitory. It is the Vanitas
motif of the Baroque age, expressed most succinctly by
Andreas Gryphius, the most representative writer of the
Baroque period. His poem entitled Menschliches Elende
clarifies the situation of man in the seventeenth century
when the Thirty-Year War ravaged the land, almost halved
the population of Germany and brought about the prevailing
mood of the "Fluchtigkeit and Nichtigkelt des mensch-
lichen Lebens." Gryphius’ poem is superbly expressive
of the feeling of human suffering and vulnerability, of
the brevity of life and temporariness of existence which
the typical Remarque hero experiences so intently:
Was sind wir Menschen doch? Ein Wohnhaus grimmer
Schmerzen,
ein Ball des falschen Glucks, ein Irrlicht dieser Zeit, 
ein Schauplatz herber Angst, besetzt mit scharfem Leid, 
ein bald verschmelzter Schnee und abgebrannte Kerzen. 
Dies Leben fleucht davon wie ein Geschwatz und Scherzen. 
Die vor uns abgelegt des schwachen Leibes Kleid 
und in das Totenbuch der groBen Sterblichkeit 
langst eingeschrieben sind, sind uns aus Sinn und Herzen. 
Gleich wie ein eitel Traum leicht aus der Acht hinfallt 
und wie ein Strom verscheuBt, den keine Macht aufhalt, 
so muB auch unser Nam, Lob, Ehr und Ruhm verschwinden. 
Was itztund Atem holt, muB mit der Luft entfliehn, 
was nach uns kommen wird, wird uns ins Grab nachziehn. 
Was sag ich? Wir vergehn wie Rauch von starken Winden. 8
Judging man's present condition based on information 
provided by the Remarque hero, the contention is that man
18
Andreas Gryphius, "Menschliches Elende,” in Deutsche 
Barock-Lyrik, ed. by Herbert Cysarz (Stuttgart: Reclam,
1968), p. 109.
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must accept the fact that he Is transient, that he 
resides on this planet for a short time only, and that 
he plays an Insignificant role In the Universe. Man 
deceives himself If he considers himself to be the 
epitome of creation as he Is tempted to do. It Is an 
Illusion to think that he is important, that he is an 
integral part of the whole, that life is eternal, and 
that he will become part of the continuum after death—  
in a transformed state. Ross states his observation in 
these words: "CEs 1st dieD Illusion der Welt: Dafi
Leben ewig 1st und dafl wir ewig leben, wenn es nur gelingt, 
die Schlangenhaut des Ichs abzuwerfen und zu wissen, dafi 
der Tod eine Verwandlung ist." (SIP, p. 120) At most, 
man may compare his existence to a snowflake drifting 
briefly and aimlessly above the surface before becoming 
totally submerged in, and absorbed by Nothingness. The 
world is in perpetual motion and engaged in perpetual 
change and will continue to turn with or without man.
Only when things no longer exist, do they no longer change.
Just as there is no permanence in our existence, so 
there is no permanence in human relationships. All are 
reduced to temporariness, following the same law as rules 
man's existence: perpetual motion and perpetual change.
Schwarz asks a theoretical question on this topic, know­
ing that it is at the same time his answer: "Verliert man
nicht immerfort, was man zu halten glaubt, well es sich 
bewegt? Und steht es nicht still, erst wenn es nicht 
mehr da ist und sich nicht mehr andern kann?" (DNvL, 
p. 19) Even meaningful relationships are accompanied by 
the fear of loss and are all doomed to failure in the end. 
Such is the case between Pat and Robby, between Joan and 
Ravic, Elisabeth and Graeber, Isabelle and Bodmer, and 
between Helen and Schwarz, to name only the most obvious 
alliances. In all instances there comes a separation, 
spatial separation or death, which can never be bridged.
Ross laments: "Nichts im Leben Cist3 von Dauer," (SiP,
p. 324) while Bodmer mourns eventual loss thusly:
"Ungliick ist, dad man sich immerfort verlassen m u S , jeden 
Tag und jede Stunde. Man weiB es und kann es nicht 
aufhalten, es rinnt einem durch die Hande und ist das 
Kostbarste, was es gibt, und man kann es doch nicht 
halten. Immer stirbt einer zuerst. Immer bleibt einer 
zurvick." (D s O , p. 159) In the end then everyone is alone. 
Whatever a relationship can provide in terms of emotional 
support and meaningfulness to life is of short duration, and 
man is cast out again, alone, into a hostile environment. 
Nothing that is of importance to him, his life, the life of 
a particular person and the bond between that person and 
himself, remains. Everything evaporates into Nothingness, 
as Graeber was to find out. He laments the involuntary
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separation from his wife, knowing that It will ultimately
translate Into permanent loss:
Nlchts war da als der klare Schmerz des Verlustes.
Es war ein Verlust fur Immer. Nirgendwo war eine 
Briicke. Er hatte es gehabt, und es war verloren.
Er horchte In sich hlnein. Irgendwo muBte noch eine 
Stimme sein, ein Echo von Hoffnung muiste noch irgendwo 
herumgeistern. Er fand nlchts. Es war nur Leere da 
und namenloser Schmerz. (Zzl, p. 325)
Graeber contemplates with great sorrow the realiza­
tion that nothing will remain of him after death, that 
even the remembrance of his existence will fade, rather 
quickly, and that there will be no cogency of evidence that 
he ever existed. Solicitously, he implores fate to 
provide an anchor to ensure that he will not sink into 
oblivion:
Was blieb dachte er tief erschrocken. Was blieb, 
wenn er nicht mehr da war? Nlchts als die verge- 
hende Erinnerung in den Kd'pfen weniger Menschen, 
seiner Eltern, wenn sie noch lebten, einiger 
Kameraden, Elisabeths vlelleicht--und fur wie lange?
. . . Was blieb? Und wo konnte er sich festhalten,
wo einen Anker auswerfen, wo Halt finden, wo etwas 
hinterlassen, das ihn hielt, um nicht vd’llig wegge- 
trieben zu werden? . . . Ihn frb'stelte wieder. Was 
blieb? Irgend etwas sollte bleiben, dachte er, ein 
Anker, der einen hielt, damit man.nicht verlorenginge 
und zuriickkame. (Z z l , pp. 197-200)
But in the world of Remarque there is no anchor.
In essence, man lives alone and he certainly dies alone, 
as Pascal said. M a n ’s life is temporary, as are his 
relationships. Death severs him from the only world he 
will ever know. All probings into the nature of being, of 
death, of the meaning of life by the Remarque hero must
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by necessity remain acts of futility, for the macrocosm
does not yield answers. That does not, however, prevent
Bodmer from doing so. Vicar Bodendieck asks him if he
thought that no one before him had mused over such
questions as Bodmer was contemplating, to which Bodmer
responds: "Ja, unzahlige. Und kliigere als ich. . . . Das
andertnichts daran, daB ich es nicht auch tue." (D s O ,
p. 81) And so he continues to ponder and question:
Ich kann nicht richtig spielen, weder auf dem 
Klavier noch auf dem Leben, nie, nie habe ich es 
gekonnt, immer war ich zu hastig, immer zu un- 
geduldig, immer kam etwas dazwischen, immer brach 
es ab— aber wer kann schon richtig spielen, und wenn 
er es kann, was niitzt es ihm dann? Ist das groBe 
Dunkel darum weniger dunkel, sind die Fragen ohne 
Antwort darum weniger aussichtslos, brennt die 
Verzweiflung iiber die ewige Unzulanglichkeit darum 
weniger schmerzhaft, und ist das Leben dadurch 
jemals zu erklaren und zu fassen und zu reiten wie 
ein zahmes Pferd, oder ist es immer wie ein mach- 
tiges Segel im Sturm, das uns tragt und uns, wenn 
wir es greifen wollen, ins Wasser fegt? Da ist 
manchmal ein Loch vor mir, das scheint bis in den 
Mittelpunkt der Erde zu reichen. Was fiillt es 
aus? Die Sehnsucht? Die Verzweiflung? Ein Gluck? 
Und welches? Die Miidigkeit? Die Resignation?
Der Tod? Wozu lebe ich? Ja, wozu lebe ich? (D s O , 
p. 29)
The effort is, of course, useless. The only 
specific results to be derived from pondering the world 
of the impenetrable is to come to the realization that 
there are no answers. That recognition, in conjunction 
with what he observes in the external world, its strife, 
conflict and evil, provides more than sufficient cause to 
explain the Remarque hero's essentially negative per­
ception of the world.
CHAPTER IV 
THE MICROCOSM AS POSITIVE EXPERIENCE
Every Remarque hero finds himself in an "extreme 
situation," to use an expression by Karl Jaspers; he finds 
himself on the other side of what is normal, routine, 
accepted, safeguarded— according to traditional inter­
pretation. As we have seen, the historical events of the 
time were not merely incidental and did not have merely 
cursory impact upon the age, but they, in fact, have 
characterized that age to the marrow; they have shown 
how flimsy our world really is. After disasters man is 
always brought face to face with his condition and is 
compelled to confront his own situation. What he 
discovers has always been there, lying concealed beneath 
the surface of even the best-functioning societies, but 
as long as he does not have to confront certain truth, he 
will not do so. For the Remarque hero, the sensitive and 
cogitative individual that he is, acknowledging the de 
facto existence of the evil in man and the actuality of 
death and all their ramifications means becoming imbued 
with a sense of alienation and estrangement from society, 
a sense of separation from the world which has proved to 
be different from the world as he imagined it would be. It 
means becoming cognizant of the existence of fear, anxiety
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and nothingness, of the fragility and contingency of human 
life, of man's solitary and unsheltered condition, of the 
impotence of reason, and of the radical sense of human 
finitude. He has come to realize that his world is 
unsafe and cruel, that his social condition is hopelessly 
disordered and that it is not blind but irrational forces 
that disturb and destroy his humanity.
The world of the Remarque hero is one of contrast. 
Han's learning has been proved to be of dubious worth, 
and there is great disparity between his external life 
where he wields enormous power and his inner life of 
poverty. He is a creature full of holes and gaps, riddled 
with doubts and fears, starkly mortal, lagging far behind 
his works. He has not shown himself to be the rational 
animal the Greeks purported him to be; rather, he is more 
inclined to verify Nietzsche's concept of man: that he is
the most dangerous of the animals.
Always mindful of what he has witnessed and what 
he himself has endured, and aware of the negative elements 
in man and in life, the Remarque hero does not, however, 
succumb to the Schopenhauer tenet of total pessimism but 
is able to affirm life despite everything. As became clear 
in the previous chapter, forces operate in the macrocosm 
which antagonize him, causing hostility and conflict. It 
is these forces lying outside his sphere of influence,
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over which he has no, or little, control, that are 
responsible for his overall pessimistic outlook. Within 
that macrocosm he occupies his space. And it is here, in 
his own niche, where he can exert some control and have 
some measure of freedom over his life— although perhaps 
only enough to be able to utter a resounding "No."
Only in his personal and private world, in the microcosm, 
can the hero's humanity be validated, upheld by living 
according to his own laws as they are reflected in his 
thoughts, his actions or even inaction. How he lives in 
his own space is his decision alone, and only here is 
he totally in charge.
The Remarque hero does not search for nirvana. He 
is not encumbered by impossible dreams; he does not expect 
"the sun to light his cigars"— as Durant claims that 
Schopenhauer did. He is pragmatic and realistic, and 
does the best with what he has available. He subscribes 
to Epicureanism and to the Carpe Diem motif of the 
Baroque age. It is "im Kleinen," in the simple pleasures 
and delights, and in the personal and private relationships 
of people to people that he sees positive aspects of 
life. And it is, above all, the mere fact of living, of 
simply being alive, that obviates total pessimism.
To a certain extent, the great desire to hang on 
to life can be traced back to the hero's recognition that
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everything ends with death and that If extinction is 
to be deferred he must grasp at all straws to prolong 
life and postpone the inevitable. Yet this attitude, 
although it is extremely prominent, does not explain the 
total picture. For the Remarque hero, there is a definite, 
distinct, and absolutely tenacious attraction to life 
that goes so far as to hint that everything is better than 
being dead. And it is the nearness of death that makes 
life so much sweeter. Enthusiastically, he hurls himself 
into life, every fiber of his being giving evidence of 
his love of life. In the phraseology of psychoanalyst 
Erich Fromm, this marks the Remarque hero as a "bio- 
philous" person, one who loves life. Fromm contends 
that biophilia "is not constituted by a single trait, 
but represents a total orientation, an entire way of 
b e i n g . H e  explains that the will to live, to preserve 
its existence, is an inherent quality of all living 
organisms; as Spinoza expressed it: "Each thing, in so
far as it is in itself, endeavors to persevere in its 
being." This tendency to live is observable in the 
plants that break through the ground to get light, and 
thereby life, in the animal that will fight to the last
^Erich Fromm, The Heart of Man: Its Genius for 
Good and Evil (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 45.
2
Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, with an introduction 
by James Gutmann (New YOrk: Hafner Press, 1949), p. 135.
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In order to escape death, and In man who will do almost 
anything to preserve his life. According to Fromm, this 
life instinct constitutes the primary and most fundamental 
potentiality in man; most living beings "fight for life 
with an extraordinary tenacity, and only exceptionally do 
they tend to destroy themselves." There is one further 
aspect to love of life, as Fromm suggests: to integrate,
to unite, to fuse with different and opposite entities— a 
characteristic of all life processes. It is "the male- 
female polarity CwhichU constitutes the core of that need 
for fusion," and "for this very reason nature has provided 
man with the most intense pleasure in the fusion of the 
two poles.
A person characterized by biophilia is one who loves 
life, loves' the adventure,of living more than he’does 
certainty and who enjoys life and all its manifestations. 
Such a person has his own ethics, his own principle of 
good and evil: good is all that which serves life, all
that which enhances life and growth. Fromm maintains that 
love of life underlies the various versions of humanistic 
philosophy and is expressive of the principles that the 
sane man loves life, that sadness is sin and joy a virtue, 
and that m a n ’s aim in life should be to become attracted to
3
Fromm, 0£. c i t ., p. 49.
^Ibid., p . 46.
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all that which is alive, and to separate himself from all 
that which is dead and mechanical.
As early as Im Westen nichts Neues, the Remarque
hero expresses an intense hunger and desire for life.
Baumer, whose friend has just died as a result of his
war-wounds, feels the irrepressible urge to live,
stimulated by the memories of pleasures as he has known
them in his.short life:
Ich atme, so sehr ich es vermag, und spiire die Luft 
warm und weich wie nie in meinem Gesicht. Gedanken 
an Madchen, an bluhende Wiesen, an weiSe Wolken fliegen 
mir pldtzlich durch den Kopf.. . . . Soldaten kommen 
an mir voruber, ihre Gesprache erregen mich, ohne 
daft ich sle verstehe. Die Erde ist von Kraften durch- 
flossen . . . Die Nacht knistert elektrisch . . .
Meine Glieder bewegen sich geschmeidig, ich fiihle 
meine Gelenke stark . . . Die Nacht lebt, ich lebe.
Ich spiire Hunger, einen grdfteren als nur vom 
Magen. (IWnN, pp. 29-30)
And as late as Remarque's last novel, Schatten im
Paradies. the desire to live and the acknowledgment of
the joy of being alive is evident. Robert Ross, reminiscing
about the time of long ago when he again had eluded the
Nazis, leaves no doubt as to his feeling about being alive:
"von allem CwarD nur das Gefiihl iibriggeblieben, daft ich
noch lebte und da war." (S i P , p. 166) Between the first
and the last Remarque hero, innumerable statements and
exclamations attest to the "Lebensgier" which becomes a
salient element in all of Remarque's writing: "Leben, Leben,
Leben" (IWnN, p. 198); "Wir wollen leben urn jeden Preis"
(IWnN, p. 102); "Solange wir leben ist alles ein Trost"
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(DNvL, p. 119); "Froh zu seln, daS man noch da ist"
(Z z l , p. 187); "FriB das Dasein" (AdT t p. 88); "Leben, 
ganz gleich wo und wie, verlaust, zerschlagen, blutend, 
Leben trotz allem." (D FL, p. 61)
That tiny spark of life is a concept of principal 
importance to Remarque's work. It exemplifies that 
tenacious desire of every Remarque hero to hang onto 
life no matter what the cost. The concept consists 
basically of two elements: in its simplest form, the
spark of life is to be equated with being a person, 
being human, with "Mensch-sein," as becomes clear when 
Baumer refers to himself and to his friend Kat as "zwei 
Menschen, zwei winzige Funken Leben," (IWnN, p. 72) or 
as is evident when Ross laments man's ultimate state of 
loneliness and alienation, a state "in der man der 
letzte und erste und verlassenste Funke Leben ist."
(SiP, p. 175). As regards its second referent, spark 
of life refers to that particular drive, that impelling 
concern and dynamic force which imbues some men with an 
animating and vital feeling, aiding them in preserving 
their life. Bodmer and Ross both sense within themselves 
that spark of life "der nicht erloschen CwillD." (SiP, p. 
151)
The life instinct is one of the most memorable and 
impressive qualities in the Remarque hero. In every novel
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there Is at least one episode where the everlasting 
miracle of life is celebrated, and in no novel is it more 
manifest than in Der Funke Leben. The novel is a drama 
in which every scene is a crisis, and the resolution is 
always a matter of life or death. The manuscript of the 
first German draft of this novel, deposited in the Library 
of Congress in Washington, D. C., contains an explanation 
by Remarque in which he states that the novel is "eine 
Geschichte iiber das Leben selbst; iiber die unglaubliche 
Fahigkeit des Menschen zu iiberleben . . . eine Geschichte
uber die Wiirde des Menschen, die nicht durch seinen 
Miflbrauch von auGen zerstSrt werden kann, nur durch ihn 
selbst."'* 509 exhibits man's primary and fundamental 
life preserving tendency, as Fromm analyzed it, to the 
utmost. He is a model of endurance and determination 
against impossible odds. He has been in the Mellern 
concentration camp for ten years. When we meet him, he 
is in a special section of the camp reserved for those no 
longer fit for labor and expected to die within weeks.
Here he has already survived for four months supported 
by the "Veterans," that group of similarly fated prisoners, 
all still alive by pooling their spiritual and material 
resources, and all stubbornly refusing to allow the tiny
■*Hans Wagener, "Erich Maria Remarque," in Deutsche 
Exilliteratur seit 1933. Vol. I: Kalifornien (Berne:
Francke Verlag, 1976), p. 597.
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spark of life within them to be extinguished. In this 
novel, Remarque gives evidence of the survival of the 
human spirit under unimaginable stress. 509 embodies 
that spark of life "Cderlf trotz allem nicht erstorben war." 
(DFL, p. 235) This spark must be kept burning, even 
under conditions of utter despair and humiliation, for it 
is those who are able to draw upon it, who are able to 
draw upon the inexhaustible resources of the spirit, who 
stay alive the longest. Ravic, the hero of Arc de 
Triomphe points to the Nike of Samothrace, the goddess 
of victory, to serve as a symbol to all those who do 
not give up— even under the most dire circumstances.
Once the hero's "aliveness" has been assured, 
perhaps only until the next battle or the next air-raid 
or capture or torture, in every case temporarily, he can 
direct his efforts toward enjoying his lease on life.
And in this area the Remarque hero excels although 
frequently an aura of doom accompanies his efforts.
Finding himself outside of the immediate threat of danger, 
he relishes life's simple pleasures, which, besides bring­
ing enjoyment, are deemed to have a saving power: nature,
food, drink, friendship, and love are positive factors to 
counteract much of what is negative in life. In every 
case, the positive factors display both a primary and 
secondary quality: initially they serve strictly as a
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means to ensure survival. Once survival has been assured, 
they take on the function of facilitating life and 
making it more enjoyable and of allowing one to forget the 
surrounding dangers or allowing one to become oblivious 
to them.
In nature, it is specifically the earth which, in
times of war, becomes the soldier's foremost ally in his
fight for survival:
Fiir niemand ist die Erde so viel wie fur den Soldaten. 
Wenn er sich an sie prefit, lange, heftig . . .  in der 
Todesangst des Feuers, dann ist sie sein einziger 
Freund, sein Bruder, seine Mutter . . . Erde--Erde—  
Erde— .' (IWnN, pp. 44-45)
And it is the earth which rekindles his spirits: "Aus
der Erde, aus der Luft . . . strb'men uns Abwehrkrafte
zu— am meisten von der Erde." (IWnN, p. 45) It is the
medicinal power of nature, as Schwarz observes, which
entrusts her to man; despite her seeming indifference to
his plight, nature becomes a blessing in disguise,
affecting man's well-being and alleviating his pain:
"Sie war . . . das, was uns nie zurvickwies. . . . Sie
gab und nahm, aber sie war unpersdnlich, und das war wie
eine Medizin." (DNvL, p. 142) She becomes man's mentor
and guide, giving him lessons in survival. A tree,
uprooted during the last bombing, its trunk split, its
branches ripped off, continues to bloom lavishly; it does
not give in or give up, but continues along its destined
path, remaining true to its intrinsic function, refusing
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to yield to the external onslaught:
Sie geben uns Lehren. Sie geben uns unaufhtirlich 
Lehren. Heute nachmittag war es eine Linde, jetzt 
ist es dieser. Sie wachsen und treiben Blatter und 
Bliiten, und selbst wenn sie zerrissen sind, treibt 
der Tell weiter, den noch ein Stuck Wurzel im Boden 
halt. Sie geben uns unaufhb'rlich Lehren, und sie 
jammern nicht und haben kein Mitleid mit sich 
selbst. (Z zl, p. 177)
The tree stands as a symbol of perseverance against the
odds and as a symbol of life amidst chaos. Graeber
acknowledges it as such and applies the lesson to his
life, except that— as is typical for a Remarque hero—
death always ends it all too soon. And, finally, nature
provides man with hope at a time when his condition
seems hopeless; time and again it is "Knospen,11 "Bliiten,"
and "Friihling" which rejuvenate his soul and remind him
of his option in dealing with destruction and death:
"Friihling . . . Wachsen. . . . Das kam wieder, jedes
Jahr, mit Schwalben und Bliiten, gleichgiiltig gegen
Krieg und Tod und Trauer und Hoffnung. Es kam. Es war
da. Das war genug." (D F L , p. 191)
It is all things gustatory, "belegte Butterbrote
und selbstgemachter Kartoffelsalat,11 (D s O , p. 101)
"Spanferkel und Kartoffelpuffer," (IWnN, p. 164) the
aroma of "gebratener Leber mit Zwiebeln" (D s O , p. 94)
which initially ensure-, later enhance life. Whether
it is the front-line soldier who kills a goose with gusto,
prepares it, and shares it with his comrades, or whether
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it is a gourmet like Clerfayt in Der Himmel kennt keine 
Gvinstlinge who is as knowledgeable about these matters as 
a Cordon-Bleu chef, food is one of the delectable diver­
sions. To catalogue the almost incredible variety of 
food in Remarque's novels would prove a formidable task.
Alcohol has the same dual function of aiding in
survival and, subsequently, of facilitating life. It
dulls the senses to despair and to the pain of living,
and becomes an anaesthetic in times of distress. It
provides an aura of warmth and gives enjoyment to life,
and heightens the quality of living. Whether it is vodka,
calvados, cognac or lesser known drinks, alcohol is a
necessary and a pleasurable ingredient,in the life of the
Remarque hero. Robby, the hero of Drei Kameraden,
describes its effects:
Langsam bekam alles Griff und Glanz. Die Unsicher- 
heit schwand, die Worte kamen von selber . . . Ich
trank weiter und spiirte, wie die grorte, weiche Welle 
herankam und mich erfaBte, . . . es war eine Ecke
der Welt, ein Winkel der Zuflucht, ein halbdunkler 
Unterstand, urn den ringsumher die ewige Schlacht des 
Chaos brauste . . . Ich hSrte-mich sprechen, aber es
war, als ware ich es nicht mehr, als sprSche jetzt 
ein anderer, einer, der ich hatte sein mfigen. Die 
Worte stimmten nicht mehr, sie verschoben sich, sie 
drangten hiniiber in andere, buntere Gebiete, als 
sie die kleinen Ereignisse meines Lebens geben 
konnten— ich wuQte, daS sie schon nicht mehr Wahr- 
heit waren daS sie zu Phantasie und Luge wurden, 
aber es war mir gleich— , die Wahrheit war trostlos 
und fahl, und nur das Geftthl und der Abglanz der 
Traume war Leben—  (DK, pp. 34-35)
Remarque himself was quite favorably disposed toward 
a glass of wine, or two or more. As Baumer relates,
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Zuckmayer, in his autobiography Als war's ein Stuck von 
m i r , refers to some evenings he spent with Remarque in 
Austria, Switzerland, and America where alcohol flowed 
freely: "Was dabei an alkoholischen Getranken aller Art
konsumiert wurde, diirfte dem Kellereibestand eines groflen 
internationalen Hotels mit Bar- und Restaurationsbetrieb 
e n t s p r e c h e n . T h e  Remarque hero consumes alcohol with 
the same fervor as did the author himself.
It is signs of genuinely human concern and 
behavior and of human intercourse which serve as an aid 
in survival and keep alive the hope for a better tomorrow. 
Comradeship between those experiencing a like fate during 
times of war in their fight with immediate death makes 
this evident as does the comradeship of the post-war 
adjustment period. It is evident in the special bond of 
kinship, of mutual support and encouragement among inmates 
of the concentration camp in their common struggle to 
survive against formidable odds; in the unselfish, com­
passionate and sympathetic efforts of ordinary citizens 
aiding emigrants in securing a hide-away or providing a 
rallying place, risking their life to save another. All
^Franz Baumer, Erich Maria Remarque, Kb'pfe des 
XX. Jahrhunderts, Vol. 85 (Berlin: Colloquium, 1976), p. 16.
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are a testimony that the "good" side in man is not
extinct. Robert Ross acknowledges just such a symbol
of good will, one, as he recalls, in a long line of others:
Ein warmes Gefiihl stieg in mir auf. Es war viel 
Zeit vergangen, seit ich gespiirt hatte, da 13 mich 
jemand gern hatte, ohne etwas von mir zu wollen.
Es war eigentlich nicht so lange her, fand ich, als 
ich daruber nachdachte. Die Welt war voll von 
guten Menschen: Das merkte man erst, wenn es einem
sehr schlecht ging, und es war eine gewisse Aus- 
sohnung dafvir, daS es einem sehr schlecht ging.
(S iP, p. 87)
And, finally, it is love, with its many ramifi­
cations, which proves to have a life-saving quality and 
which intensifies living in a positive way. Early in 
his career, Remarque ascribed positive qualities to love 
and praised its potentiality to counteract all that is 
negative in the world; his poem Abendlied, appearing 
in the Osnabriicker Tageblatt in 1920, gives evidence of 
this notion:
Und ob der Tag auch wild und qualvoll war, 
von Ironie und Hohn und Leid zerfressen, 
ein KuB von Dir--der Duft von Deinem Haar, 
lieB mich am Abend alle Qual vergessen.
Wenn auch des Tags erbarmungsloser Brand 
mir alien Glauben an das Leben raubte, 
es brauchte nur das Streicheln Deiner Hand, 
daB ich am Abend dennoch wieder glaubte.
Und wenn auch alles, was ich je gelebt, 
nutzloser Kampf von Anfang war zum Ende, 
es war doch gut und schb’n' denn silbern schwebt 
darauf der Segen Deiner milden Hande.?
7Ibid., p. 58.
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In every case, love is more than a casual sexual 
encounter. To be sure, sex is an important element in 
every male-female relationship, except between Bodmer 
and Isabelle, but it is never only that. Even in the 
case of Baumer's first sexual experience, which was con­
strued to be a purely sexual one, it is evident that the 
rewards were greater than anticipated, for surrounding 
it is an aura of enchantment, of extreme tenderness to 
the extent that even the objects in the room are trans­
formed as if by magic; furthermore, it proved to be a 
means to shut out the war and its terror and to evoke an 
earlier time of a carefree and happy existence. The 
love affairs represent a flight from an inhospitable 
environment toward something pleasureable, perhaps even 
something sustaining. Initially, relationships are built 
on a mutual understanding of "no strings attached" 
association. What the Remarque hero looks for, and 
finds, is relief from loneliness and isolation, respite 
from fear— that abstract fear that has no locus— a sense 
of protection against that feeling of envelopment into 
Nothingness. But he remains without emotional ties. 
Michael O'Malley, in his review of Shadows in Paradise, 
refers to it as "cool city sex: sex between equals;
without vows, without loyalties, but also without
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deceptions on either side." O'Malley's statement about 
Ross and Natascha Is equally applicable to other relation­
ships In their early stages. At this point, they are 
rational, cynical and often tired affairs, and love is, 
as O'Malley says, a small light "lit in their bodies,
g
put out when bodies part." Robert Ross describes his
sentiments at a time when he finds himself in the early
stage of an evolving relationship; at this point his
feelings for Natascha are
ein Gemisch aus verschiedenen Griinden . . . es war 
Feigheit dabei und der Wunsch, nicht noch verloren- 
zugehen in jener geheimnisvollen und lauernden 
Zwischenzeit der Hilflosigkeit, die zwischen Rettung 
und Entkommen liegt, und es war das blinde Tasten 
darin, das nach allem greift, was wie Geborgenheit 
aussieht. . . . ich trostete mich oberflachlich
damit, daft auch Natascha nicht sehr viel anders sei, 
daft auch sie wie eine Pflanze war, die sich an 
das nachste anklammerte, ohne viel zu fragen und 
ohne allzu grofte Ehrlichkeit. (SiP, p. 130)
To a Remarque hero, love means "Nichtalleinsein 
gegen Alleinsein," (SiP, p. 236) as Isabelle tells 
Bodmer:
Es war schdn mit dir, auch wenn du mich nicht verstanden 
hast. Du warst doch wenigstens da. Sonst ware ich ganz 
allein gewesen. (D s O , p. 268)
Bodmer, expressing the same sentiment, says: "Vielleicht
gibt es wirklich nichts anderes . . . als das biftchen
• 8
Michael O'Malley, review of Schatten im Paradies, by 
Erich Maria Remarque, Critic, XXX (May, 1972), p. 81.
9Ibid., p. 81
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Beieinanderseln." (D s O , p. 77) Love means traveling 
the road of life together if only for a stretch; it 
is an agreement to support each other against the haunting 
memories of the past: "DaQ wir zusammen sind, urn uns
gegenseitig zu helfen, von alten Geschichten loszukommen!
. . . urn die Wunden zu heilen, die andere uns geschlagen
haben!" (S i P , p. 201) Love serves as a buoy that keeps 
afloat appreciative feelings for the present life: it
provides resilience and vivacity, and adds a feeling of 
human warmth. Bodmer senses it while walking with 
Isabelle:
ich hore ihre Schritte durch den Regen und spiire 
ihre Bewegungen und ihre Warme, und es scheint die 
einzige Warme zu sein, die in der Welt ubriggeblieben 
ist. (D s O , p. 157)
Yet, at this stage, love has restrictions. All love 
relationships in Remarque's novels— to which, in every 
case, only that between Bodmer and Isabelle is an exception 
due to Isabelle's unusual "illness"--stand under the augury 
of a so-called contract. Natascha makes specific reference 
to it in a discussion with Ross: "Du mit Deinem beriihmten
Pakt" (SiP, p. 201) The concept incorporates all that 
which identifies a love relationship of a Remarque hero in 
its beginning stages and as it is deemed desirable ini­
tially. According to the unwritten pact, each partner's 
independence shall remain intact; his actions and behavior 
need not be explained; responsibility to each other is
obviated; sentimentality and serious emotional involve­
ment shall not be acknowledged in order that an eventual 
break-up of the relationship does not produce any hurt. 
Each partner shall remain an entity unto himself.
Put into so many words, the contract— remembering 
that it is an unwritten contract— has a sound of in­
sensitivity, even callousness about it. Its intention 
is, however, quite otherwise. The purpose is to minimize 
the psychological effects which a deep and meaningful 
relationship might have on the partners involved (the 
tenets of the contract are equally applicable to the 
female counterparts of the Remarque hero) if it were 
allowed to take its course indiscriminately. What would 
prevent it from inflicting emotional pain and injury in 
the partners when, not'if, the relationship ends? The 
question must be "when," not "if," because the air of 
transitoriness hangs as heavily over love affairs as it 
does over life itself. As members of the "lost generation 
these characters have had to endure their share of 
traumatic experiences; they wish to evade them in love. 
Thus the contract becomes a source of protection that 
shields against emotional harm. Even if all relationships 
were to remain fixed by the conditions set forth in the 
contract and would not evolve further, they would, never­
theless, be considered extremely successful and meaningful
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for they fulfill the expectations of the Remarque hero: 
to facilitate survival and to add an air of sweetness to 
life. As Georg explains it to Ross, it is "irdische 
Liebe"; (SiP, p. 92) it yields moments of pleasure and 
joy, and insulates the characters from the world.
Gerda, in Der schwarze Obelisk, is its supreme 
representative. She is pragmatic in her approach to 
love and realistic in her expectations. She takes love 
where, when, and with whom she can find it after the 
motto: "Freue dich einfach deines Lebens, fertig."
(D s O , p. 176) Love is neither poetry, nor sentimentality, 
nor a romantic vision of eternal union, and it is not 
faithfulness.. It is enjoying sleep, food, drink, sex with 
another person— and then having more of.the same. Gerda 
is glad to be alive and takes life as it is; she is honest 
and self-assured, makes no scenes, is without affectation, 
and derives much satisfaction out of her version of love.
She does not philosophize about life, nor about her function 
in the Universe. Life is only that which is happening at 
the moment. It is having fun, and making the best of a 
given situation.
Bodmer regards Gerda with a touch of envy, for Gerda 
has become reconciled with her life and has discovered a 
way of living that provides her with a fair share of satis­
faction without encountering emotional turmoil. Bodmer 
recognizes its simplicity and validity, and there is in him
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an Intimation that he too would like to subscribe to her
way of life. He senses Its appropriateness acutely just
prior to spending some time with her before she moves on
with the entertainment troupe with whom she appears:
Vor mir steht das Gluck einer Woche, klar, fest, 
ein Gluck, das nicht schmerzt— das einfache Gluck 
der Sinne und der gemaftigten Phantasie, das kurze 
Gluck eines Nachtklub-Engagements . . . eine Fata
Morgana, die nicht schmerzt und die keine Wiinsche 
weckt, die unerfiillbar sind. (D s O , p. 117)
What Gerda exemplifies, and Bodmer yearns for, is
characteristic of every Remarque hero. At the beginning,
all desire human companionship and love without too much
emotional attachment. It is the kind of relationship
which Ross enjoys with Natascha at the moment:
Ich liebte sie sehr. Ich liebte ihre Bedenkenlosigkeit. 
Sie war immer ganz da, aber sie fiel einem nie zur Last, 
und sie war fort, ehe man es sich versah. . . . Ich
liebte sie sehr, aber ich spiirte, daft keine Sentimen- 
talitat dabei war. Solange sich daran nichts 
anderte, wuftte ich, daft ich einigermaften sicher war.
Ich konnte abbrechen, ohne verletzt zu werden . . .
Bleib da, du herrliches fremdes Stuck Welt! Verlafl 
mich nicht, bevor ich dich verlasse! (SiP, p. 196)
Although precautions are taken, by way of the 
contract, to maintain an aloofness from intense, personal 
and potentially hazardous involvement, and be content with 
a relationship that is loving, yes, but somewhat super­
ficial, these restraints do not "save” the hero from 
emotional harm in the end. Invariably, the male-female 
relationships take on the form of a full-fledged and 
deeply passionate romance that is characterized by
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extremes: an extreme sense of happiness, and an extreme
sense of despair due to the loss of the partner. In all 
of Remarque's novels, loss Is a necessary by-product of 
love. There is a direct correlation between the degree 
of love invested, and the degree of loss suffered: the
more intense the love, the more intense the loss. But 
while it lasts, love is the ultimate positive experience. 
And no matter at what stage of development the relation­
ship is, love— in combination with life's other positive 
forces— negates that other world where death and des­
truction reign. It makes life worthwhile. Graeber 
senses it acutely and analyzes it in this manner:
Es war das Unerwartete, das Leichtigkeit und Auf- 
schwung brachte, fiihlte er plotzlich, das, was iiber 
das Notwendige hinwegging, das Unnotige, scheinbar 
Nutzlose, und es war so, well es zur anderen Seite 
des Daseins gehorte, zur glanzenderen, zu der des 
Uberflusses, des spielerischen und der Traume. Nach 
den Jahren hart am Tode war der Wein nicht nur Wein, 
das Silber nicht nur Silber, die Musik, die von 
irgendwoher in den Raum sickerte, nicht nur Musik 
und Elisabeth nicht nur Elisabeth— sie alle waren 
Symbole jenes anderen Lebens, des Lebens ohne 
Tbten und Zerstbren, des Lebens urn des Lebens 
willen, das schon fast zu einer Mythe und zu einem 
hoffnungslosen Traum geworden war. (Zzl, pp. 144-145)
Once a man-woman relationship has been established, 
it evolves and enters into a secondary stage. Here the 
hero still seeks to achieve the same goals as he did 
initially, but the relationship is no longer bound to the 
tenets of the imaginary contract. With the restrictions
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lifted, the accompanying support vanishes and the 
relationship is laid bare precisely to that emotional 
injury from which the contract was to protect it. Ross 
finds himself in that transitional state, moving from a 
situation where he is in total control of his actions and 
emotions toward one where control may no longer be his 
prerogative:
Ich spiirte irgendwo eine Gefahr . . . Es war mir, als
hatte ich eine geheimnisvolle Grenze iiberschritten, 
ohne es gemerkt zu haben, und als ware ich in ein 
Gebiet geraten, das von Kraften beherrscht wurde, 
die ich nicht kontrollieren konnte. . . . ich selbst
hatte mich wieder eingeschaltet in ein Netzwerk, in 
dem andere Werte galten als die, die vorher fiir 
mich maftgebend gewesen waren. Vieles, das mir 
noch vor kurzem egal gewesen ware, war es nun nicht 
mehr. Ich war vorher ein Auftenseiter gewesen, 
jetzt war ich es nicht mehr ganz. Was ist mit mir 
geschehen? dachte ich. Ich bin doch nicht verliebt! 
Aber ich wu3te, daft der AuGenseiter sich auch verlieben 
konnte, ohne ein sehr geeignetes Objekt zur Liebe zu 
finden, nur weil er die Liebe selbst so notwendig 
brauchte, daft es nicht so wichtig war, auf wen sie 
fiel. Und ich wuftte auch, daft da die Gefahr lag, 
plb'tzlich gefangen zu werden und alle Ubersicht zu 
verlieren. (SiP, p. 187)
As long as the hero observed certain limitations in his 
love relationship, he was safe although the affair may 
have been lacking in emotional involvement. By ignoring 
the stipulations of the contract, deep emotional involve­
ment is assured— but at a price, following the Remarque 
motto: "man bekommt nichts im Leben geschenkt."
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In every case,^® it is a risk worth taking.
Graeber takes it, as do Schwarz, Ross and Bodmer.
And if we were to include in the discussion the situation 
of those heroes with whom we are not preeminently con­
cerned, Robby in Drei Kameraden, Ravic in Arc de Triomphe, 
Clerfayt in Per Himmel kennt keine Giinstlinge, the evidence 
would point unanimously to a clearcut breach with the 
contract state, or rather, with a development beyond it.
In every case, it is not a conscious decision to renege on 
the contract, but rather, the new emotional commitment is 
a natural outgrowth of the relationship.
In Graeber's case, the relationship with Elizabeth 
was initially based on "Nichtalleinsein gegen Alleinsein." 
One by one, other factors enter into the relationship, 
subconsciously, making it develop ever greater complexity 
until the boundaries become blurred and the individual 
needs on which the relationship originally was based can 
no longer be clearly identified. The relationship has 
now become a synthesis of the various contributing 
elements. As it continues to grow, a point is reached 
where life without one's particular partner seems undesir­
able and meaningless. At this juncture, it can be said
^ W i t h  the exception of Im Westen nichts Neues 
and Per Funke Leben in which love plays little or no 
part in the life of the hero at that particular time 
when we encounter him.
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that a new dimension has been added to love. Whereas
before, It mattered little with whom time was spent as
long as certain expectations were fulfilled, now only a
specific person can satisfy the hero's emotional needs.
Only in relation to that other person does life seem to
hold meaning. The life-saving qualities formerly ascribed
rather abstractly to love and its correlative elements
are now much more closely interconnected with a specific
person. They thus gain in concreteness. Graeber takes
this line of reasoning to its maximum and suggests
marriage to Elisabeth: "Weil ich mir das Leben ohne
dich nicht mehr vorstellen kann." (Zzl, p. 205) When
Elisabeth asks him if he could have had the same feelings
for another person as he now feels for her, Graeber does
not reject that supposition:
Vielleicht hStte es mir auch mit jemand anderem 
passieren konnen . . . Wer weifl so etwas schon?
Nur jetzt, nachdem es mit uns passiert 1st, kann 
ich mir nicht mehr vorstellen, da/3 es mir jemals 
mit jemand anderem auch hatte passieren konnen.
(Z z l , p. 205)
Even though he admits to that possibility, he is too 
much interested in his relationship with Elisabeth to 
concern himself with what could be or could have been.
The concepts applicable to Graeber are valid for 
other heroes as well. Only the specific circumstances 
under which a relationship comes into being, under which 
it flourishes and under which it ends, differ. The
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general concepts pertaining to it are, in all cases, 
the same.
Ross is acutely aware, that his supposedly "no­
strings" attachment to Natascha is taking on an alto­
gether different form, causing him to respond in a poetic 
and passionate manner. Ross cannot, as yet, define the 
feeling that seems to be taking hold of him except to 
note that it is definitely something to rejoice about:
etwas Cwar3 eingetreten, an das ich nicht mehr geglaubt 
hatte: DaS ich etwas erwartete und auf etwas wartete,
und dag es nicht etwas Verniinf tiges, Faflbares war, 
sondern etwas, das man eher als Warme bezeichnen 
konnte, und das mir das begliickende Gefiihl gab, 
noch nicht ganz ein Automat zu sein. Alle alten 
Klischees von Herzschlag, Atemzug und Atemlosig- 
keit fielen mir ein, und sie waren in dieser Minute
richtig und von unerwartetem, doppeltem Leben
iiberglanzt, dem meinen und dem ohne Namen. (S iP, p. 143)
Sometime later, Ross is still not sure as to the nature of
that particular feeling which gives him such contentment
when he is with Natascha:
Alles 1st anders, Natascha. Ich kann es nicht 
erklaren. Etwas, das wichtig 1st und das man so 
nicht erwartet hat, kann man nicht sofort erklSren.
Ich bin glucklich, daG wir .zusammen sind. (S iP, p. 290)
As he finally closes in on his discovery of what binds him
to Natascha, he expresses apprehension and is fearful of
allowing Natascha to recognize his feelings for what they
really are. The implication is that Natascha might be
disappointed if she were to discover that Ross did not live
up to the tenets of the contract but invested more into the
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relationship than had been agreed upon:
Im Augenblick, als Ich sle wledergesehen hatte, war 
alles zuriickgekoromen. Jetzt scheute Ich mich fast, 
sle anzusehen, aus Furcht, mich zu verraten. Dabel 
wuftte Ich nicht einmal, was zu verraten war. Ich 
hatte nur das Gefiihl, daft Ich ftir lmmer unterlegen 
seln wiirde, wenn sle es herausfande. (SIP, p. 290)
In the end, however, Ross admits to his feelings for 
Natascha, and at the same time he Indicates the effort 
he expended in avoiding such a state of total involve­
ment :
Ich habe das entsetzliche Gefiihl, Natascha, daft ich 
dich liebe. Und wir haben uns soviel Miihe gegeben, 
es nicht zu tun! (SiP, p. 302)
And after the relationship has ended— because Ross
returns to Germany to see for himself that justice is
done— the recognition overwhelmed him suddenly that the
relationship with Natascha had been the most important
event of his life:
Je weiter die Zeit zuriickwich, um so bestiirzender 
wurde die Erkenntnis, daft Natascha das wichtigste 
Erlebnis meines Lebens gewesen war, ohne daft ich 
es gewuftt hatte. (S i P , p. 348)
Only after it was all over did he recognize the total
significance of it.
The step by step development of the relationship
between Natascha and Ross is not an isolated phenomenon
in Remarque's novels. It is symptomatic of others, but
because the various intermediary steps are so clearly
outlined here, it serves to illustrate all those relation
ships where the general concept is there, but where
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the details are not as obvious.
That love is the all-powerful positive element in 
life becomes most abundantly clear in Die Nacht von 
Lissabon. In this novel, we encounter "die Geschichte 
einer Liebe." (DNvL, p. 163) The evidence points 
conclusively in the direction of love as a salvation for 
man. Twice Schwarz endangers himself voluntarily in 
order that he may be reunited with his wife. Danger in 
his case is a matter of degree. Schwarz tells the story 
of the crabs who were thrown into a pot of cold water to 
be boiled. When the temperature had risen to 120 degrees, 
they screamed that it was unbearable, and moaned for the 
time when it was only 100; when it went up to 140, they 
moaned for the time when it was only 120, when it was 
160, for the time when it was only 140, and so on. The 
analogy illustrates Schwarz1 situation. He trades the 
not so grave dangers peculiar to his status as an 
emigrant in France for those of a man on the wanted- 
list of the Gestapo secretly reentering Germany, and 
on another occasion exchanges the dangers of being a 
prisoner in a detention camp for those of being an 
escapee from that camp. The motive in both cases of 
trading lesser danger for an imminently greater one is 
Helen. What drives Schwarz back to be united again with 
her is a quiet, stark sense of desperation. His reserves 
were used up in his fight for survival and his instinct
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for self-preservation is no longer strong enough to 
endure the chill of loneliness. The affairs he had 
had in France, born, as they were, of misery, loneliness 
and fear, had accomplished their goal, and had given him 
a certain degree of warmth; as he said, one was always 
thankful "einen anderen Atem neben sich zu horen."
(D N v L , p. 17) But they were not enough. They were 
sufficient if one's concern was survival, but they were 
not sufficient if one wanted more out of life. And 
Schwarz did. He had led an anonymous existence for the 
past five years which now seems utterly empty. There 
had to be more to life. He began to reproach himself 
for having led a commonplace marriage with Helen, 
before he fled the country— involuntarily— and he 
began to suffer from the realization that he had bungled 
the greatest chance he had ever had-in life: to create
something meaningful. He began to think a great deal 
about Helen and had recurring dreams in which she appeared,
either as a person who is ill or as one calling for help.
He was overcome by the "Emigranten-Koller" (D N v L , p. 15) 
in its purest form: that tightening of the stomach and
of the throat because all the things he had been trying to
bury for the past five years in order to survive were 
coming to life again. Schwarz had to go back; he had to 
appease his fears about Helen's actual situation, and he
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had to see if he could make emendations for the past.
Once he is reunited with Helen, life takes on
new meaning and a new dimension:
plotzlich CwarH ein Lebensgefiihl da, das ich friiher 
nicht gekannt hatte. . . . es war so neu und
erregend, als ware es eine groBe, leuchtende, 
tropische Bliite, hingezaubert auf einen durchschni11- 
lichen Strauch, von dem man hochstens ein paar 
bescheidene, durchschnittliche Knospen erwartet hatte. 
(DNvL, p. 45)
His fears have been allayed. Within him arises a sense of
thankfulness for "ein zweites, vom Himmel gefallenes
Leben mit Helen" (DNvL, p. 126) and for the newly
acquired feeling of being alive: "Das Dasein war wieder
so gut, wie es nur in unseren Wiinschen ist." (DNvL, p. 109)
He treasures their new togetherness, "das unfaBbare
Gefuhl, nicht allein zu sein," (DNvL, p. 126) fully aware
that Helen "war alles, was CerJ hatte." (D N v L , p. 97)
He cherishes the new intimacy of almost forgotten things:
ihren Atem, den Geruch des Haares, am meisten aber 
den ihrer Haut, verloren gewesen fur so lange Zeit 
und noch nicht voll wieder da, aber doch schon da.
. . . Der Trost der Haut eines geliebten Menschen.'
(D N v L , p. 59)
and the tranquility and affirmation that derives from 
their unity:
Langsam kam der Schlaf . . . iiber mich, die Tra'ume
blieben aus, die Stille und der Atem Helens fiillten 
mich, und gegen Morgen erwachte ich, nichts war 
mehr zwischen uns, was uns trennte, ich nahm sie und 
sie kam willig, und wir fielen zuriick in den Schlaf 
wie in eine Wolke, in der es schimmerte und nicht 
mehr dunkel war. (DNvL, p. 59)
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His love for her knows no bounds— and most significantly,
Helen reciprocates the feeling. With Helen by his side
Schwarz "wurde . . . zu einem Vogel, der keine Grenzen
kannte" (DNvL, p. 92); he was like a caterpillar,
emerging from the darkness, discovering "dafi Cer3 Fliigel
hat." (DNvL, p. 95) Bodmer verbalizes what Schwarz
intuits, and he reminds us of the transitoriness of love,
of love even as powerful as that which Schwarz experiences:
ich glaube, ich habe endlich gefiihlt, was Liebe 
1st.' Es ist Leben, nichts als Leben, der hochste 
Griff der Welle . . . nach sich selbst— der Griff,
der immer wieder vergeblich ist, der des Sterblichen 
nach dem Unsterblichen--, aber manchmal kommt der 
Himmel der Welle entgegen, und sie begegnen sich fur 
einen Augenblick, und dann ist es nicht mehr Piraterie 
des einen und Versagen des andern, nicht mehr Mangel 
und UberfluB und Verfalschung durch Poeten . . . es
ist noch so neu fur mich, dafi ich es nicht ausdriicken 
kann; ich wuBte nicht, daB auch mein Atem lieben kann 
und meine Nagel lieben konnen und sogar mein Tod 
lieben kann, und zum Teufel damit, wie lange es
dauert und ob ich es halten kann oder nicht. (D s O , p.271)
Bodmer explains what love is: "Es ist Leben, nichts
als Leben." (D s O , p. 271) It is the attempt to attain
the impossible; it is something that cannot succeed nor
satisfy if from it we expect to be transported to a state
of permanent bliss. If we, however, accept love and life
for what they are, if we accept the "moments" of love
and the "moments" of life in their exquisiteness yet
brevity, we have attained all that is possible to attain.
Schwarz has reached that state, and he cherished his
life and his love in his newly created "Insel des 
Glucks."
Although we know that in the world of the Remarque 
hero, Schwarz’ general state of happiness will be of 
brief duration (Helen dies of cancer), the relationship 
with Helen is nevertheless extremely satisfying and 
r e w a r d i n g . ^  Life is beautiful despite its tribulations.
The positive forces that obviate life's negative qualities 
and that make it beautiful are not due to some extra­
ordinary revelation but are simply due to the recognition 
that there are good and pleasant things in life and that 
they not only aid in survival but make life enjoyable, 
even give it an air of satisfaction. The rejuvenating 
powers of nature, the epicurean delights, a genuine human 
concern within a small and intimate circle of friends, and 
love in its various manifestations are what constitute 
life in the microcosm. It may not be much, but in view of 
the hostile forces operating in the macrocosm, it is all the 
Remarque hero can expect. Above all else, he is glad to be 
alive to enjoy life's pleasures to the extent he can.
^^But even this relationship contains moments of 
sadness— an indication that nothing is perfect. As 
becomes clear from the conversation between Graeber 
and Elisabeth, "nur die Kiihe sind ganz gliicklich."
(Zzl, pp. 306-307)
CHAPTER V 
EXISTENCE IN A DUALISTIC WORLD
The world is given and must be taken as is. The 
elements that are active in the macrocosm— death, imper­
manence, anxiety, inherent evil— cannot be explained 
and cannot be understood; there is no certainty, no 
coherence, no permanence. The mystery that is life 
lacks rationale. Just as the world evolved through 
blind chance, so all life is merely the struggle of 
blind chance and blind forces. And man is simply 
there— like an accidental expression of colliding atoms 
moving continuously at random.
Remarque portrays man's outer and inner experiences. 
As we have seen, danger is external to man and comes from 
two fronts. It comes from life itself, that is, from the 
world of man which is composed of those who have the 
potential to commit evil and who frequently do so. We 
have seen m a n ’s outer world: a modern inferno of un­
fathomable depths of hatred, violence and unrelieved 
anguish; a wretched world in which one desolate scene 
follows another, one trauma another; the world of modern 
Europe, the land of the dying, the broken and the dis­
possessed; the world of modern Germany with its infamous 
record of brutality, destruction and the worship of much
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that Is bad In man. But the danger comes also from 
death, the ultimate destroyer of life, destroying even 
what little gratification man may attain for himself, 
tainting his all too brief life with an acute sense of 
temporariness.
To counteract such enmity as confronts him, the 
Remarque hero opts to create his own world, an "Oase 
in der Wiiste," "Insel des Friedens" or "Insel des 
Glucks" as he refers to it, a world built on values 
diametrically opposed to what he observes in the outer 
world: there it is negativeness and the undesirability
of existence, here it is positiveness and desirability.
It is a physical removal from that outer world as well, 
for however brief a period of time, so that epicurean 
desires may be gratified and sensual love experienced, 
so that a deeper love based on true emotional commit­
ment and unselfish concern may be realized and man's 
humanity and belief in the goodness of the human race be 
restored. It is a "personliches Gluck," an "egoistisches 
Gluck," to be sure; but because of how the hero views 
the external world, it is for him the only realizable 
option. It is thus a reaction totally in accord with 
his perception of the world. Hans Habe, a friend of 
Remarque, said that Remarque once told him that his view 
of life is contained in the Parabel written by Johann
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Michael Friedrich Ruckert (1788-1866). The parable
reads as follows:
Es ging ein Mann im Syrerland,
Ftihrt ein Kamel am Halfterband.
Das Tier mit grimmigen Gebarden 
Urpltitzlich anfing scheu zu werden,
Und tat so ganz entsetzlich schnaufen,
Der Fiihrer vor ihm muBt entlaufen.
Er lief und einen Brunnen sah 
Von ungefShr am Wege da.
Das Tier hSrt er lm Riicken schnauben,
Das must ihm die Besinnung rauben.
Er in den Schacht des Brunnens kroch,
Er stiirzte nicht, er schwebte noch. 
Gewachsen war ein Brombeerstrauch 
Aus des geborstnen Brunnens Bauch;
Daran der Mann sich fest tat klammern,
Und seinen Zustand drauf bejammern.
Er blickte indie H6‘h und sah 
Dort das Kamelhaupt furchtbar nah,
Das ihn wollt oben fassen wieder.
Dann blickt er in den Brunnen nleder;
Da sah am Grund er einen Drachen 
Aufgahnen mit entsperrtem Rachen,
Der drunten ihn verschlingen wollte,
Wenn er hinunterfallen sollte.
So schwebend in der beiden Mitte,
Da sah der Arme noch das Dritte.
Wo in die Mauerspalte ging
Des Strauchleins Wurzel, dran er hing,
Da sah er still ein MSusepaar,
Schwarz eine, weiS die andre war.
Er sah die schwarze mit der weiflen 
Abwechselnd an der Wurzel beiBen.
Sie nagten, zausten, gruben, wiihlten,
Die Erd ab von der Wurzel spvilten;
Und wie sie rieselnd niederrann,
Der Drach im Grund aufblickte dann,
Zu sehn, wie bald mit seiner Biirde 
Der Strauch entwurzelt fallen wiirde.
Der Mann in Angst und Furcht und Not, 
Umstellt, umlagert und umdroht,
Im Stand des jammerhaften Schwebens,
Sah sich nach Rettung urn vergebens.
Und da er also urn sich blickte,
Sah er ein Zweiglein, welches nickte
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Vom Brombeerstrauch mit relfen Beeren.’
Da konnt er doch der Lust nicht wehren.
Er sah nicht des Kameles Hut,
Und nicht den Drachen in der Flut,
Und nicht der Mause Tiickespiel,
Als ihm die Beer* ins Auge fiel.
Er lieB das Tier von oben rauschen,
Und unter sich den Drachen lauschen,
Und neben sich die Mause nagen,
Griff nach den Beerlein mit Behagen;
Sie dauchten ihm zu essen gut,
AB Beer' auf Beerlein wohlgemut 
Und durch die SiiBigkeit im Essen 
War alle seine Furcht vergessen.
Du fragst: Her ist der toricht Mann,
Der so die Furcht vergessen kann?
So wiss', o Freund, der Mann bist du;
Vernimm die Deutung auch dazu:
Es ist der Drach im Brunnengrund 
Des Todes aufgesperrter Schlund;
Und das Kamel, das oben droht,
Es ist des Lebens Angst und Not.
Du bists, der zwischen Tod und Leben 
Am griinen Strauch der Helt muBt schweben.
Die beiden, so die Wurzel nagen,
Dich samt den Zweigen, die dich tragen,
Zu liefern in des Todes Macht,
Die MSuse heiBen Tag und Nacht.
Es nagt die schwarze wohl verborgen 
Vom Abend heimlich bis zum Morgen,
Es nagt vom Morgen bis zum Abend 
Die weiBe, wurzeluntergrabend.
Und zwischen dlesem Graus und Wust 
Lockt dich der Beere Sinnenlust,
DaB du Kamel, die Lebensnot,
DaB du im Grund den Drachen Tod,
DaB du die Mause Tag und Nacht 
Vergissest, und auf nichts hast acht,
Als daB du recht viel Beerlein haschest,
Aus Grabes Brunnenritzen naschest.-^
The parable elucidates man's precarious position and that
^■Johann M. F. Ruckert, Gedlchte und Spriiche 
(Wiesbaden: Insel Verlag, C1952D) , pp. 38-41.
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of the Remarque hero In particular: danger from below
and danger from above, man suspended In between, his 
existence undermined further by the passing of time; 
escape Into a world of sensual pleasure Is his only 
means of coping, but It Is only a temporary solution.
The concepts expressed by RUckert and adopted by Remarque, 
applicable to virtually any age and differing only in 
particulars, determine how man, and the Remarque hero in 
particular, looks at his world.
Remarque has been accused of living the life of a 
bon vivant while engaged in writing about man's plight.
The implication is that the two realms shall not be 
combined, and that Remarque— having done so— must 
necessarily be an insincere writer, that he exploited 
man's condition for personal materialistic gain and 
that he is thus marked as a traitor to his profession.
Not true, of course. Remarque is no less the "Mann im 
Syrerland" than is the hero of his mental creation. As 
he said: "Ich habe mein Leben nach ihm modelliert.
Verganglichkeit— dann sollte man wenigstens nach ihr 
leben." Remarque, simply stated, "lived" his life 
philosophy and did so while enveloped in the crisis of
Hans Habe, "Umstellt, umlagert und umdroht," 
in Erich Maria Remarque zum 70. Geburtstag am 22. Juni 
1968, CVerlags prospektJ (Cologne: Kurt Desch, 1968), p. 5.
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his particular age.
Remarque was a most sagacious observer of his time 
of crisis; he shared in the bewilderment and psychological 
pain of the individual human character trapped in a 
nightmarish existence. Knowledge thereof overshadowed 
the rest of his days; from his first novel to his last 
this concern has not abated. He created parables of 
existence set in the panorama of his time and sympathized 
with his hero who is pitted against the nihilism of a 
terrifying, desolate and chilling world. The specific 
themes are contemporary, to be sure, while on the other 
hand, they have always been there: love, lack of it,
man's inhumanity, death and its successful temporary 
avoidance which we describe as life. His thematic range 
did not expand or change significantly over a writing 
career that spanned much of his life, an indication that 
he did not see any change to alter his opinion one way 
or another. He is a moralist at heart. In book after 
book, he waged war against all he has witnessed, and through­
out his career he excoriated war's inhumanity and man's 
inhumanity to man. Even years of comfortable living did not 
wash from his consciousness the horrors of the century. 
Remarque was himself a member of the "lost generation."
I do not wish to further belabor the point that 
Remarque is a chronicler of our age. Sufficient evidence
to substantiate that claim has been given in other 
chapters. What needs further elaboration, however, is 
the expression of existentialist thought in Remarque's 
fiction. Remarque does not consciously espouse or 
follow a doctrine, any doctrine, in an effort to explain 
his position or to suggest solutions such as might be 
inherent in a particular doctrine. Certainly not every 
aspect of existential philosophy is evident in his novels, 
and it would be something of an exaggeration to call 
Remarque an existentialist. But the similarities are 
there and need to be pointed out— if only to help clarify 
Remarque's position.
Existentialism and Remarque's ideas are products
*•
of our age and speak for our age. As the following dis­
cussion of Remarque's use of existentialist notions will 
show— a discussion based upon the characterization of
3
that philosophical movement as presented by Wesley Barnes
the existential dilemma is at the same time the dilemma
of the Remarque hero. Exis.tentialism, as its name already
implies, places its emphasis on existence, on living,
according to the motto "I am (I live, I exist) therefore
4
I perceive, I think, and I act." In like manner,
3
Wesley Barnes, The Philosophy and Literature of 
Existentialism (Woodbury: Barron's Educational Series, 
1968), pp. 48-99.
^Ibid., p . 48.
155
Remarque begins with "I live," and everything else-- 
how I live, where, with whom, for how long— is of 
secondary importance. In the true spirit of existen­
tialism, Birkholz retorts to an admonition by his father 
that he consider getting a job and getting ahead in the 
world in these words: "Ich will es ja zu nichts bringen,
Vater, ich will nur leben," (DWz, p. 144) while Ross 
responds to the rhetorical question of whether or not 
he wants to become an American citizen with the statement 
"Ich will gar nichts werden, ich mSchte endlich einmal 
etwas sein." (SiP, p. 21)
The existentialist creates his own world of 
experience. He chooses from the self and not through 
external dictates. His choice makes him free from all 
other men, but it enslaves him to his own doubts, un­
certainties and to the consequences of his choice.
This is the predicament of the Remarque hero. He stands 
outside society, drawn toward it because life within it 
seems to be, from his perspective, a life without 
emotional turmoil and without mental anguish, yet 
rejecting it because he recognizes the narrow focus of 
that life; as a result, he is forced to live with 
these afflictions: In creating his own world, the
existentialist has no other recourse but to rely on his 
own resources. Schwarz has a clear understanding of 
that: after he flees the camp where he is held prisoner,
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to find, and hopefully free Helen from her camp—  
subjecting himself to a definite life-death situation—  
he Indicates his awareness that the burden Is on him 
alone, stating: "Und wieder kam es nur auf mich an." 
(D NvL, p. 127) Neither God nor justice can aid him.
And he does succeed in freeing Helen without outside 
help or support. Ross is aware as well of the fact that 
he must take the initiative if he does not wish to 
succumb to the feeling of indifference and helplessness 
which he observes all around him as an emigrant in the 
United States. He decides to return to Germany to see 
to it that justice will prevail and that the evil 
committed in World War II is avenged: "Ich wollte nicht
selbst in diese ohnmachtige Schattenrebelllon und 
Resignation hineingeraten . . . ich wollte nicht eines
Tages nach den Jahren des Wartens aufstehen und fest- 
stellen, daft ich vom Warten und nutzlosen Schattenboxen 
miirbe und morsch geworden war, ich wollte selbst meine 
Vergeltung und meine Rache suchen . . . mit meinen
elgenen Handen . . . "  (S iP, p. 191)
The existentialist and the Remarque hero must 
endure in an environment where violence, war, ideological 
conflict and immediate death are their everyday companion. 
Both know firsthand of man's suffering, of man living in 
crisis, of man's threatened self, of his struggle against
3.57
any form of dehumanization; both are driven by the 
urge to exist; both oppose authoritarianism. They 
maintain an inherent and persistent feeling of individual­
ity but one for which they must pay a price if they 
choose not to take refuge in a group form of social life; 
they believe that the world is solely a matter of human 
concern; they are filled with foreboding concerning the 
predicament of man; they care only for specific flesh and 
blood, not for abstracts; they must stand or fall on their 
own means of support or nonsupport and shake off any idea 
that man can be rational; they are concerned with two 
crises: encounter with the physical environment, and
encounter with a world of communal "existence";^ they 
discover that by merely living, man encounters life; they 
are cognizant of the fact that the individual source of 
security against the external world can come from no 
other person or source except from the individual himself; 
they recognize that they must face a life of dread and 
anxiety, replete with lack of fulfillment, emptiness and 
frustration, but fully aware of their freedom to escape 
their agony through suicide; they live with the conscious­
ness that only uncertainty is certain and that death is a 
fact.
Wesley Barnes states that in educational circles 
"the existential movement is known as the Life Adjustment
5Ibid., p. 65.
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Principle."** This means that the immediate concerns of 
everyday living are more important than references to 
traditional values; in specific terms, "this life principle 
consists of keeping well, understanding self, and adjust­
ing to the natural environment."^ We have already seen 
evidence to the effect that the Remarque hero has found 
his personal adjustment principle: wherever possible,
he creates and withdraws into his own little world where 
life is consciously reduced to its most elemental forms, 
and where, on a higher level', his sense of self is 
reaffirmed and his belief in the goodness of man and the 
world is restored. His adjustment principle allows him 
to "live" life, not merely exist, and to live it most 
intensely, and to rejuvenate the state of his individual 
soul in order that he may be able to persist regardless 
of his country's social, sociological, political and 
economic structure. He has found his modus operandi 
in the motto: "Freu dich deines Lebens, solange du
nicht gefressen wirst"— although it is not an 
unqualified acceptance of that motto, as we have seen.
He refutes the world of accepted values having recog­
nized that the old concepts and old virtues embedded 
in Christianity and other ethical systems of the Western
^Ibid., p . 48
7 Ibid.
world have not saved mankind from World War I and World 
War II but have in fact proved to be useless, and he 
replaces them with his own adjustment values; he gives a 
degree of meaning to life despite the meaningless that 
surrounds him; and despite everything, he persists in 
being human. His microcosmic world is his adjustment 
principle. It is a defense mechanism to the age-old 
problem of "man against the world" and is his answer to the 
question "how shall I survive in the midst of chaos?"
It becomes, at the same time, his code for living. He 
proves to us that the preciousness of existence can be 
distilled out of its very precariousness. Whereas in the 
macrocosm, he is being acted upon, here in the microcosm, 
he acts. However dark his outer world is, in his inner 
world he finds reprieve from the "terrors of existence" 
and from the state of "Geworfensein," as Karl Jaspers 
phrased it. In the microcosm lies his reason for being.
The explanation of such ardent concern for the 
individual can be found in Remarque's work, viewed as a 
totality. Knowledge of the events of our century, 
knowledge of the finality of man, and, most important, 
knowledge of the sense of temporariness which enshrouds 
all actions and relationships makes an extension of private 
concerns toward more general ones seem gratuitous.
They are realities to be reckoned with, realities over
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which the Individual has little, if any, control. In 
the case of the horrifying events of our time, one 
individual’s effort to mitigate them, even if he were 
to exert a herculean effort, is minimal at best. In 
the case of death and temporariness, any effort is 
totally useless. Remarque is enough of a realist to 
recognize the limit of one man's scope of influence: 
his own life, and that life only to the extent that it 
is not adversely affected by external forces. The 
individual, threatened as he is from all sides, can gain 
a degree of satisfaction only from his own self.
He does so through immersion in the realm of the 
senses, but not exclusively so. He takes seriously a 
sense of personal responsibility for advancing the con­
cerns of humaneness and tolerance and for overcoming 
evil. His success in this endeavor enhances his own 
humanity. We see clear evidence of a developing social 
conscience in 509. 509 becomes the leader, even the soul
of the "veterans" by displaying- growing courage and by 
adamantly refusing to bow to the demands of the Nazis—  
at any cost. He determines that he must outlive Weber, 
the representative of evil, as though the validity of 
everything he had always believed in and fought and 
suffered for depended on that ember of life within him 
smoldering longer than the ember of life within his enemy.
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And by outlasting his enemy, 509 becomes victorious over 
evil Incarnate.
Graeber takes an equally decisive stand against
evil. He has been contemplating for some time the extent
to which he, as a single person, is responsible for the
war in which he is fighting and for the specific
occurrences during war in which innocent people lose their
life. In the last decision of his life, he openly
opposes Steinbrenner, another representative of evil, who
wants to kill Russian prisoners of war for what appears to
Graeber to be unjustified cause. He prevents Steinbrenner
from doing so by killing him first. As a result of this
first conscious and deliberate action for the cause of
humanity, he is overwhelmed by a sense of release:
Ein Stein schien weggerollt zu seln. Etwas war fiir 
immer entschieden. Er fiihlte keine Schwere mehr.
Er fUhlte sich ohne Gewicht. (Z z l , p. 347)
But in an ironic twist characteristic of Remarque, the
Russian prisoners of war turn out to be partisans as
Steinbrenner had thought, and shoot Graeber.
Schwarz and Ross likewise decide to put their life 
in the service of humanity. Schwarz, distraught about the 
death of his wife, has good cause for committing suicide 
in order that he be spared a life of loneliness. Yet he 
does not succumb to that feeling of "Schwache" but instead 
determines to fight actively against barbarism:
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Ich werde mir nicht das Leben nehmen . . . Nicht, 
seit ich den Lachler gesehen habe und weiB, daB er 
noch lebt . . .  so lange es noch Leute wie den 
LSchler gibt, ware es ein Verbrechen, ein Leben 
mit Selbstmord zu verschwenden, das man gegen 
Barbaren seinesgleichen einsetzen kann. (D NvL, p. 195)
And Ross foregoes a safe and pleasurable life in America
in order to return to Germany and fight against that which
had, at one time, brought so much misery to his life:
Ich hatte einen EntschluC gefaBt, und es wurde mir 
tSglich klarer, daB es keinen anderen fUr mich gab . . . 
Ich muBte zurvick . . . Ich wachte auf . . .  in einer 
furchtbaren Ungeduld und dem finsteren BewuBtsein, 
noch am Leben zu sein und mein Leben benutzen zu 
konnen . . . Es war das Gefuhl, das nur dem Menschen 
eigen war: DaB ein Verbrechen nicht ungesvihnt
bleiben sollte, well sonst alle moralischen Fundamente 
zusammenbrechen und Chaos herrschen wurde. (SiP, p. 340)
In all cases, the heroes do not seek personal revenge
"obwohl es ihr glich und aus denselben Wurzeln kam";
(S i P , p. 340) rather, it is an effort to combat evil
itself. Hans-Joachim Bernhard's evaluation of Remarque's
post-World War II novels is of particular use, despite
its Marxist bias, in defining the degree of active
involvement on the part of the hero. Bernhard concludes:
daB alle Hauptgestalten der Romane Remarques fur 
sich die Verantwortung moralisch zu handeln erkennen 
und anerkennen. Ihre Anstrengungen konzentrieren 
sich darauf, auch unter schwierigsten Bedingungen, 
alien Anfechtungen zum Trotz ihre morallsche Integritat 
zu wahren. Damit ist GrSBe und Grenze ihrer Aktivitat 
umrissen. Die GroBe ihres Handelns liegt darin, dag 
sie nicht unbeteiligte Beobachter bleiben, 
wo sie mit dem Unrecht in Beriihrung kommen, nicht jene 
Stufe menschlichen Verfalls erreichen, auf der die 
moralischen Normen friihbiirgerlichen Denkens sich 
gSnzlich auflosen oder in ihr Gegenteil verkehrt 
werden. Sle nehmen Stellung, sie greifen ein. Die
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Grenze ihrer Aktivit&t liegt darln, daii der 
Berelch der morallschen Verantwortung nicht (iber 
das Individuelle hinausfUhrt.®
The dominant strain In Remarque's hero Is 
pessimistic. But he Is not a pessimist at heart; he 
never forgets "to smell the flowers." Life is sufficiently 
dear to keep that spark of life burning and to desire that 
its glow never be extinguished. Not one Remarque hero 
commits suicide although all are aware of that special 
"gift" which could terminate their hell on earth. As 
Schwarz explains, the mere knowledge of having the 
power to end one's life voluntarily if the pain of living 
should become intolerable* makes it, in some remote way, 
no longer wholly necessary to do so.
It is the outer world, the macrocosm, which has
not been kind to him. It has trapped him; it has made
him its victim; it has made him subject to extinction. The
hero has been thrust into a world inhabited by "HySnen, 
Schakalen und sehr wenigen L6*wen." (SIP, p. 50) Aware­
ness of its desolate condition makes him exclaim: "Am
besten ware es, ohne Kopf geboren zu werden." (DK, p. 143)
Occasionally, if he is fortunate, positive qualities 
relieve an otherwise depressing existence and remind him 
that "Mut, das groOe Hitleid, die Menschlichkeit, die 
Liebe und der tragische Regenbogen der Schonheit" (D s O , p. 226)
g
Bernhard, ag_. c i t ., p. 44.
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are as much part of life as Is the negative side of 
life, but In lesser measure. Robby states that "die 
Einzelhelten slnd wunderbar, aber das Ganze hat kelnen 
Sinn. Als wenn es von elnem gemacht 1st, detn auf die 
wunderbare Vielfalt des Lebens nlchts anderes einge- 
fallen 1 st, als es wleder zu vernichten." (DK, p. 341)
He revels In the little pleasures life offers but cannot 
fathom a grand overall design; It all seems so pointless, 
so totally lacking in meaning and purpose, so des­
tructive, so incomprehensible. Ross, in exploring this 
line of investigation, concludes that if meaning could 
be derived out of the world of experience, it would already 
have been done. Books and more books have been written in 
the attempt to answer all those questions which haunt the 
hero, and if what he wishes to know were knowable and 
recognizable, one book, one answer, would have sufficed 
to illuminate and pacify his questing mind:
Es scheint mit der Wahrheit und dem Sinn des Lebens 
so zu sein wie mit den Haarwassern— jede Firma preist 
ihres als das alleinseligmachende an-, aber Georg 
Kroll, der sie alle problert hat, hat trotzdem einen 
kahlen Kopf behalten, und er hatte es von Anfang an 
wissen sollen. Wenn es ein Haarwasser gabe, das 
wirklich Haar wachsen liefte, gabe es nur das eine, 
und die anderen wSren ISngst pleite. (D s O , p. 95)
He will never obtain a satisfactory explanation, because
there is none. What he may attain at best . is a working
defense that yields moments of pleasure and a functional
accommodation to death, loneliness and historical realities.
Love yields the greatest consolation and delight; yet 
it also invites disaster. For a brief period, it isolates 
the hero from society and Insulates him from the world, 
but he never doubts that the relationship will be pre­
maturely ended; and in all cases it is, either through 
death or other circumstantial loss. There are no happy 
endings. There is only a practical guide to living as 
exemplified by Gerda in Der schwarze Obelisk and more 
crassly so by Carmen in Schatten im Paradies. Gerda 
spells out her principles to Bodmer: to accept life as
is, to take pleasure in the present moment for that is 
all one can be assured of possessing, to avoid pondering 
the meaning of life, to forego explanations and to 
request none, and, above all, not to ignore "den siiften, 
anonymen Ruf des Lebens." (D s O , p. 229) Bodmer envies 
Gerda her ability to not only accept these tenets but to 
make them her guidelines for living. It simplifies life, 
as Bodmer acknowledges:
sie kennt ihr Dasein und hat sich damit abgefunden.
Sie hat all das, was ich nicht habe, und ich wollte, 
ich liebte sie, und das Leben ware klar und iiber- 
sehbar, und manwiiite iramer alles dariiber, was man 
braucht, nicht allzuviel, aber das unanfechtbar.
(D s O , p. 301)
But Bodmer cannot jump over his shadow; it follows him 
and fills him with Weltschmerz for his spiritual and 
emotional wounds have never fully healed. Despite his
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longing for that easy life and despite his success of 
snatching from life some moments of joy, some moments 
"wo man dem Dasein sehr dicht in die griingoldenen Augen 
starrt," (D s O , p. 172) he never completely masters the 
art of living. He remains in his state of Weltschmerz 
and remains a member of the "lost generation."
"Erinnerungen" become his downfall. The theme 
"Erinnerungen sind ein verdammt schweres Gepack"' (SiP, 
p. 345) is a leitmotif that runs through all of Remarque's 
novels. Because the hero is always mindful of them, he 
cannot become part of the unmindful masses but must 
remain relegated to the "lost generation," condemned to 
live outside the mainstream of life, alienated and 
isolated. He carries the memories of the past on his 
shoulders.lest all the suffering of the past might have 
been in vain. Occasionally, he may attempt to free 
himself of this burden, but in the end his sense of 
responsibility and accountability to the war-dead is 
stronger than the desire to forget; he owes it to them 
"nicht zu vergessen und auch nicht an der Erinnerung 
zu Grunde zu gehen." (D F L , p. 253) Each man must do 
his share to help rebuild and make restitution, as Birkholz 
the hero of Der Weg zuriick, recognizes. Birkholz is 
also aware that he will not be able to accomplish 
impressive feats, knowing his limitations, but that he
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must, nevertheless, take positive action In order that the 
death of those who lost their life In this upside-down 
world will be avenged and that the memories of the past 
can be laid to rest: "Dann werden die Toten schwelgen,
und die Vergangenhelt wird mlch nicht mehr verfolgen, 
sondern mir helfen." (DWz, p. 189)
Remarque sees hope for mankind only In the 
individual, but the individual's vulnerability is all too 
apparent. In times of crises he can be relied upon to 
build, to help, to care, to risk his life for others.
But when he becomes absorbed into the immobile mass, 
his sense of responsibility dissipates and his desirable
and admirable qualities vanish:
«•
Die Geschichte der WalroGherde. Hunderte am Strand; 
zwischen ihnen der Jager, der eines nach dem andern 
mit der Keule erschlug. Zusammen konnten sie ihn 
leicht erdriicken— aber sie lagen da, sahen ihn kommen, 
morden und rtihrten sich nicht; er erschlug ja nur 
gerade den Nachbarn— einen Nachbarn nach dem andern.
Die Geschichte der europaischen Walrosse. (A d T , p. 88)
Ross was forced to draw the depressing conclusion upon
his return to Germany after the war, that almost as a
matter of general consensus its people abdicated
responsibility for the events of the past and erected a
wall of excuses to justify their deeds or to clear their
conscience: "Die schwerste Enttauschung war die Riickkehr,
sie war eine Riickkehr in die Fremde, eine Riickkehr in
Gleichgiiltigkeit, versteckten HaB und Feigheit . . .
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Keiner iibernahm die Verantwortung fur das, was er getan
hatte." (SIP, p. 347)
The pessimist has thus received more food for
thought, for if this populace is left to itself, it will
fall further into apathy and all the sufferings, the
horrors, the tortures and murders will have been in vain
indeed. Through his novels, Remarque sought to obviate
this trend and to raise public consciousness for the
events of the past so as to prevent their recurrence.
It is one of his motives for writing. As he said:
"Wirkung'war fiir mich nie wichtig . . . Ich habe versucht,
das Gefuhl fiir Verantwortung ein wenig zu schSrfen. Am
9
Ende kommt es darauf an, was nicht passlert."
Remarque was a sincere artist who gave a realistic 
portrayal of that stratum of society of which he had been 
part and with which he could identify best. In an inter­
view, he once stated that he wanted to portray "den 
einzelnen Menschen in der Beriihrung und Auseinandersetzung 
mit den groBen historischen Ereignissen und Erschiitterung- 
en des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts . . . And he did so.
He was able to capture the spirit of the many who shared 
his plight. He once stated that he wanted to show "die 
Themen Menschlichkeit, Einsamkeit, Abschled, Mut und
9
Baumer, ojj. cit. , p. 10. 
^ W e g n e r ,  ££. cit . , p. 232.
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das Gliick des kurzen Beieinanderseins. And he did
so. Remarque was a spokesman philosopher for all the 
solitary, the wounded and the lost souls, and he Illus­
trated their concerns and portrayed them, pitted as they 
were, against overwhelming external forces, living In 
the twilight of spiritual and physical catastrophe.
Remarque gave us stories of human fortitude and of life 
affirmation, stories of love and death. He adhered to 
truth and reality and described life as it was without 
its illusions. He showed us people whose acts of kind­
ness and sacrifice in the middle of the immense waste 
of bestiality and perversion give us a ray of hope for 
the future. Pohlmann, in Zeit zu leben und Zeit zu 
sterben, has suffered as much as most Remarque heroes, 
but despite his suffering, gives indication of that hope: 
"Eine Sonnenfinsternis 1st moglich, aber nicht ein 
dauerndes Stuck Nacht. Nicht auf diesem Planeten."
(Zzl, p. 270) Remarque focused on victims whose will to 
survive, whose humanity and decency are inextinguishable, 
and he showed us the indestructability of the human spirit. 
"Ja . . . Der Mensch kann viel aushalten," (A d T , p. 393) 
says Ravic. "Das Schicksal war nie starker als der 
gelassene Mut, den man ihm entgegensetzte. Wenn es
"^"Erlch Maria Remarque" (An unsigned interview. 
Sheet no. 328 of the Remarque-Sammlune. compiled by Hans- 
Gerd Rabe, housed at the Niedersachsisches Staatsarchiv 
in Osnabriick) .
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unertraglich werden wvirde, konnte man slch tttten. Es 
war gut, das zu wlssen, aber es war auch gut zu wlssen, da3 
nie etwas verloren war, solange man noch lebte." (A d T , 
p. 369)
Remarque has found a ready audience for his work.
He has become, In the words of Kesten,
elner der In aller Welt meistgelesenen, meistiiber- 
setzten, melst verfilmten und meistgeschStzten 
Autoren des 20. Jahrhunderts CderD gleichsam von 
selber zum Prototyp des anstandigen Deutschen In 
kommunistlschen und kapitalistischen Landern 
CwurdeH zum bestseller In USA wle In SowjetruBland . . .
aus schierer Intuition, well er menschenfreundllch 
und darum selnen Lesern wohlgefSllig war, eln 
schllchter Erzahler, der Leser In fiinf Kontlnenten 
spannt.
His reader senses a close kinship to the Remarque hero,
for he recognizes that here is a man who speaks for
him against the evils both had witnessed, who speaks for 
him in clarifying his own precarious condition, and who
speaks for him in taking a stand for humanism and
tolerance.
12
Hermann Kesten, "Gedenkwort fiir Erich Maria 
Remarque," Deutsche Akademie fiir Sprache und Dichtung, 
Yearbook (1970), p. 102.
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